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I 
 
Abstract 
Zhang HE 
 
THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
Evidence from Business cycle synchronisation, monetary policy 
effectiveness and the Euro fiscal dividend 
 
EMU as the only functioning single currency area has been criticised as a non-
optimal currency area since the Treaty on European Union was signed. Despite 
this, it has been seen as, probably, the most complete economic project that has 
ever been conducted by any group of governments. Through Dynamic Factor 
model and Panel VAR method, we are focusing on the issues of business cycle 
synchronisation, effectiveness of ECB monetary policy and the euro fiscal 
dividend, thus to advances the current studies on EMU through assessing 
whether it can be a sustainable system. For example, whether economic 
fluctuations can be effectively managed by implementing a single ECB monetary 
policy and financial market can be relied upon as a monitoring and enforcing 
device to discipline fiscal behaviour of Eurozone countries.   
Overall, we concluded that EMU could be more sustainable if it was just 
formed by its core members, leaving the periphery outside the single currency 
area. However, since the EU has recently conducted many rescue measures to 
save the Eurozone, we are unlikely to see those troubled countries to quit EMU, 
at least, at the present time. The sustainability of the current EMU can be 
improved if more intra-trade can be promoted to enhance business cycle 
convergence; hence, it will be more likely to have a union-wide appropriate 
monetary policy. This will also reduce the requirement of depending upon using 
fiscal measures to compensate the loss of monetary sovereignty. Moreover, 
fiscal activities can also be better monitored/enforced since the financial market 
has begun to adequately adjust the long-term interest rates on Eurozone 
government bonds according to the development in those countries fiscal stance.  
Keywords: EMU, Business Cycle Synchronisation, Panel VAR, Dynamic Factor 
Model 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
In 1992, fifteen European Economic Community members signed the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), which formally implied the creation of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) had finally started1. Twenty-two years 
later, among academics and policymakers, EMU, which has been seen as, 
probably, the most complete economic project that has ever been conducted by 
any group of governments, already has seventeen participating members across 
continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Spain).  
 
Its theoretical foundation was actually developed a few decades earlier. 
Optimal currency area theory (OCA), which was mainly developed by Mundell 
(1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), is the standard criterion for creating 
a single currency union2. This theory can be summarised into multiple criteria, 
which are mainly threefold3. First, similarity and convergence in the economic 
structure ensure that the currency union is less likely to face asymmetric shocks 
and that union-level policy will be optimal to all members. Second, sufficient 
factor and price flexibility form the absorber of the asymmetric shocks. Finally, 
policy integration would encourage macroeconomic policy coordination among 
members, which can be used to restore the disequilibrium at national levels. 
 
                                                          
1
 All the EU15 member states signed the TEU, but only 12 committed themselves to Stage Three 
of EMU. The UK, Denmark and Sweden effectively opted out of this. 
2
 More detailed discussion of OCA theory is available in Chapter 3.  
3
 See Baimbridge et al. 2005 
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Besides OCA theory, which sets out the selection criteria for forming a single 
currency area, the New consensus macroeconomics (NCM) model is the basis for 
the assumptions of how the economy should work and be operated for the 
Eurozone (Arestis 2011). Rational expectations and the efficiency market 
hypothesis play a key role in NCM (Fontana 2009). For example, an efficient and 
well-informed financial market and the rational expectations of economic agents 
can form a fiscal discipline mechanism, which works along with EMU fiscal rules 
(EMUFR) to ensure disciplined fiscal activities inside the Eurozone.  
 
Moreover, since NCM is heavily based on the ideas of neoclassical thought 
(Goodfriend and King 1997, Fontana 2009), the typical Keynesian economic 
stabilisation is seen as ineffective in altering economic growth given that 
economic agents are assumed to be acting as ‘Ricardian’ consumers who are 
forward-looking and aware of government intertemporal budget constraints, and 
will react to government fiscal policy rationally. This in turn implies consumers 
take future tax liabilities fully into account in today’s consumption/saving 
decisions, hence government bonds will not be treated as net wealth and 
impacts of fiscal expansion may eventually be cancelled out by decline in private 
consumption (Buchanan 1976, Dimand 2002). The consequence of rapid use of 
fiscal policy may only lead to unnecessarily high prices. Therefore, fiscal policy is 
downgraded in NCM as government should only keep the budget balanced 
(Fontana 2009). In contrast to the downgrade of fiscal policy, since the 
fiscal/political independence of the European Central Bank (ECB), which can 
ensure the credibility of EMU’s monetary activities, monetary policy has been 
seen as a key policy instrument to stabilise/smooth the fluctuation of price in 
order for the economy to avoid or, probably, eliminate ‘inflation bias’ inside the 
Eurozone (Buti et al. 2001, Chair and Kehoe 2008).     
 
Following the announcement of EMU project by the EU, many empirical studies, 
which are especially based upon the theoretical criteria of a single currency area, 
have been conducted by academics. Prior to the establishment of EMU, the 
suitability of creating a single currency union among those potential EMU 
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members was a key question among academics. Many studies have been carried 
out to evaluate whether EMU satisfied OCA criteria during the 1990s and early 
2000s. To our knowledge, among them (Mundell 1997, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1997, Caporal and Pittis 1998, Demeztris et al. 2000, Kempa 2002) 
there is no evidence to prove EMU is an optimal currency area in terms of fully 
fulfilling OCA requirements.  
 
Besides the above general studies of EMU, there are some papers attempting 
to evaluate the Eurozone referring to specific criteria of the OCA theory. In 
particular, they mainly focus on the issues, which would affect the operations of 
the Eurozone’s economic activities at an aggregated level. Minford and Rastogi 
(1990) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) suggest that the economic 
structures among union members have remained heterogeneous, which implies 
a higher probability of asymmetric shocks. This means the ECB’s single monetary 
policy for the entire EMU is less likely to be, union wide, optimal to each 
individual member. The central bank of the Eurozone – the ECB – may face the 
‘one size fits all’ problem while they operate the single Eurozone level monetary 
policy.  
 
Furthermore, in terms of asymmetric-shock-absorbing requirements of OCA, 
language and cultural barriers, and different legal systems across the Eurozone, 
leave EMU with insufficient factor mobility and flexibility. Thus, the automatic 
shock absorber inside the union may be relatively weak at offsetting asymmetric 
shocks (de Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke 1991, Heylen and van Poeck 1995, Arpaia 
et al. 2007, Janiak and Wasmer 2008). Finally, there is no centralised system of 
fiscal federalism available at the union level inside the Eurozone. Instead, the 
fiscal policy is operated on a decentralised basis at the national level. Therefore, 
the channel of fiscal transfer between union members does not exist inside EMU, 
which may potentially affect the sustainability of the union given that EMU has 
little power to conduct Eurozone fiscal policy to mitigate shocks (Wickens 2007, 
von Hagen and Wyplosz 2008). 
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Therefore, as has been raised by previous empirical works, we can see that the 
Eurozone was created under considerable doubts and some inherent weakness; 
in particular, the ECB’s monetary policy, which has been seen as the key policy 
instrument, may not be appropriate to each individual member of EMU. 
However, there is an influential economic theory that has been used to justify 
the movements of the Eurozone project: that is, the modern theory of OCA – the 
endogeneity of OCA hypothesis. This theory provides a pro-EMU argument that 
the improvement of intra-Eurozone trade, which can be delivered by the 
membership of EMU, will lead to a convergence among EMU national business 
cycles, which will eventually allow the ECB to implement an appropriate  
monetary policy union-wide (Frankel and Rose 1998).  
 
In contrast to the endogeneity view of OCA theory, the counter-endogeneity 
view, which is represented by the specialisation hypothesis (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1992 & 1996, Krugman 1993), argues that trade integration will 
enhance the specialisation of each country’s production since countries will tend 
to export more of those goods in relation to which they have comparative 
advantages. This, in turn, will reduce the income correlation and means that, 
even if the country did not fully satisfy OCA criteria before they joined the union, 
trade integration may not help them move towards satisfaction ex post. 
Furthermore, another counterargument to the endogeneity view of OCA theory 
points out that the monetary integration of EMU may not be able to enforce the 
correlation of business cycles (Baxter and Stockman 1989, Bordo and Helbling 
2003, Bergman 2004). Their argument is focused on the costs of loss of exchange 
rate policy, which means that if, during asymmetric shocks, the exchange rate is 
no longer available as a shock-absorbing mechanism, the shock can force all the 
adjustments to take place in the real economy rather than via the exchange rate.  
 
Since the establishment of EMU in 1999, the debate about whether the 
Eurozone is an optimal currency area has eased, and the focus of research on 
EMU has moved onto the question of whether the ECB can deliver a successful 
single monetary policy which meets the demands of each individual nation 
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within the Eurozone. The general conclusion is that the level of homogeneity of 
the monetary transmission mechanism (MTM) is insufficient for each member to 
have an identical reaction to ECB monetary policy, which implies the possible 
existence of a ‘one size fits all’ issue in EMU (Mojon 2001, Clausen and Hayo 
2006). Moreover, attention has also been paid to business cycle synchronisation. 
If business cycles for currency union members remain or move towards 
divergence, the union-wide monetary policy is unlikely to be optimal for the 
large majority of EMU members, even when the MTM is homogenous (Artis et al. 
2004, Grauwe 2009, Soares et al. 2009, Savva et al. 2010). Compared with two 
former research areas, during the period before the 2007–8 credit crunch and 
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, there was less focus on the relationship 
between national fiscal behaviour/stance and the level of long-term interest 
rates on government bonds. Fiscal discipline, it seemed to be optimistically 
assumed, can be enforced by EMU fiscal rules and an efficient market 
mechanism is probably the reason behind the lack of attention to fiscal stance–
bond rates relations in EMU.     
 
Figure 1-1 Eurozone real GDP 1999 to 2007 (2005=100) 
 
  Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 1-2 Eurozone annual inflation 1999 to 2007 (2005=100) 
 
  Source: Eurostat 
During most of the first decade (i.e. before 2007) after the formal 
establishment of EMU, the benefits of being a member of the Eurozone seemed 
to overwhelm any criticism. For instance, by looking at the union level data for 
EMU during the period prior to the outbreak of 2007-8 credit crunch, economic 
growth remained positive and inflation was stable and low (see Figure 1-1 and 
Figure 1-2). At the national level, the immediate benefit of being a part of this 
‘currency club’ was low interest rates (see Figure 1-3), and thus cheap money to 
compensate the loss of monetary sovereignty. However, the inherent issues of 
EMU (e.g. business cycle convergence, effectiveness of the ECB’s single union-
wide monetary policy, high level of public debt etc.) remained (Minford and 
Rastogi 1990, Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992, Arpaia et al. 2007, Janiak and 
Wasmer 2008). The outbreak of the 2007–8 global financial crisis, followed by 
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, has again raised the question of EMU 
sustainability. 
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Figure 1-3 Eurozone long-term interest rates 1999 to 2013 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Fiscal discipline, which is supposed to be enforced by EMU fiscal rules and 
market mechanisms, was poor among some of EMU members; moreover, 
following the 2007-8 financial crisis and major economic hardships afterwards, 
EMU slipped into its own sovereignty debt crisis and is suffering from a deep 
economic recession at the moment. Some countries have experienced significant 
increase in their government bonds rates since 2008. For example, interest rates 
on Greek, Irish and Portuguese government bonds raised from around just 5 
percent, which were at a similar level as the other EMU member countries, to 
their peak level at 19.79 percent, 9.4 percent, and 10.09 percent respectively 
(see Figure 1-3),  while the speed of economic recovery is slow. What is the cause 
of this? Why is EMU, which is supposed to be a sustainable economic system, 
currently experiencing the worst economic crisis compared to other major 
Western economies that have also been affected by the financial crisis (e.g. the 
USA and the UK)? By answering the question of whether EMU really is a 
sustainable economic system with the necessary conditions for having an 
effective and union-wide appropriate monetary policy, as pro-EMU economic 
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theories initially suggested (e.g. endogeneity of OCA hypothesis and NCM), it can 
help us to investigate the root of the current economic crisis inside the Eurozone.  
 
The first question we can ask, which helps us to see if EMU is a sustainable 
system, is whether the ECB has the essential condition for operating a union-
wide appropriate monetary policy. This essential condition is to have a highly 
synchronised business cycle among members inside the Eurozone (Guiso et al. 
1999). If all members’ economies are moving in a highly similar way (i.e. 
economic growth is always moving in the same direction and at the same speed), 
then it indicates that all members will need similar levels of interest rates to 
facilitate their economic growth. Moreover, it also enables us to judge whether 
the endogeneity of OCA hypothesis really is a creditable justification for creating 
a monetary union with poor adherence to the Maastricht Convergence Criteria 
(MCC) among its members.  
 
The second question will focus on the effectiveness of ECB monetary policy. We 
are not just concentrating on whether this supranational independent central 
bank does have effective influence on controlling inflation within the Eurozone. 
We will also evaluate if ECB monetary policy has different impacts on different 
countries, especially in terms of affecting real economic activities (e.g. real GDP 
growth). If ECB monetary policy does affect real economic activities differently 
among members of the Eurozone, then some countries have had to rely on 
national-level fiscal policy to compensate for the loss of monetary sovereignty in 
order to maintain/achieve their own economic targets. In such a situation, the 
overuse of fiscal policy is inevitable; this also helps us to explain the possible 
motivation for the poor fiscal discipline among some EMU members during the 
pre-crisis period (e.g. Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal). 
 
The final question concerns NCM’s key assumption which has been used to 
assume the efficiency of the market. In particular, we will focus on the behaviour 
of the financial market, especially during the period prior to the 2007–8 financial 
crisis, to see whether the market does operate as has been described/assumed 
_____________________________________________________Chapter 1 Introduction 
9 
 
by NCM theory. The particular issue we are concentrating on in this section of 
the thesis is the dynamic relation between long-term interest rates and the fiscal 
stance of EMU members: did the financial market fail to operate as an efficient 
device to discipline fiscal behaviour of EMU members (i.e. the monetary union 
provides excessive fiscal credibility, which allows members to overuse/misuse 
fiscal policy at national level – the ‘Euro Fiscal Dividend’ phenomenon)?  
 
 By answering these questions, this thesis advances the current studies on EMU 
through assessing whether it can be a sustainable system in the following ways: 1) 
this research will comprehensively look at the current status of EMU by focusing 
on some key issues which can crucially affect the macroeconomic 
performance/sustainability of the Eurozone. They are: business cycle 
synchronisation, effectiveness of ECB monetary policy and the Euro Fiscal 
Dividend; 2) analysis will focus on EMU as a whole rather than being interested in 
a few key economies, as has been the case among some previous studies; 
however, instead of using union-level aggregates, our research is based upon 
national-level data. The three papers format will be adopted here as follows, 
answering three key research questions: 
 Has business cycle synchronisation among EMU members improved since 
the creation of the Eurozone? 
 
 What’s the impact of the ECB’s monetary policy on macroeconomic 
performance? 
 
 Does the ‘Euro Fiscal Dividend’ exist in the Eurozone?  
 
For our analysis, we also augment the previous studies by analysing EMU as a 
whole, using national-level data rather than union-wide aggregates. This allows 
our research to be conducted without omitting information from any individual 
members of the euro area. This can be important given that EMU is a monetary 
union under the EU where each country is still sovereignly independent. To 
achieve this, two econometrics techniques are employed here: the panel vector 
autoregression (PVAR) method and the dynamic factor model (DFM). The main 
feature of these two methods is to allow the analysis of EMU to be done by 
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focusing on the post-EMU period without stumbling into the problem of low 
degrees of freedom, which is a common issue in conventional time series 
analysis on this area of research. The Eurozone is still examined as a whole 
through PVAR and DFM methods, together with being disaggregated into two 
groups: core members (i.e. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium 
and Luxembourg), who are experiencing fewer issues during the crisis relative to 
the periphery members (i.e. Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal), whose 
economies are currently suffering from deep recessions and sovereign debt 
crises. The current poor performance of EMU’s economic activities and 
divergence among core and periphery members may suggest that there are 
inherent weaknesses that do not allow the economic stabilisation policy (e.g. ECB 
monetary policy) to be effective and probably had some role in causing the 
current economic struggles inside the Eurozone.  
 
In this thesis, the research will be segmented into five major parts. Chapter 2 
revises the historical development of macroeconomic theory in terms of EMU’s 
sustainability, which allows us to have overview of how the Eurozone’s economy 
is being operated. Chapters 3 to 5 respectively answer our three key research 
questions. Chapter 3 will use the DFM method to evaluate the degrees of 
business cycle synchronisation among EMU members since the creation of the 
euro. This enables us to evaluate the question of which whether EMU has a 
necessary condition for having a union wide appropriate monetary policy.   
Chapters 4 and 5 will use the PVAR model to discover the effectiveness of ECB 
monetary policy and the existence of the Euro Fiscal Dividend. Finally, this 
research will end in Chapter 6 by providing a general conclusion for key findings 
of the entire thesis, and pointing out possible scopes of future research. 
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Chapter 2  
Historical developments of macroeconomic 
theories and the case of EMU economic system 
 
 The macroeconomic model is a key tool and a foundation, which is used for 
analysing/forecasting aspects of economic performance, such as output, inflation 
and unemployment. Therefore, it is crucial to policymakers in terms of 
designing/implementing an appropriate economic policy that can respond to the 
needs of the economy at the aggregate level. The purpose of this thesis is to 
evaluate the sustainability of EMU from the macroeconomic perspective. Hence, 
a quick overview of relevant macroeconomic models is a necessary initial step, 
which helps us gain a basic understanding of the theoretical foundation that 
determines EMU economic operations.   
 
2.1 Historical developments in macroeconomic models – from 
Keynes back to classical 
 
 
We will begin the review of development of modern macroeconomic models 
with the raise of Keynesians, in particular, the establishment of IS/LM model. 
This core theoretical tool of Keynesian macroeconomics, may be, no longer 
treated as the centre of current macroeconomics. However, it has been partially 
adopted in the current mainstream -- new consensus macroeconomic model. 
Therefore, it would be appropriate to start with the model of IS/LM and 
Keynesian’s view on macroeconomic issues.     
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2.1.1 The rise of Keynesians  
The Great Depression in the 1930s had tremendous impacts on Western 
countries’ economies. In most countries in the USA and Europe, the 
unemployment rate was soaring, and the deflationary policy, which was 
proposed by the orthodox school at that time – neoclassical economics – had 
failed to solve this massive-scale economic crisis. Moreover, the Great 
Depression not only had deep impacts on day-to-day economic performance, but 
also shifted the focus and the way of thinking of modern economics. The focus of 
economics shifted from microeconomics to macroeconomics; the subject needed 
a good explanation of economic issues at the aggregate level, in order to provide 
a solution to the Great Depression.     
 
However, due to the domination of classical economics before the Great 
Depression, there was very little room in the theories for understanding of 
unemployment. This shortcoming of the economic theories at that time provided 
an opportunity for John M. Keynes to step in, which eventually created a new 
sub-branch of economics, macroeconomics, and replaced the orthodox position 
of classical economics. Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (1936) shed light on the key economic problem at that time. The aim of 
this influential book was to elucidate the cause of the mass unemployment 
during the Great Depression and, therefore, to provide some solutions for the 
economic crisis of Western countries.  
 
The explanation Keynes gave for the mass unemployment at that time concerns 
the relation between investment and aggregated demand. Rather than following 
the classical theory of investment, Keynes suggested that investment is not 
mainly driven by the level of interest rates; he said that the role of expectation 
among individual economic agents has a more important position in determining 
the level of investment expenditure at the aggregate level. If expectations of 
future economic stance are poor among most individual economic agents, then, 
despite a country having very low levels of interest rates, which should 
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encourage aggregate demand due to rising investment expenditure (classical 
view), poor expectations can outweigh the possible impacts of low interest rates, 
resulting in insufficient investment that will eventually cause a deficiency in 
aggregate demand. As a result of this, involuntary unemployment can soar in an 
economy if the market is left to solve the problem by itself.      
 
 Keynes’s book had received a great reception among economists who were 
also desperately searching for the answer and solution to the Great Depression. 
In 1936, an econometrics conference took place in Oxford. During this 
conference, John Hicks (1937) proposed a model, which was initially aimed at 
interpreting Keynes’s macroeconomic theories and making the comparison 
between them and classical theories, and which was the first version of the 
IS/LM model that eventually become the workhorse of the Keynesians’ 
macroeconomic model. Hicks’s work transformed Keynes’s ideas into a simple 
simultaneous equations model which can easily be used to show the joint 
outcomes of the real and money sides of the economy resulting from changes in 
economic circumstances and policies. Due to the further contributions made by 
Franco Modigliani (1944) and Alvin Hansen (1953), the IS/LM has become a 
baseline tool for analysing outcomes of economic policies among economists and 
policymakers. It is not a tool only for Keynesians: by changing the slopes of IS and 
LM curves, it can also be used by classical economists to illustrate their views of 
macroeconomics.  
 
The key implication of the IS/LM model is the efficiency of Keynesian demand 
management policy. But the success of this model in analysing and 
demonstrating Keynes’s theory also relies on another essential concept of the 
Keynesian school of thought – the Phillips curve (PC) model. One of the 
shortcomings of the IS/LM model is the omitting of the variable of price, or, more 
precisely, the fixed price assumption (Snowdon and Vane 2005). Therefore, the 
original PC model, which was initially developed by Bill Phillips to study the 
relationship between inflation and unemployment (Phillips 1958), can fill the gap 
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here and hence complete the analysis for Keynesians. Given that the study is 
based on a solid empirical and statistical analysis over a long period of time, 
which was a remarkable achievement at that time, the work of Phillips was highly 
recognised by economists soon after the article was published (Gordon 2009). In 
particular, in the view of Keynesians, for example Paul Samuelson and Robert 
Solow (1960), the PC model has a useful theoretical implication for demand 
management policy. Since the Phillips curve model shows a negative relationship, 
it provides theoretical and empirical evidence about the possibility of 
governments using active/expansionary fiscal policy to ‘buy’ low levels of 
unemployment through ‘paying’ inflation as the price of the policy (Samuelson 
and Solow 1960).  
 
2.1.2 The return of the classical school – monetarists’ attacks on Keynes and 
new classical economics  
 
 The Keynesian demand management policy, which incorporates the IS/LM 
model, did meet the demands of the policymakers in Western countries during 
the first couple of decades since the end of World War II. It provided 
governments with a solution for the high unemployment after the War and also 
a practicable way of boosting economic recovery. However, in the 1960s, before 
the Keynesian system formally collapsed in the 1970s, some economists, who are 
rooted from the classical school, started to question the demand management 
policy, especially in terms of its long-term consequences.  
 
A representative, and one of the most influential, economist among those 
monetarists who started their attacks on Keynesian theory is Milton Friedman. In 
his presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1967, which 
turned into his famous paper The Role of Monetary Policy (Friedman 1968), he 
pointed out a crucial issue of Keynesian demand management policy, and was 
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proved right by the economic crisis in the 1970s4. He questioned whether the 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment, which is the standpoint of 
Keynesian-type economic policy and frameworks, does exist in the long run. In 
particular, he focused on whether the government is really able to maintain low 
unemployment over the long run by altering the level of money supply.    
 
Friedman argued that the inverse relationship only exists in the short run under 
certain circumstances (Friedman 1968). To allow an active economic policy (e.g. 
expansionary monetary policy) to work, some imbalance of information between 
firms and workers is essential. It is assumed that firms correctly anticipate 
inflation, which is caused by rising money supply, but workers are mistaken due 
to an information imbalance. Under such circumstances, the money is no longer 
nature to the real economic activities, given that a rise in money wage will be 
wrongly interpreted as an improvement in real wages by workers. Therefore, 
more workers will accept the market wage and unemployment will decrease 
(aggregate demand will rise). However, one key concept from Friedman’s PC 
model will ensure the inflation–unemployment trade-off will end in the short run. 
The backward-looking behaviour of workers leads them to learn from their 
previous mistakes, and therefore to adjust the expected price level upwards. This 
leads to a drop in employment and a fall in the level of output and national 
income.  
 
Friedman agreed that wages would be negotiated between workers and firms 
for the subsequent periods, but workers and firms are interested in real wage 
not nominal wage; therefore, the wage agreed between both parties takes the 
expected level of future inflation into account. Therefore, the wage is set 
according to Equation (2-1):  
 eUfw  )(  (2-1) 
                                                          
4
   The Friedman’s Phillips Curve still plays as a key part of the 3-equations model of New 
Consensus Macroeconomics, which we will discuss later in Chapter 4.   
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The growth rate of nominal wage w depends on a component determined by the 
level of unemployment and expected inflation for the period ahead. Moreover, 
this expected inflation is based on workers’ knowledge of inflation during the 
previous period. This implies that there will be many different PCs; each one will 
represent a unique level of expected inflation.  
 
Figure 2-1 Friedman’s Phillips curve model  
 
Source: figure drawn by the author  
 
Suppose the economy is initially at full employment level: hence, only voluntary 
unemployment exists at the present time. Therefore, we are at point A where 
unemployment is Un (see Figure 2-1). At this stage, the economy is on the short-
term PC SRPC1 with no changes in the level of money wage w. This means 
workers did not experience any inflation; moreover, since we are at full 
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employment, the unemployment-determined component in Equation (2-1) has 
zero value; therefore, workers do not require any changes in the level of money 
wage for the next period (w=π=πe=0). Assuming the government decides to 
conduct a demand management policy through expansion in money stock, this 
monetary expansion will cause excess demand which eventually leads to a rise in 
the level of price and money wage, with price changing faster than wage rate. 
Because workers are backward-looking, the adaptive expectation of inflation still 
equals zero.  
 
Workers mistakenly interpret higher money wages as an increase in real wages. 
Some of those workers who voluntarily decide to be unemployed while the 
economy is at point A now decide to accept job offers from firms. As a result of 
this, government successfully reduces unemployment below its full employment 
level (moves from point A to B). However, due to the backward-looking 
behaviour of workers, they eventually learn that inflation has risen, and the 
increase in real wage is just a short-term illusion. Moreover, as price is growing 
faster than money wage, real wages have actually fallen. Therefore, workers 
renegotiate wages with firms based on (w1+π
e), short-term PC shifts up to SRPC2, 
and unemployment will rise back up to Un from U1. We are moving from point B 
to E. If government wants to reduce unemployment again through monetary 
expansion, all the above processes will repeat again, leaving the economy with 
higher and higher levels of inflation with no change in the long-term equilibrium 
output/unemployment (assume no technological progress).    
 
The implication of Friedman’s expectation-augmented Phillips curve model is to 
reject the trade-off relationship between inflation and unemployment but still 
accept the existence of it in the short run. Therefore, the long-run PC is a vertical 
line located at the natural rate of unemployment. As long as the economy is at its 
natural rate, any attempts to reduce the unemployment rate to below its natural 
rate will not be successful in the long run; the only consequence of this type of 
Keynesian economic policy will be a high level of price, but since the output is 
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dependent on the level of employment, which will eventually shift back to its 
natural level due to correct adjustments of workers’ expected inflation, the level 
of output will remain unchanged. Another implication of Friedman’s view on the 
PC model concerns the behaviour of the central bank. Monetary policy 
implemented by the central bank has to be based on rules rather than discretion, 
otherwise continued expansionary/discretionary monetary policy may lead to 
hyperinflation in the economy.  
 
Although the attack of monetarists on Keynesian economics, which was led by 
Friedman, can be seen as the first wave of the attack on Keynes’s orthodox 
position from classical economists, the criticism made by Friedman mainly 
related to the policy issue of macroeconomics. He had demonstrated a ‘better’ 
model that can be used to analyse and predict the outcome of current economic 
policy. In fact, his argument about vertical Phillips curves and neutrality of money 
in the long run, which was proved right by the stagflation which took place 
across the Western countries in the 1970s, was later recognised by Robert Locus, 
the main figure of a new and more fundamental attack on the Keynesians’ theory 
of macroeconomics (Lucas 1972).    
 
New classical economists, who were represented by Lucas at that time, had 
established a new theory to explain how the economy functions at the aggregate 
level from a microeconomics point of view, thus oppugning the justification of 
the Keynesian macroeconomic model. In Keynes’s view, the behaviour of 
individual economic agents is hard to predict at the collective level due to their 
‘animal spirits’ and the assumption of the non-ergodic economy (Davidson 1982–
3 & 2008). The motivations for holding money are not just about treating it as 
the medium of exchange; the speculative motive is also crucial to the demand of 
money function. The elasticity of the money demand function will be infinite in 
an extreme textbook case, therefore the monetary policy will be ineffective to 
alter the aggregate demand, but can be a useful tool for facilitating the 
expansionary fiscal policy (Wray 2006). Moreover, Friedman provided another 
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explanation of why monetary policy can be used to alter aggregate economic 
activities. Rather than use monetary policy as an assistant tool to fiscal policy, 
actually it has a direct impact on short-term unemployment and output through 
misperceptions of inflation, which are a direct result of expansionary monetary 
policy, by workers.  
 
Another key element of the Keynesian revolution, the assumption of the non-
ergodic world, challenged a fundamental concept of classical economics, which is 
the efficiency of the market under the influence of the ‘invisible hand’. The non-
ergodic assumption of Keynes’s macroeconomics implies that the volatility of 
economic performance in both aggregate and individual markets is hard to 
predict given that the economy will face great uncertainty about the future 
(Allington et al. 2011). In other words, even if there is some evidence to show the 
market was and currently is efficient, the great uncertainty about the future can 
mean that behaviour of economic agents in this market may not be so efficient in 
the future. In contrast to Keynes, the ergodic axiom lies at the centre of the new 
classical economics, which indicates that if one conceives of the economy as 
stochastic, then the future outcome of any current decision is determined via a 
probability distribution process (Davidson 2008). That means the future 
outcomes of both economic agents’ behaviours and the economy as a whole can 
be foreseen by sufficient economic data and appropriate statistical analysis.  
 
The shortcoming of the ergodic axiom assumption of tradition classical 
economics is the backward-looking nature of the behaviour of economic agents. 
For instance, the Friedman’s expectation-augmented Phillips curve model is 
entirely based on the backward-looking behaviour of workers allowing the short-
run fluctuations of national output and employment level. Workers’ expected 
future price level, which will determine workers’ view of real wages, is assumed 
to be based on the experience of price level in the previous period. This allows an 
unanticipated monetary shock to take its effect on the employment level as 
workers will mistakenly see the rise in normal wage as a rise in real wage. 
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However, this backward-looking behaviour assumption does not answer Keynes’s 
argument of the role of future uncertainty in the decision of economic agents 
who collectively influence the future economic outcome based on today’s 
decisions.  
 
In order to overcome the lack of consideration of future uncertainty, which has 
been seen as the main shortcoming of the traditional classical assumption of the 
ergodic axiom, Lucas’s critique was developed to fill the gap. Lucas argued that 
the macroeconomic models (e.g. Keynesian dynamic IS/LM model, expectation-
augmented Phillips curve model) cannot be relied on to predict the outcome of 
current policy or alternative economic policy given that these models do not 
correctly take into account the dependence of private agent behaviour on 
perceived or anticipated government policy rules for generating current and 
future values for government policy variables (Lucas 1976). In this sense, the 
economic model has to be structural by allowing the forward-looking behaviour 
of agents; hence, the estimation function is invariant to announced or perceived 
changes in government policy rules. In particular, when unknown functional 
forms are replaced by functions that are assumed to be known up to unknown 
parameter values, the estimated parameter values are said to be structural when 
they are invariant to announced or perceived changes in government policy rules.  
 
This theory of Lucas’s critique can be seen as ‘completing’ the classical 
economic assumption of the ergodic axiom, thus providing the theoretical 
justification for the traditional idea of classical economics – ‘the invisible hand’ of 
the market and the reason for the ineffectiveness of Keynesian economic 
intervention policy. Moreover, Lucas’s critique also performs as a part of one 
essential new classical economic theory which provides the explanation of why 
the invisible hand does exist in the market. The rational expectation/behaviour 
hypothesis (REH), initially introduced by Muth (1961) and advanced by the work 
of Lucas (1965, published in 1981; 1966, published in 1981) and Lucas and 
Prescott (1971), had shifted economic assumptions on the behaviour of 
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economic agents from backward-looking to forward-looking and claimed that 
economic agents do behave rationally by learning from the past and using all 
available information to make the best prediction of the future values of a set of 
economic variables (e.g. inflation).  
 
There are two versions of REH: weak and strong (Snowdon and Vane 2005). 
According to the weak version of REH, the expectation of the future value of a 
variable is said to be rationally formed, in line with the economic model, which 
assumes the agent has utility-maximising behaviour. In order to form this 
rational behaviour in estimating the future values of economic variables, 
economic agents will use all publically available information on factors which 
they believe have impacts on these variables. For example, if economic agents 
adopt the classical dichotomy and believe money is natural to real economic 
activities, the expansion of money stock only leads to proportional changes in 
the level of price; in this case, all the public information on money stock will be 
used to form the expectation of future inflation. This makes monetary policy 
ineffective in altering real economic variables unless the monetary authority 
makes an unannounced monetary expansion/contraction. Despite this, this 
method may adjust the level of economic activities in the short run; however, it 
can lead to a serious problem of ‘time inconsistency and inflation bias’.  
 
 Compared to the weak version, the strong version of REH, which is consistent 
with the original ideas of Muth (1961), takes a step further by assuming the 
correctness of agents’ expected future values of a variable in relation to the ‘true’ 
objective predictions from relevant economic models. The strong version does 
not insist on the absolute accuracy of agents’ expectations of future value; there 
can be some degree of random error (e.g. unexpected ‘surprises’ which also 
affect the future value of a variable), which prevents agents from having perfect 
foresight (Snowdon and Vane 2005). Hence, the REH can be represented using 
the following simple equation: 
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 )|( 1 tt
e
t PEP  (2-2) 
  
In Equation (2-2), etP  is the expected future value of price at time t; it is 
rationally estimated using all the relevant information Ω available up to time t-1; 
and the accuracy of this expected future price is also affected by random error εt. 
The error term is assumed to be random and not correlated to the information 
set Ω at the time when economic agents form their predictions. At the average 
level, the predictions made by those rationally behaved agents can be correct. 
Moreover, the random error is assumed to have a zero mean and to be 
uncorrelated to previous events; hence, any error occurring in the current period 
only affects the accuracy of ‘rational expectation’ for one period only. 
Furthermore, agents are also assumed to have great learning ability. Any 
mistakes made/experienced will be learned from by agents to prevent any 
systematic errors over time.  
 
REH assumes there will be: (1) universal knowledge of the structural equations 
characterising the economy; (2) universal belief that all markets are cleared; and 
(3) universal understanding that all other agents also share assumptions (1) and 
(2), so they are common knowledge. Therefore, we will have a natural rate of 
unemployment given that a unique level of employment will clear the labour 
market. The output level of an economy is determined by this unique market-
clearing employment level through the short-run production function, which is in 
accordance with the classical economic model for output determination. 
Furthermore, in order to prevent any unnecessary inflation – in other words, to 
keep the aggregate demand at the same level as the market-clearing output – 
real money supply has to be kept constant. Any discretionary monetary 
expansion will lead to an immediate rise in inflation as agents will adjust their 
price expectations in accordance with changes in the money stock. Fiscal policy 
will also be ineffective: any increase in the current level of government 
expenditure will be seen as future taxation, and economic agents will cut their 
current private expenditure by an equal amount. This crowding-out 
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phenomenon implies the downgrade of fiscal policy in view of new classical 
macroeconomics. All of these policy implications have been left within the 
current mainstream macroeconomic model, which is adopted by EMU to operate 
their economic policy.     
         
REH has denied the effectiveness of demand management policy in altering real 
output and employment for an economy, together with the assumption of 
flexible wages in the labour market which allowing the economy to be 
continually at equilibrium in both the short run and the long run. Moreover, 
since there is an instant adjustment for an economy to move from one 
equilibrium to another, there should therefore not be a period when 
employment, price and output deviate from the natural equilibrium position, 
which is determined by the market-clearing employment level (Snowdon and 
Vane 2005). However, from historical data, we do observe fluctuations in real 
economic variables such as employment and output. The reason why sometimes 
the dynamics of economic activities can be different from the predictions of the 
new classical economic model has been explained through Lucas’s 'surprise' 
supply function, which was based on the Lucas imperfect information 
assumption (Lucas 1972, 1973 and 1975).  
 
The perfect use of all publically available information and flexible price/wage 
allow the economy to adjust/maintain equilibrium in both the short and the long 
run. However, in Lucas’s view, once there is an information imbalance among 
firms and workers, then it is possible to see a temporary deviation of 
employment and output from their natural equilibrium levels (Lucas 1972, 1973). 
The simple form of Lucas’s analysis of ‘surprise’ supply function can be explained 
by Equation (2-3): 
   ttttnt PEPYY t    )|( 1  (2-3) 
 
where Yt is the actual output at time t, Yn
t represents the natural rate of output 
which is determined by the natural rate of employment at present time period t; 
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P is the actual price level; )|( 1ttPE expresses the rational expected price level 
for time t workers anticipated at time t-1 by using all available information Ωt-1 
up to the previous period of time t; and εt is the random error term. Assuming 
we are in equilibrium and there is no systemic error of agents’ price expectation, 
then the price differential between actual and rational expected price 
 )|( 1 ttt PEP  is zero, and the actual output Yt equals the natural rate of 
output Yn
t.  
  
If we assume the distribution of information is imperfect, we have an 
information imbalance occurring in this economy, which is due to an 
unannounced monetary expansion. Then firms only know the price and costs of 
their own products, whilst the general price level for other markets can only be 
discovered in the next time period. Thus, firms are facing the problem of ‘signal 
extraction’, which is described by Lucas (1973). If information extracted by firms 
shows that the rise in the price level of their products in the market indicates 
shifts in the level of demand, the rational response of firms is to increase output 
by hiring more labours. Meanwhile, among workers, given the monetary 
expansion is unanticipated, the real wage they believe they are receiving at this 
period of time (W/Pe) has increased due to the rise in normal wage (expected 
price levels remain constant as workers do not have the information about a rise 
in money stock).  
 
Therefore, economic agents have been ‘surprised’, which leads to a rightward 
shift of the aggregate demand curve from AD0 to AD1 (see Figure 2-2). 
Employment rises above its natural rate and we are temporarily producing more 
than the long-term equilibrium output Yn. However, as we are assuming agents 
are rational, they learn from their experience of the past and will use all available 
public information to adjust their price expectations; therefore, soon workers 
will realise the higher level of money wage is just the consequence of higher 
price, which is due to the unannounced monetary expansion in the last period. 
As workers decide the allocation of time between work and leisure based upon 
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the real wage they anticipate receiving (Lucas and Rapping 1969), price and wage 
are fully flexible in the new classical model; therefore, those workers who 
mistakenly believed real wages had risen and decided to accept jobs, will now 
quit work and output will fall back to its natural level Yn.   
Figure 2-2  Long-run ASAD model  
 
 Source: figure drawn by the author  
 
This model demonstrates that the economy should stay at its equilibrium level 
in both the long term and the short term given that the fully flexible price and 
rational expectation behaviours of agents allow continuous market-clearing to 
take place in an economy. Thus, the optimising behaviour of rational agents in 
the market implies that any unemployment observed is voluntary rather than 
involuntary. The demand management policy (through monetary expansion) can 
only alter the output and employment if it can ‘surprise’ agents by conducting 
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the policy secretly. However, this ‘surprise’ only has a short-term impact; in the 
long term, after agents learn their mistake, employment/output will return to 
the natural level, but price will remain high. Hence, there is no place for 
policymakers to use any economic stabilisation policy to alter real economic 
activities.  
 
This proposition of policy ineffectiveness can be seen from a simple algebraic 
analysis following Gordon (1976). It can be started from a linear Friedman’s 
expectation-augmented Phillips curve model – Equation (2-4):  
 
tnt
e
tt SUU   )(  (2-4) 
 
Current inflation πt depends on the expected inflation of current period πt
e, the 
deviation of unemployment from its natural level )( nt UU   and random supply 
shocks.  
 
According to the classical dichotomy, inflation is the consequence of monetary 
expansion; therefore, it can be represented as follows: 
 
ttt Dm    (2-5) 
 
tD is the random demand-side shock with zero mean. Due to the rational 
expectation behaviours of agents, the expected inflation should equal the actual 
growth rate of the money stock mt if it is known to the public. Let’s assume 
agents can process all available information at time t-1 to form a ‘true’ 
estimation of monetary expansion, mt
e; then we can write Equation (2-6):  
 e
t
e
t m  (2-6) 
Moreover, suppose the growth rate of money stock is controlled at the constant 
rate λ0 plus some proportion of the previous period’s deviation of unemployment 
from its natural rate, and money supply can also be influenced by random shocks 
in the current period. Since we have universal knowledge of economic model and 
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inflation is available to the public, then agents can form their expectation of the 
growth rate of the money stock by using Equation (2-7): 
 )( 1,110   tt
e
t n
UUm   (2-7) 
   
Then, any difference between actual money supply growth and expected 
growth rate will indicate the occurrence of a random shock to money supply 
(θMt). Therefore, the accuracy of agents’ rational expectations of inflation will 
depend on the whether any random shocks (θMt and θDt) occur at present time t. 
We can represent this by:  
 
tt
e
tt MD    (2-8) 
 
By substituting Equation (2-8) into Equation (2-4), we get:  
tnttt SUUMD   )(  
Then by rearranging Equation (2-8), we can show the determining factors of the 
deviation of unemployment from its natural rate in Equation (2-9): 
 
)(
1
tttnt DMSUU 

   (2-9) 
 
From Equation (2-9), we can see that the growth of the money stock, which is 
managed by the monetary authority, does not appear in the equation. This 
provides supports for the policy implications of the new classical economic 
model, which claims that the fluctuations in the level of unemployment, and thus 
changes in output from its natural level, are the outcomes of random shocks to 
the economy. If there are no such unanticipated random shocks, the economy 
will maintain its long-run equilibrium position. Hence, classical economists 
recognise Friedman’s long-run vertical PC and the idea of the natural rate of 
unemployment, but provide a different explanation of short-term fluctuations of 
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the economic aggregates. The purpose of monetary policy is controlling inflation 
rather than manipulating output; discretionary use of monetary policy will only 
cause a rise in inflation. This theory led to the proposition of the independence 
of the central bank that has been adopted in the current mainstream 
macroeconomic model, which was the theoretical foundation of the ECB.   
  
2.1.3 New Keynesians’ defences  
The emphasis of the new classical macroeconomic model is on policy 
ineffectiveness and random shocks (e.g. unanticipated monetary expansion) 
being the only sources of business cycles in the short run; otherwise there would 
be continual equilibrium. However, the later empirical studies did not support 
the idea of policy ineffectiveness, such as anticipated/announced systematic 
monetary policy having no real effects; instead, they found that 
announced/anticipated monetary policy does have impacts on output and 
employment (Mishkin 1982, Gordon 1982). The assumption of fully flexible wage 
price appears to be a shortcoming of the new classical school which leads to it 
conflicting with empirical evidence. This weakness of the new classical model has 
received attention from the new Keynesian economists. Theoretical studies such 
as Fischer (1977), Phelps and Taylor (1977) and Taylor (1980) have established 
models which consider some levels of wage rigidities (e.g. multi-period wage 
contracts) but also retain the rational expectation behaviours of agents, 
suggesting that monetary policy is not neutral to the real side of the economy.   
 
Different theories have been developed to provide justifications for one 
essential Keynesian assumption – rigidities in price and wage. All of them can be 
divided into two strands: nominal rigidities and real rigidities. The former started 
with a more traditional Keynesian view, which claims that the rigidities exist in 
nominal price and wage. The failure of speedy adjustment in the level of money, 
wage and price gives room for the economy to perform in a non-Walrasian way. 
The possibility of instant and continuous adjustments towards equilibrium, which 
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is the core of Walrasian theory based on the new classical economic model, has 
now been ruled out. The latter recognises the possibility of the existence of 
nominal wage and price flexibility, but argues that, due to incomplete contracts 
and imperfect indexation, output and employment can still be very volatile once 
there is a shock to the economy or monetary policy is used to alter output and 
employment.  
 
Nominal rigidities  
The theory of nominal rigidities is a first response to the new classical model of 
macroeconomics, which argued that any anticipated monetary disturbance 
would be fully absorbed by the immediate changes in the level of price and wage, 
thus there would  be an instantly and continuously cleared market. In contrast to 
this, new Keynesian economists such as Fischer, Phelps and Taylor have argued 
that, even under the rational expectation behaviours of agents, monetary 
disturbance can affect real economic activities such as output and employment if 
the continuous market-clearing assumption is dropped (Fischer 1977, Phelps and 
Taylor 1977). The foundation of their counterargument to the new classical 
model is based on their assumptions of labour market characteristics – in 
particular, the way of agreeing/setting wages among firms and employees.  
 
Fischer’s analysis (Fischer 1977) emphasised that workers may realise there is a 
change in the level of price, but that pre-determined nominal wage is fixed by 
contract; hence, it is impossible to make an adjustment of nominal wage 
instantly, or even in the short run. This is also known as the Early Contract 
Theory. A feature of Fischer’s model of nominal rigidity and output is that it can 
be demonstrated through the new classical Lucas ‘surprise’ supply model. 
Therefore, we can show the model by starting with Equation (2-3):  
  )|( 1 tttnt PEPYY t    
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Workers will negotiate their long-term wages with employers based upon their 
expected price level for the next period; thus, the real wages workers aim to 
receive are fixed through a contract by setting the nominal wage increases as 
equal to the expected value of future inflation. This can be seen as:   
 )|( 1 ttt Ew   (2-10) 
 
By substituting Equation (2-10) into Equation (2-3) and replacing price level P by 
inflation π in Equation (2-3) we get Equation (2-11):  
  ttnt wYY t    (2-11) 
It shows that the aggregate supply is negatively related to the real wage, which is 
set through the multi-period contract between workers and employers (Fischer 
1977). In Fischer’s view, the monetary authority has the ability to adjust the 
money supply more frequently; however, workers can only renegotiate their 
wage once their contract is about to finish. Therefore, inflation can fluctuate 
more in relation to nominal wage. Hence, if there is a shock, e.g. government 
announces a monetary expansion that was not anticipated by workers when they 
were negotiating their future nominal wage, since this event was not included in 
the information set Ω at time t-1, the actual output Yt can differ from its natural 
level Yn.  
 
To understand the policy implication of this new Keynesian model, let us 
assume there is an unexpected demand shock, caused by economic recession in 
a major foreign trading partner. The aggregate demand curve will shift to the left 
due to this demand-side shock (see Figure 2-3). Assuming economic agents, 
including workers, are rational and information for the current period is perfectly 
available, if the wages are fully flexible as new classical economists assume, then, 
by instant adjustment in the level of nominal wage (W0 to W1), the economy is 
able to move from point A to point C due to the downward shift of short-run AS 
curve SRAS. However, as the current nominal wage is fixed by the contract which 
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was agreed between workers and firms in the previous period, the equilibrium 
will move along the short-run AS curve SRAS(W0), and we end up with a lower 
level of output Y1 at point B.  
Figure 2-3  Long-run ASAD Model – New Keynesian case 
 
Source: figure drawn by the author 
 
This nominal rigidity in money wage, which is caused by the persistence of long-
term contracts, leaves room for the monetary authority to actively adjust the 
level of output by altering the quantity of money stock (Fischer 1977). The 
monetary authority can use discretionary monetary intervention by creating 
some inflation to reduce the actual real wage in the current period, thus 
increasing employment and shifting the short-run AS curve back to SRAS(W0). 
Therefore, as long as the monetary authority can react to the exogenous shock 
more quickly than the time-consuming contract renegotiation lasts, even when 
________                  Chapter 2 Historical Developments of Macroeconomic Theories and 
________________________________________the Case of EMU Economic System 
 
32 
 
economic agents are rationally behaved as Lucas argued, there is always scope 
for the demand management policy (through monetary expansion) to have 
impacts on the level of output and employment in the short run. 
 
Soon after Fischer’s model was developed to justify the validity of Keynesian 
demand management policy, it was criticised by new classical economists such as 
Robert Barro, who argued that Fischer’s model of macroeconomics – in particular, 
its view on the existence of contracts – had not yet cast off the typical 
shortcomings of traditional Keynesian economics – that is, a lack of solid 
microeconomic foundations (Barro 1977). Moreover, this model also lacks 
empirical support. In Fischer’s model, after an external shock the monetary 
variable can alter output by adjusting the level of employment through 
decreasing the real wage. In other words, the changes in the level of real wages 
are countercyclical. In fact, Mankiw suggested that, rather than taking a 
countercyclical path, the real wage has procyclical behaviours (Mankiw 1990). 
Instead of using nominal wage rigidities as the explanation of business cycles, 
new Keynesian economists turned their attention to the behaviours of suppliers 
in the goods market and the stickiness of nominal price in the market (Akerlof 
and Yellen 1985, Mankiw 1985, Parkin 1986). Through this model, which focuses 
on the behaviour of firms and its relation to overall economic activities, the 
Keynesian economic model provided more solid microeconomic principles for 
their macroeconomic models (Rotemberg 1987)5.  
 
Real rigidities  
The nominal rigidities of price provide a microeconomic-oriented explanation 
for the observed fluctuations of real economic activities even if we assume 
economic agents are behaving rationally. They also imply that unemployment is 
not entirely voluntary; the involuntary type does exist due to the rigidities of 
nominal price. Therefore, Keynesian-type demand management policy is still vital 
to the stabilisation of an economy when there is an external shock in the short 
                                                          
5
 Example of nominal price rigidities is available in Appendix. 
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run. The criticism of the menu costs approach to price rigidities argues that, 
although, the theory is capable of demonstrating a large impact of small menu 
costs on real economic activities, which depends on the slope of the marginal 
cost curve (Gordon 1990); however, the impulse of such effects is implausible 
(Ball et al. 1988). In fact, the disturbances to real economic variables are due to 
the combination of nominal and real rigidities (Ball and Romer 1990). 
   
Figure 2-4 New Keynesian real rigidities 
 
Source: figure drawn by the author 
 
Suppose there is an external shock, which leads to a decline in aggregate 
demand. Hence, according the theory of menu costs, due to nominal rigidities, 
firms will choose to maintain their pre-shock profit-maximising level price. This 
can lead to severe disturbance to the effective demand of labour as each 
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imperfectly competitive firm reduces their labour force’s size and produces 
fewer products (Abel and Bernake 2001). Given the downward shift of the labour 
demand curve and the stickiness of price levels, the real wage will fall due to a 
fall in the level of the money wage. Moreover, this decline in real wage can be 
substantial if the labour supply is relatively inelastic (Ball et al. 1988, Gordon 
1990, Romer 1993). Due to the decline of the real wage, the marginal costs of 
firms will also decline, which implies an upward-sloping marginal cost curve (see 
Figure 2-4). As the MC curve becomes upward-sloping in this case, the profit area 
when price is at P1 tends to be bigger, and volume of profits for price level P0 gets 
smaller. Therefore, if the labour supply is sufficiently inelastic, which implies a 
steeper MC curve, then firms will choose to reduce to the optimal level. Thus, 
the menu costs/nominal rigidities have no scope to explain the business cycles. 
Following the same principle, if the elasticity of demand falls like the downward 
shift of firms’ demand curve, then the marginal revenue curve will have an 
intense leftward shift. Thus, firms are more likely to maintain their pre-shock 
price levels.  
 
Therefore, the nominal price rigidities can be a source of fluctuation of real 
economic activities; however, this source can’t be a unique force that can lead to 
much greater changes in macroeconomic performance. Real price rigidities have 
a much bigger role in explaining economic fluctuation that is due to the 
inflexibility of price level. Here, we can adopt the mark-up pricing equation for 
profit-maximising monopolistically competitive firms to illustrate the concept of 
real price rigidities. Let us start with marginal revenue equation, which takes the 
form of Equation (2-12):     
 
where P is the price of product of a firm, k is price elasticity of demand, and k < 0. 
According to the profit-maximising condition, the Equation (2-12) can be 
rewritten to demonstrate the function of profit maximisation for a firm: 
 
)
1
(

PPMR   (2-12) 
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)
1
(

PPMC   (2-13) 
 
By rearranging Equation (2-13), we can show the price is a mark-up on marginal 
cost, which is:  
 
)
/11
1
(

 MCP  (2-14) 
 
Then we can replace the MC (marginal cost) by W/MPL given that the marginal 
cost to a firm is the real wage they have to pay to their workers, which can be 
calculated by nominal wage divided by the marginal product of labour. Hence, 
Equation (2-14) can be rewritten as:  
 
)
/11
1
(


MPL
W
P  (2-15) 
 
From Equation (2-15), we can see that if the elasticity of demand remains 
constant, then, assuming a negative a shock, as the MPL will not rise 
substantially due to decline in the level of labour inputs, which implies a flatter 
MC curve, we will have the presence of menu costs and low incentives for firms 
to reduce price. If the marginal cost falls as the price of input decreases, due to 
decline in the level of aggregate demand (falling AD leads to lower demand for 
labour and reduction of the price of labour inputs), as long as the mark-up can 
adjust sufficiently to offset the decline of marginal cost, the price P will remain 
constant, or, at least, adjust downwards slowly. In fact, the nominal rigidities can 
be reinforced by real rigidities during the economic recession, given that implicit 
collusion may increase among imperfectly competitive firms; hence, there is no 
need of a very flat MC curve (bigger menu costs) to allow the existence of price 
rigidities (Romer 2001).  
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Real price rigidity has an important meaning to price inflexibility. It is the source 
of involuntary unemployment and also the justification for government 
economic intervention in the short run; nevertheless, the existence of real price 
rigidities does not necessary indicate the occurrence of nominal rigidities (Ball 
and Romer 1990). In fact, the presence of real rigidities has an amplificatory 
function to the nominal imperfection, which can be seen as a distinguishing 
feature of the new Keynesian macroeconomic model (Mankiw and Romer 1991).   
Besides real price rigidities6, the new Keynesian economic model also focuses on 
the labour market, which is emphasised by the new classical economists for its 
key features of flexible wages and continuous market-clearing7. Previously, wage 
inflexibility was explained through the early contract theory (Fischer 1977); 
however, it was criticised as lacking microfoundation and received insufficient 
empirical support (Barro 1977, Mankiw 1990). In response to the criticism and 
shortcomings of Fischer’s nominal wage rigidity theory, the real wage rigidities 
model was developed to explain the stickiness of price in the labour market. 
Hence, new Keynesians reinforced their view of non-market-clearing equilibrium 
and argued that the equilibrium may not be one where supply equals demand; in 
fact, it occurs at a time when no one in the market is willing to change their 
behaviour and the market is not necessarily clear (Stiglitz 1987).  
 
 
2.2 Current mainstream macroeconomic model and the 
European Monetary Union  
 
Modern macroeconomics has emerged since the rise of the Keynesian model, 
which tried to explain the cause of mass unemployment, thus providing a cure to 
economic problems at that time. From a historical view of macroeconomics, 
there have been continuous debates and alternation of orthodoxy positions in 
                                                          
6
 For other sources of real price rigidity please see details from: Thick market externalities 
(Diamond 1982); Input–Output table (Gordon 1981, 1990); Capital market imperfection 
(Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Romer 1993); Judging quality by price (Stiglitz 1987).  
7
 Example of real wage rigidities is available in Appendix. 
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this discipline, which has led to different implications for policy implementations. 
Over the last couple of decades, a new orthodoxy macroeconomics model – the 
new consensus macroeconomics (NCM) model has risen to become the current 
mainstream macroeconomic model, which has firmly established itself amongst 
both policymakers and academics (Allington et al. 2008).  
 
2.2.1 Brief overview of NCM  
The rise of NCM is a response to the need for a better macroeconomic model 
which can produce more satisfactory results than old-generation large-scale 
macroeconomic models (Fontana 2008). The old-generation large-scale 
macroeconomic models, such as the MPS model8, which contains 60 equations, 
had become out of date given that the econometrics methods applied in MPS 
were obsolete by the early 1990s (Sims 1980 and 2002). Secondly, the large-scale 
model only considers adaptive expectation; however, the macroeconomic 
consensus at that time was influenced by Lucas’s work (Lucas 1976) on the role 
of rational forward-looking expectation and intertemporal decision-making in the 
context of monetary policy implementation (Fontana 2009). In comparison to 
MPS, NCM can include as few as three equations which contain the Philips curve, 
monetary policy curve and IS curve9. Moreover, it takes the Lucas critique into 
consideration; hence, agents are behaving rationally and have a forward-looking 
manner. 
       
The distinguishing feature of this new mainstream model has been its 
theoretical content. It is no longer classical versus Keynesian, but a blend of 
these two rival schools of thought, which gives it its name of ‘new consensus’. 
They were developed from the basic real business cycle (RBC) model into a 
Walrasian general equilibrium with endogenously determined rational 
                                                          
8
 The MPS model is a joint project between MIT, University of Pennsylvania, and the Social 
Science Research Council.  
9
 More detailed information about these three equation and NCM model are provided in Section 
4.2.1. 
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expectations, but under some alternative assumptions. Instead of starting from a 
model with perfect competition, no asymmetric information and other market 
imperfections, NCM adopts monopolistic competition, nominal price and wage 
stickiness and considerations of the possibility of other market imperfections. So 
NCM rejects the idea of continuous market-clearing, through the incorporation 
of some market frictions, showing that the new classical conclusion about 
macroeconomic policies’ ineffectiveness comes from the adoption of this 
hypothesis, not from the incorporation of rational expectations. It also 
recognises the vertical long-term aggregate supply curve and vertical Phillips 
curve; hence, government economic intervention is ineffective in the long run. 
The monetary policy should be rule based, rather than implemented 
discretionarily. Therefore, we can say that NCM is heavily based upon the new 
Keynesian model, but has also adopted some key features of new classical 
economics (Meyer 2001, Arestis and Sawyer 2008)10. 
 
Since NCM adopts the idea of the vertical aggregate supply curve and Phillips 
curve (Carling and Soskice 2005), in the long term the economy will be at its 
potential level of output and economic agents will be able to use all available 
information to form rational expectations on anticipated/announced monetary 
policy; hence, there is no room for discretionary monetary policy to be effective 
in altering the real output and employment level. Monetary aggregates will be 
natural to economic activities, and so will the interest rate policy. The monetary 
policy has to be designed to be a tool responsive to any deviation of output from 
its natural level, and also try to adjust any differentials between actual inflation 
and target inflation, therefore maintaining price stability without creating any 
inflation bias (Taylor 1985 and 1999).  
 
In order to achieve price stability and avoid inflation bias, a ‘conservative’ 
independent central bank needs to be created which has adequate credibility of 
its price stability policy (Cukierman 1992, Goodhart 1994, Svensson 1997). A 
                                                          
10
 More detailed explanations of NCM, such as the three-equation model, and implications of 
implementation of monetary and fiscal policy will be given in Chapters 4 and 5.   
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nominal anchor has to be created by the monetary authority, thus causing 
economic agents’ expectations of inflation to converge on a determined point. 
Since under an inflation-targeting regime, a central bank is assumed to be 
independent of fiscal authority and focusing on price stability, eventually the 
inflation expectation of the agents will move towards the target, as long as the 
central bank has a history of credible policies and is not causing time 
inconsistency problems.  
 
This ‘price stability’ objective is a core mission of a successful economic policy 
since the ‘stagflation crises of Western economies in the 1970s. The concern of 
policymakers on overall economic performance shifted from ‘maintain low 
unemployment’ to ‘keep price stable and low’. The independent central bank 
provides a possible channel to achieve this major economic goal. However, the 
fiscal policy could make contradictory impacts on price stability if discretionary 
fiscal policy was implemented (Woodford 2001, Brück and Zwiener 2006 and 
Chair and Kehoe 2008). Therefore, in order to achieve a successful price stability 
macroeconomic policy, fiscal dominance has to be avoided given that high 
government debt could well constrain the ability and willingness of the central 
bank to maintain the target inflation by controlling the central bank base rates 
(Turner 2011).  
 
Secondly, Ricardian equivalence, which suggests the ineffectiveness of fiscal 
policy given that households rationally see today’s rise in government spending 
as tomorrow’s higher taxation, also indicates the downgrade of the fiscal policy 
and upgrade of the monetary policy in the new consensus macroeconomics 
model (Fontana 2009). Moreover, the economic aggregates are assumed to be 
fluctuating around the long-term equilibrium where unemployment is at its non-
acceleration inflation rate level (NAIRU), and this equilibrium is determined by 
the supply side of the economy, such as equilibrium in the labour market. 
Effective demand no longer has a determining role in the long-term equilibrium 
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of the economy; hence the fiscal policy is treated as an ineffective tool in long-
term economic activities (Arestis and Sawyer 2008).  
 
Overall, the characteristics of NCM in respect of policy implications are: 1) price 
stability is the major goal of economic policy. Given inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon, monetary policy has to be rule based and an independent central 
bank provides credible monetary policy that is crucial to avoid inflation bias and 
maintain a stable price. The rule of monetary policy is based on the inflation-
targeting strategy: the interest rate is used as an instrument to manipulate 
inflation around the target level (through adjusting the differentials between 
natural rate of output and actual output level); 2) since the long-term 
equilibrium is supply-side-determined, and economic agents are assumed to 
have, at least, some levels of Ricardian behaviour towards expansionary fiscal 
policy, therefore fiscal policy can be seen as an ineffective policy instrument. 
However, there is a possibility that government may discretionarily use the fiscal 
policy to facilitate their political needs (Alesian and Perotti 1995, Balassone 
Francese 2004), and such discretionary use of fiscal policy can weaken the 
effectiveness of ‘price-stability’-type monetary policy; hence, fiscal discipline has 
to be monitored and enforced.  
 
2.2.2 EMU economic policy and NCM  
In the process of establishing EMU, member states have lost their monetary 
sovereignty and monetary policy has been centralised at the union level. The 
European Central Bank, the only, and supranational, monetary authority, was 
created for implementing the monetary policy for the entire Eurozone. The 
treaty on the European Union ensured its independent status to any fiscal 
authorities and their governments within EMU. The primary objective of the ECB 
is to maintain price stability within the Eurozone, which is officially written down 
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in Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and also 
written down in a statement of the ECB as11: 
 To maintain price stability is the primary objective of the Eurosystem and of the 
single monetary policy for which it is responsible. This is laid down in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Article 127 (1). 
"Without prejudice to the objective of price stability", the Eurosystem shall also 
"support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Union". These include inter alia "full employment" 
and "balanced economic growth". 
The implementation of monetary policy has been treated by the ECB as mainly 
sustaining price stability in the long run, but it still recognises its impacts on the 
level of real economic activities such as output and employment; however, such 
impacts will vanish in the long term12:  
In the short run, a change in money market interest rates induced by the central bank 
sets in motion a number of mechanisms and actions by economic agents. Ultimately the 
change will influence developments in economic variables such as output or prices. … 
Real income or the level of employment are, in the long term, essentially determined by 
real factors, such as technology, population growth or the preferences of economic 
agents. 
 
  The principle behind the ECB’s monetary policy implies the policy implications 
of NCM, which has adopted the idea of supply-side-determined long-term 
equilibrium and short-term economic fluctuations due to the slow adjustments 
of wages in the labour market. The vertical long-term Phillips curve (PC) adopted 
by NCM economists shows that in the long term the natural level of 
unemployment, and hence the output, is neutral to the level of the price that can 
be affected by monetary shocks. Therefore, the inflation–unemployment trade-
off relationship does not hold for the economy in the long term. While 
unemployment is still elastic to a change in the level of price, there is room for 
                                                          
11
 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/objective/html/index.en.html. 
12
 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/role/html/index.en.html. 
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monetary policy to have an effect on real economic activities. However, the 
implementation of monetary policy should only react to the deviation of actual 
output or inflation from their natural rates and target levels respectively (Taylor 
1999). Any discretionary use of monetary policy can cause the occurrence of the 
time inconsistency issue and damage the credibility of the monetary authority, 
which leads to a suboptimal equilibrium between inflation and unemployment 
and price stability of the economy is damaged (Kydland and Prescott 1977, Barro 
and Gordon 1983a&b). Hence, we can say that the principle of the ECB’s 
monetary strategy, which is given in their statement, is consistent with the policy 
implications of the NCM model.    
  
Although the ECB adopts the NCM model and sees monetary policy as an 
essential instrument to controlling fluctuation of price level, in terms of policy 
practice, it adopts a slightly different strategy from the NCM model. Such policy 
objectives among NCM and the ECB are based on the hypothesis that of inflation 
in the long term is a monetary phenomenon. Based on this, a target inflation 
strategy is suggested by the NCM model, such as using the Taylor rule (Taylor 
1999) to adjust inflation around the target level; hence, the interest rate should 
be set at equal to the inflation rate, and should react positively to deviations of 
current inflation above target and positively to deviations of current output 
above the natural rate. This inflation-targeting strategy is fully adopted by many 
central banks such as the Bank of England (Horvath and Mateju 2011). In practice 
of monetary policy, the ECB also set out a target of ‘closely around 2 per cent 
inflation’, which has been seen by the ECB as adequate to avoid deflation and 
too little inflation (ECB 2008), but with a different practice from the Taylor rule to 
assess the necessity of changing interest rates. 
 
The method adopted by the ECB is called A Two-Pillar Approach (Gerlach 2003, 
Issing 2006). Rather than using estimations of output gap and the deviation of 
inflation from its target level as indicators of changing interest rates, the ECB 
adopts a range of variables to decide if interest rate has to be changed to 
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maintain the long-term monetary goal of price stability. All of those variables, 
which are used in the two-pillar approach of the ECB, can be categorised twofold: 
economic condition variables and monetary development variables. The logic 
behind this two-pillar approach is related to the various time perspectives of 
inflation, and its causes, which require a different focus of monetary policy. For 
the former, it focuses on a basket of variables that is related to domestic and 
international economic conditions, which include overall economic activities – 
output, level of aggregate demand, conditions of labour and capital markets, 
fluctuations of exchange rates and balance payments, fiscal policy, financial 
markets, balance sheet position of the euro area sector, and global economic 
conditions (ECB 2004). This is in order to assess future price development in the 
short and medium term based upon the broad economic conditions. The latter 
considers the impacts of development of monetary aggregates – money supply – 
on the level of price over the medium and long term (ECB 2004). This clearly 
reflects the NCM view on the cause of inflation over the long term and neutrality 
of money.  
 
The fundamental idea of this two-pillar approach is principally consistent with 
the NCM model. Monetary policy’s goal is primarily focused on price stability 
rather than being used discretionarily to boost real economic activities. However, 
there are still some differences between the ECB’s and NCM’s approaches to 
monetary policy. According to the NCM model, in particular, as the Taylor rule 
suggested, an explicit inflation target has to be set as a benchmark to monetary 
policy, output gaps are considered an indicator of potential source of inflation 
from the real side of the economy, and monetary aggregates are not included in 
the model. In contrast to NCM, the ECB’s two-pillar approach does consider the 
growth of the money supply as a major source of inflation in the medium and 
long term and an implicit inflation target level is adopted. Nevertheless, given 
the consistency of ECB monetary policy with the NCM model at principle level, 
but also the differences in their implementation strategies, it is still sensible to 
expect the ECB to be able to deliver an effective monetary policy for the whole 
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Eurozone. However, by considering the possible existence of heterogeneity of 
monetary transmission mechanisms among member states of EMU, and 
different requirements of the interest rate due to insufficient business cycle 
synchronisation, ECB monetary policy can be appropriate for the entire euro area, 
but may not be optimal for every individual member.  
 
Compared to the centralised monetary policy, the fiscal policies of EMU are still 
designed and implemented at the national level. This decentralised fiscal regime 
allows members’ government to keep their fiscal sovereignty. However, rules 
have been set by the EU to monitor and enforce fiscal discipline within the euro 
area. The EMU fiscal rules require that the national budget deficit does not 
exceed the 3 per cent of GDP ceiling, and the national debt has to be maintained 
below 60 per cent of GDP. These fiscal rules are enforced through the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), which mainly contains three elements: 1) to pursue the 
medium-term objective of a balanced budget; 2) the submission of annual 
stability and convergence programme by members of EMU; 3) to monitor and 
enforce the fiscal ceiling.  
 
Member countries have to submit their budgetary data with stability 
programme each year to the European Commission. The stability programme will 
be examined by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and 
recommendations will be made available to each member’s government. If the 
examination of a country’s stability programme report shows the member’s fiscal 
stance has diverged from its medium-term objective, a 
warning/recommendation has to be issued to strengthen their stability 
programme. If there are no improvements in a member’s budgetary condition, 
and no exceptional circumstances have been found, then this member can be 
judged as breaching EMU fiscal rules and fines can be imposed13.  
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 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm. 
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As per the statement from the European Commission, the need for the union-
level fiscal rules and relevant enforcement mechanism is mainly to enhance price 
stability within the Eurozone14:  
By imposing a common framework within which Member States would set budgetary 
policy, the possibility of negative impacts on other euro area countries – whether 
stemming from the inflationary impact of large deficits or the destabilising effect of 
unsustainability or insolvency – could be reduced and monetary policy could operate in a 
stable environment. 
The motivation of EMU’s fiscal rules reflects the view of NCM on fiscal policy. The 
fiscal policy is only able to alter real economic variables in the short-term and is 
neutral to long-term output that is supply-side determined. Moreover, the 
Ricardian equivalence (RE) hypothesis suggests that ‘Ricardian’ consumers, who 
are forward-looking and aware of government intertemporal budget constraints, 
will react to the government fiscal policy rationally, which implies consumers 
take future tax liabilities fully into account in today’s consumption/saving 
decisions, hence government bonds will not be treated as net wealth and 
impacts of fiscal expansion may eventually be cancelled out by decline in private 
consumption (Buchanan 1976, Dimand 2002). Hence, fiscal policy is not effective 
in achieving full employment. Instead, it can be harmful to ‘price stability’ given 
that the credibility and outcome of price stability monetary policy is hardly to be 
achieved without controlling fiscal behaviour of individual members in the 
monetary union (Woodford 2001, Brück and Zwiener 2006, Chair and Kehoe 
2008).  
 
Despite the ‘price stability’ goal being set as the essential objective of EMU’s 
economic policy, and fiscal policy having to be closely monitored and enforced by 
EMU, the adherence to EMU fiscal rules among members and the reform of the 
SGP in 2005 shows that most EMU members have no intention of complying with 
the original SGP and require more flexibility (Bonatti and Cristini, 2008). During 
2001–4 six countries – France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and 
                                                          
14
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/q_and_a_en.htm. 
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Portugal – became formally subject to the excessive deficit procedures for 
breaking the 3 per cent GDP limit. Instead of enforcing the rules and applying 
sanctions to those members, a dramatic event took place inside EMU. In 
November 2003, tensions with respect to the rules reached a climax when the 
ECOFIN refused to take a decision on the basis of a recommendation by the 
European Commission to move to the next step in the sanction procedure for 
Germany and France. After the European Commission had brought the case to 
the Court of Justice, the Court ruled that the Council had not been allowed to 
take its own decisions outside the scope of the EU Treaty (European Court of 
Justice, 2004). At the same time, it also confirmed the discretion of the Council 
on whether or not to move forward in the sanction procedures15.  
 
Although the adherence to EMU fiscal rules was poor among members of the 
Eurozone, the instruments of economic governance were too weak to force 
governments of EMU members to commit to the SGP after the memberships 
were granted to them (Eichengreen 2005; Larch et al. 2010); however, the NCM 
model also implies another mechanism which can also perform as a device to 
monitor and enforce fiscal behaviours of EMU. The rational behaviour of 
economic agents in financial markets should be able to penalise any ‘bad’ 
behaviour of fiscal authorities in the Eurozone. As monetary policy has been 
centralised at the union level, member governments are no longer able to 
finance their budget by issuing new money or devaluing their currency; therefore, 
national debts and budget deficits have to be financed through issuing 
government bonds in financial markets. This implies that the market may have a 
crucial role in public borrowing. There will be fewer risks of free-rider issues, if 
the financial market is able to identify the risk premiums of public debt 
borrowers in different debt situations (Warin and Wolff 2005).  
 
The role of the financial market in disciplining fiscal behaviour is based upon 
the efficiency market hypothesis which is one of the main implications of the 
                                                          
15
 More details about the implementation of the SGP are available in Chapter 5.  
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rational behaviour model. By using all available information about countries’ 
fiscal and general economic conditions, rational agents in the financial market, 
who are supposed to have good knowledge, should be able to discriminate 
between governments and make borrowing more difficult by adjusting upwards 
the interest rate on bonds. Therefore, this rational behaviour of agents on 
government bonds can discipline borrowers’ fiscal activities. However, the 2007–
8 credit crunch and the current Eurozone sovereign debt crisis seem to suggest 
the market, which is assumed by NCM to be efficient and have rational 
behaviour, had failed to correctly price assets and charge appropriate risk 
premiums on EMU members’ government bonds.  
 
2.3 Summary  
 
In this chapter, we have reviewed the state of modern macroeconomics by 
highlighting key theories and their developments. The Keynesians who explained 
the economic fluctuations are the consequence of demand deficiency 
established the modern macroeconomic. Therefore, fiscal policy needs to be 
conducted to stimulate the economic recovery through direct spending and 
improvements on confidence and expectations among private economic agents 
as the results of expansionary fiscal policy. However, due to outbreak of 
economic crisis in late 60s and 70s, Keynesians theory no longer able to be used 
to explain and providing cure to stagflation. Hence, Monetarists and New 
Classical economics rose, thus to provide more appropriate answers to the 
present economic issues at that time. In responds to lose of its dominate position, 
newly developed mainstream Keynesian thoughts – New Keynesian economics 
defined Keynes’ theory through explanation of nominal and real rigidities.   
 
Given the evolving of macroeconomic theories, different school of thoughts has 
merged that creates the New Consensus Macroeconomics. The current 
mainstream macro-model, which is a mixture of new classical and new Keynesian 
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theories, adopts the rational behaviour hypothesis and supply-side-determined 
long-term equilibrium of output; it also recognises that price/wage rigidities in 
the short term are the cause of business cycle and deviation of 
unemployment/output from its natural rate; therefore, it rejects the assumption 
of continuous market-clearing. As the results of rational behaviour and supply-
side-determined long-term equilibrium, vertical Phillips curves are continually 
used to indicate the limitations of discretionary economic stabilising policy, and 
to indicate that monetary policy has to be rule based and mainly used to achieve 
price stability.  
 
Fiscal policy has been downgraded to be considered an ineffective policy tool 
for real economic activities, and harmful to ‘price stability’ monetary policy. The 
independent position of the ECB and its policy goal and implementation of 
monetary policy are, by and large, consistent with the NCM model. The fiscal 
policy framework designed by the EU, which aims to discipline the fiscal 
behaviours of EMU members, also reflects the adoption of the NCM model as 
the theoretical foundation of EMU’s economic operations.  
 
For the financial market, where government interact with lenders for accessing 
funds to finance their budget deficits and debts, the underlying assumption 
putting forward by the NCM is the market should be perform rationally and 
efficiently. The implication of this is that the behaviour of fiscal activities of EMU 
members could be monitored enforced through a dual mechanism, which 
contains EMU fiscal rules and financial market. Hence, if both fiscal discipline 
mechanisms operated normal as they should be, the fiscal behaviours within the 
Eurozone can be well managed and maintained.   
 
In the next three chapters (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), we will start to assess whether 
EMU is a sustainable economic system in terms of the NCM model, e.g. 
effectiveness of monetary policy on controlling inflation and its impacts on other 
macro-variables (Chapter 4), and the existence of the Euro Fiscal Dividend, which 
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show whether the financial market did perform rationally and efficiently in 
monitoring/enforcing fiscal behaviours within EMU (Chapter 5). Before we 
answer these two questions, in Chapter 3 we will first evaluate business cycle 
synchronisation among EMU members to see if the general economic conditions 
among members have converged to a similar level, which allows the ECB to 
implement a union-wide appropriate monetary policy. If this is the case, 
members should be less likely to rely on using their fiscal policy to compensate 
the loss of monetary sovereignty. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Business cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone – a 
dynamic factor model analysis  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The EMU is criticised as a non-optimal currency area. This is partially due to the 
heterogeneity of economic structures among member countries. This implies 
different reactions in each domestic market to a common union policy, and 
different impacts on the domestic macroeconomic performance due to a 
common external shock. Therefore, the business cycles of EMU members might 
also remain heterogeneous across EMU. For instance, countries in an upward 
phase of the cycle may prefer a relatively tight monetary measure; in contrast, 
countries in a downward phase of the cycle may need more expansionary 
monetary policy. Hence, if business cycles for currency union members remain 
divergent or move toward divergence, the union-wide monetary policy is unlikely 
to be optimal to the large majority of EMU members, even when the MTM is 
homogenous (Artis et al. 2004, Grauwe 2009, Soares et al. 2009, Savva et al. 
2010).  
 
However, the current developments in the theory of OCA (mainly influenced by 
Frankel and Rose 1998) have suggested that economic structures can be changed 
by participation in a currency union – this is known as the endogeneity of OCA 
hypothesis. The argument is that cycles will tend to be more synchronised due to 
the increase in trade, if the intra-industry trade dominates the inter-industry 
trade. This argument favours the original OCA theory that was developed based 
on classical and monetarist ideas, which was mainly contributed by Mundell and 
Friedman in the 1950s and 1960s (Cesarano 2006). The modern view of OCA 
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theory suggests that due to economic integration members will tend to share the 
same, or, at least very similar, business cycles. Therefore, different countries will 
more likely be subject to common patterns of economic shocks. Moreover, due 
to the synchronisation of business cycles across the currency union, the 
fluctuations of price also tend to be similar among members. This indicates that 
the cross-country relative prices are constant; therefore, the exchange rate 
policy is not needed. Indeed, trade intensity is found to lead to more 
synchronisation within the euro area.  
 
Hence, if evidence of business cycle convergence existed in the euro area, we 
might say that the centralised monetary policy would be likely to be optimal, and 
dependence on domestic fiscal instruments might become lower among EMU 
members. Many previous studies have suggested that the business cycles in the 
euro area have become more similar (Fatás 1997, Artis and Zhang 1997 & 1999, 
Agresti and Mojon 2001, Belo 2001, Monfort et al. 2003, Altavilla 2004, Darvas 
and Szapary 2004, Enders et al. 2010, Siedschlag and Tondl 2011 etc.). However, 
other previous works argued that the business cycles of many euro countries are 
still substantially out of sync, and there is no strong evidence to support the 
argument of a European business cycle (Kose et al. 2003, Kaufman 2003, Artis 
2004, Darvas and Szpary 2004, Massmann and Mitchell 2004, Camacho et al. 
2008, Giannone et al. 2010, Lee 2012, Lehwald 2012). Because of the relatively 
short history of EMU, the above results are mainly drawn from the literature that 
is focused on the pre-EMU period. Therefore, the above conclusions, which are 
mainly based on members’ experience before the adoption of a single currency, 
can be considered as a misleading representation of what actually happed during 
the first decade of the currency union. Thus, the actual picture of cyclical 
convergence over the first decade needs to be studied. 
 
In this chapter, we will make comparison of the business cycle synchronisation 
among all initial twelve members of the Eurozone between the pre-EMU and 
post-EMU periods. The contribution of this is that we consider all twelve 
countries’ growth dynamics in a single model, rather than using a correlation 
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approach, which only considers a pair of countries (e.g. Artis and Zhang 1999, 
Inklaar de Haan 2001, Massmann and Micthell 2004, Camacho et al. 2008, 
Enders et al. 2010). To achieve this, the Dynamic Factor model (DFM) was 
adopted as the platform of our analysis, which enables us to uncover the 
unobservable common factor which captures the co-movements of 
macroeconomic aggregates across these members of EMU. Moreover, given that 
most macro-variables are collected on a quarterly/annually basis, 
implementation of DFM also allows us to avoid the usual problem of low degrees 
of freedom when the regression-based research is trying to focus on the post-
EMU period only. Furthermore, we contribute to the existing literature (Beine et 
al. 2000, Kaufman 2003, Kose et al. 2003, Monfort et al. 2003, Lumsdaine and 
Prasad 2003, Giannone et al. 2010, Siedschlag and Tondl 2011, Lee 2012, 
Lehwald 2012)  by investigating which key components of the growth dynamics 
for each member can be seen as the driving element for business cycle 
synchronisation. Finally, we attempt to advance the study through a further 
analysis to check if the convergence of cycles is due to the spill-over effects 
among members.  
 
In the following section, we will firstly review the OCA theories in Subsection 2, 
followed by the literature review of previous empirical studies. In Subsection 3, 
the econometrics method for this chapter will be discussed. The empirical 
findings and conclusions will be presented in Subsections 4 and 5 respectively.  
 
 
3.2 Theories of common currency area and factors in business 
cycle synchronisation  
 
The EMU was created based on the theoretical model of an optimal currency 
area; however, the Eurozone itself and its members do not fully satisfy the 
criteria that are set out by OCA theory for creating the optimal currency union. 
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Moreover, the adherence to the Maastricht Convergence Criteria, which were 
designed as a simplified EMU version of the OCA criteria, was generally poor 
among the initial 12 members of EMU (including Greece). All of these imply the 
possibility of divergence among the overall economic activities between member 
states of the Eurozone; thus, countries may require different levels of interest 
rates to facilitate their domestic economic goals.  
 
This will not only cause the implementation of union-wide appropriate ECB 
monetary policy to become more challenging; also given EMU has no centralised 
fiscal transfer system, national-level fiscal policy can be more frequently used by 
governments of Eurozone members to compensate the loss of monetary 
sovereignty. Consequently, the ‘price stability’ goal of the ECB can be dampened 
and sovereign debt will rise. Therefore, the degrees of business cycle 
synchronisation among members of EMU are crucial to both successful union-
wide monetary policy and fiscal discipline. In this section, by reviewing the 
theories of optimal currency areas, we will gain an overview of the inherent 
weaknesses of EMU that could harm the success of the Eurozone, and also see 
how the modern version of this theory prompts the idea of EMU through arguing 
that the initial divergence of cycles’ co-movements can be solved by 
improvements in the level of synchronisation due to granting of membership.   
          
 
3.2.1 Traditional theory of OCA  
The fundamental theoretical foundation of optimal currency area (OCA) theory 
began with the seminal work of Mundell (1961), which suggests that a currency 
area should be a region where borders should not be considered as the borders 
of countries. The debate in OCA theory had remained an academic interest until 
the European Union started the process of creating the Eurozone. First, Mundell 
emphasises the significance of convergence between the economic structures of 
the regions or countries within a currency area. Given that a currency area 
involves relinquishing the exchange rate as an instrument that can be used for 
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correcting external imbalances, an OCA requires structural convergence so that 
the risk of asymmetric shocks is minimised.  
 
Second, Mundell (1961) stated that factor mobility, especially labour mobility, 
is also crucial to creating and maintaining an optimal currency union. If an 
asymmetric shock occurs in a currency union, unemployment may worsen in 
parts of the region, but not in others. If this forces other low-unemployment 
members to accept inflation as a cure for the asymmetric shock, then this 
currency area cannot be considered as an optimal currency area. Moreover, if 
demand for goods shifts from region A to region B, this may cause an economic 
downturn that may cause rising unemployment in region A; however, region B 
will be exposed to inflationary pressure. Given the loss of regional/national 
monetary policy and exchange rate mechanisms, both regions of the currency 
union need another mechanism to restore the equilibrium. Mundell argued that 
if factor mobility is sufficient in a currency union, labour from high-
unemployment regions can move to other parts of the currency union, therefore 
the balance of payments will restore equilibrium and there will be no need for 
the members’ own exchange rate mechanisms, and the union-level monetary 
policy can be appropriate for all. Furthermore, Mundell also emphasised the 
importance of price and wage flexibility as mechanisms to cope with 
idiosyncratic demand shocks. Hence, if labour mobility or price and wage 
flexibility is present in an economy (region), there is no need for national-level 
monetary policies e.g. exchange rate policy. 
 
Factor mobility may influence the degree of efficiency of common monetary 
policy; however, in the monetarist view of OCA theory, the loss of national 
monetary policy may not be crucial to the currency area (Matthes 2009). The 
traditional OCA theory, which is developed based on Keynesian macroeconomic 
theory, considers a negatively sloped Phillips curve. Under this assumption, 
conducting monetary policy that induces unexpected inflation can lead to lower 
unemployment rates and adjust the real wage downwards. Thus, losing the 
ability to create policy shocks is very serious to the policymakers. That is the 
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purpose of having factor mobility built into OCA theory: to be treated as an 
automatic shock absorber. However, in the view of monetarists with a rational 
expectation model, workers tend to focus on the real wage rather than the 
nominal one. Therefore, the Phillips curve tends to slope vertically. Thus, 
national monetary policy appears to be less effective, which means the danger of 
losing national monetary sovereignty may not be as crucial as the 
counterargument to OCA theory  described.  
 
Factor mobility provides one of the theoretical bases for explaining the reason 
for moving monetary policy from the national level to union level. However, if 
factor mobility is insufficient to compensate the loss of monetary sovereignty, 
then the currency union can be exposed to asymmetric shocks with insufficient 
policy instruments to correct imbalance. For instance, language and cultural 
barriers, and different legal systems across the Eurozone leave EMU with a weak 
automatic shock absorber to offset possible asymmetric shocks (Heylen and van 
Poeck 1995, de Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke 1991, Arpaia et al. 2007, Janiak and 
Wasmer 2008). 
  
Following the work of Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) does not question the 
relevance of the convergence requirement, but made another major 
contribution to early OCA theory. McKinnon emphasised the degree of openness 
as a key criterion for forming an OCA. Given a high degree of openness in the 
economy, foreign price shocks can be more easily transmitted to the domestic 
price level through bilateral trade. As with the rise in the cost of living in the 
domestic economy, wage contracts and price can be significantly influenced by 
the exchange rate due to the reduction of money illusion (Shafir et al. 1997). This 
implies that the adjustments of the exchange rate may become less effective as a 
mechanism for correcting the trade balance. Therefore, the argument here is 
that, the more open the economy is, the more advantage this country may have 
from a fixed exchange rate regime. This is especially relevant to small economies, 
as a small economy is less likely to efficiently produce all the products it needs. 
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Therefore, it is more advantageous to engage in international trade and only 
produce those goods concerning which it has comparative advantages.  
 
Furthermore, Kenen (1969) also contributes to OCA theory as the third key 
founder of the theory. Product diversification, also known as specialisation, is an 
important criterion of selecting a potential member of an OCA. He argues that 
sufficient factor mobility, especially labour mobility, rarely exists between 
countries. Therefore, the OCA needs another criterion to ensure the join a 
currency is feasible (or to have a fixed exchange rate regime). Kenen (1969) 
highlights the importance of a well-diversified (or less specialised) economy as it 
determines the effects and outcomes of changes in the demand patterns. 
Assuming a demand shift on a product is caused by a random shock rather than 
induced by the fluctuations of business cycles, if the economy is specialised in 
this type of product and the economy is less diversified, consumers will demand 
more of other goods that are produced by foreign countries, and consumption of 
this product from both domestic and foreign markets will fall. This may lead to 
an economic downturn and rise in unemployment.  
 
However, under the flexible exchange rate regime, a fall in the revenue of 
exports will reduce the demand for the domestic currency, and, therefore, cause 
depreciation of the exchange rate. This can actually help to restore international 
competitiveness, which in turn may lead to recovery of the economy. If this 
country is in a currency union, the exchange rate adjustment cannot be exploited; 
hence, the recovery will rely on the reduction of wages and national fiscal 
policies. In comparison with a specialised economy, a country with well-
diversified domestic industries can be more resistant in the above situation. 
Unemployment will be less likely to be affected by the export demand shift in a 
particular industry. 
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, many empirical studies were carried out to 
evaluate whether EMU is satisfied with OCA criteria. To our knowledge, among 
them (e.g. Mundell 1997, Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1997, Caporal and Pittis 
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1998, Demeztris et al. 2000, Kempa 2002) there is no evidence to prove EMU is 
an optimal currency area. Some studies (Demeztris et al. 2000, Baimbridge et al. 
2005) even argue that EMU is more motivated by political determination than 
economic factors. Besides these general studies of EMU, some studies have 
attempted to evaluate the Eurozone referring to a specific criterion of OCA. 
Minford and Rastogi (1990) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) suggest that 
the economic structures among union members remain heterogeneous, which 
implies a higher probability of asymmetric shocks. This means EMU monetary 
policy is less likely to be union-wide optimal.  
 
Furthermore, language and cultural barriers and different legal systems across 
the Eurozone leave EMU with insufficient factor mobility and flexibility, thus the 
automatic shock absorber inside the union may be relatively weak at offsetting 
asymmetric shocks (Heylen and van Poeck 1995, de Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke 
1991, Arpaia et al. 2007, Janiak and Wasmer 2008). Finally, there is no system of 
fiscal federalism available inside the Eurozone. Instead, the fiscal policy is 
operated decentrally at the national level. Therefore, the channel of fiscal 
transfer between union members does not exist inside EMU, which may 
potentially affect the sustainability of the union (Wickens 2007, von Hagen and 
Wyplose 2008). Despite the counterargument of EMU in respect to traditional 
OCA theory, the modern view of the theory has provided some new argument to 
support pro-EMU academics and policymakers. 
 
3.2.2 Modern view of OCA theory – endogeneity hypothesis 
The modern view of OCA theory emphasises the positive relation between 
monetary integration and economic convergence in EMU. This ‘optimistic view’ is 
raised by Frankel and Rose (1997) who argue that further economic and 
monetary integration can lead to less divergence among members of a currency 
union. In other words, the business cycle synchronisation will improve among 
member states after the creation of the union; therefore, the cost of not having 
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their own national-level monetary policy, which could be used to adjust internal 
imbalance, is minimised. For pro-EMU supporters, this theory can be interpreted 
as asserting that, once a country enters a common currency area, even if it did 
not satisfy the criteria ex ante, eventually through economic integration (e.g. 
improved trading relationships with other members of the currency union) this 
country could satisfy the criteria ex post. This argument implies that even if EMU 
is established with non-optimal members, it will still shift towards an optimal 
currency area through continued economic interaction, and the single monetary 
policy is more likely to be union wide appropriate over time. 
 
This theory is known as endogeneity hypothesis of OCA. Frankel and Rose (1997) 
point out that, with the creation of the currency union and removal of trading 
barriers (such as removing custom and border controls, removing exchange rate 
uncertainty and transaction costs etc.), the correlation between movements of 
key business cycle variables (e.g. GDP, consumption, exports and imports etc.) 
will increase if intra-trades make up the majority of trading patterns or common 
demand shocks prevail. Their theory implies that the international trade pattern 
and international business cycle correlation are endogenous and based on the 
forward-looking model. The principal foundation of the endogeneity hypothesis 
is built upon on the Lucas critique (Lucas 1976) which states that a prediction 
based on historical data, especially highly aggregated data, would be invalid if 
the relationship between relevant variables could be altered by conducting 
economic policies. If the policy change alters the relationship between the 
variables, then the future relationship between the variables may not be fully 
represented by the historical relationship.  
 
In summary, according to the pro-EMU theory (Frankel and Rose 1997, Frankel 
1999, de Grauwe and Mongelli 2005), countries which have a close relationship 
of trading will have a high interdependence on one another’s national income. 
Thus, they may be able to consider forming a currency union according to the 
endogeneity hypothesis, and the correlation of business cycles should improve 
since it is closely related to trade integration between members. This implies 
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that the high level of intra-trade in Europe would enforce the synchronisation of 
business cycles, which eventually could lead Europe to become a common 
currency area.  
 
Empirical works which focus on Europe tend to suggest the endogeneity 
hypothesis is pronounced for Europe. Artis and Zhang (1995) show that the 
increasing trade integration among European monetary system countries had 
shifted those member states towards a universal business cycle. Baxter and 
Koupartitas (2005) find that bilateral trade plays an important role here, since 
countries that have more trade with each other have more correlated business 
cycles. Fidrmuc (2004) confirms Frankel and Rose’s endogeneity hypothesis, 
though argue that, rather than increasing trade directly affecting the 
convergence, it depends more on increasing structural similarities of foreign 
trade. 
 
Furthermore, some other studies have shown that the monetary integration of 
the single currency can lead to a significant improvement in the volume of trade 
among members, which provides the fundamental basis for the argument of the 
endogeneity hypothesis. Frankel and Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose (2002) 
report some extremely large positive effects of monetary integration on the 
trading relations among members of the common currency. The former claimed 
that, between two countries sharing the same currency, trade is three times 
bigger than if they traded with different currencies. Glick and Rose’s results are 
based on a much larger volume of data and reach similar conclusions, which is 
that a common currency can double the volume of trade between members.  
 
In contrast to those studies that are pro endogeneity view of OCA theory, the 
counter-endogeneity view, which is represented by the specialisation hypothesis 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992 & 1996, Krugman 1993), argues that trade 
integration will enhance the specialisation of each country’s production since 
countries will tend to export more of those goods concerning which they have 
comparative advantages. This, in turn, will reduce income correlation and means 
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that if the country did not fully satisfy the OCA criteria before they joined the 
union, the trade integration may not help them move towards satisfaction of 
them ex post. Krugman (1993) applies data from North America to show that the 
increase in trade integration actually causes further increases in divergence 
rather than raising income correlation and economic convergence, as promised 
by Frankel’s theory. This result would suggest the creation of a currency union in 
North America could be costly.  
 
Furthermore, another counterargument (Baxter and Stockman 1989, Bordo and 
Helbling 2003, Bergman 2004), which works in a similar fashion to Krugman’s 
specialisation hypothesis, points out that the monetary integration of EMU may 
not be able to enforce the correlation of business cycles. Their argument focuses 
on the costs of loss of exchange rate policy. For instance, under a fixed exchange 
rate regime, the central bank is required to maintain its peg on the objective 
currency. Or, if the economy joins the currency union, it will lose its monetary 
sovereignty. That, in turn, means that, during the asymmetric shocks, if the 
exchange rate is no longer available as a shock-absorbing mechanism, it can 
force all the adjustments to take place in the real economy rather than via the 
exchange rate.  
 
  The empirical studies of how the exchange rate may have impacts on the co-
movements of growth dynamics among countries are mixed. Baxter and 
Stockman (1989) show no evidence of the positive relation between stability of 
exchange rate and business cycle synchronisation. Bordo and Helbling (2003) 
confirm that the correlation of GDP growth is not significantly dependent on the 
relative length of the year in which the exchange rate was pegged. Bergman 
(2004) provides direct empirical evidence to support the idea that the exchange 
rate may function as a shock-absorbing tool. He reports that the synchronisation 
of business cycles is positively related to the volatility of the exchange rate. 
However, other empirical studies finished with a different conclusion – the 
higher the volatility of the exchange rate, the lower the co-movement of cycles 
(Otto et al. 2001, Inklaar et al. 2008).   
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In the above section, we have reviewed both traditional and modern views of 
OCA theory. Although EMU does not fully meet the criteria set out by the 
traditional OCA theory, the modern view of the OCA theory – the endogeneity 
hypothesis – has provided a theoretical argument for creating EMU among non-
optimal members/regions. This theory suggests that even in a currency union 
that is not satisfying the OCA criteria ex ante, trade integration among member 
states can improve the situation ex post. This implies that the improvements of 
synchronisation of business cycles, which are caused by intra-trade in the 
Eurozone, can eventually solve the ‘one size fits all’ issue. The trading pattern in 
the Eurozone does suggest that the key trading partner of each member is 
actually other fellow members of EMU. Therefore, this may reflect some 
possibilities of improvement in the convergence of members’ economies. 
However, as we also mentioned above, the anti-EMU argument also suggests the 
theoretical possibility of EMU remaining as a currency union with low levels of 
co-movement of overall economic activities across members. Hence, it is 
important to the policymaker to review the issue of synchronisation of business 
cycles in the Eurozone, in particular to understand whether there are a grounds 
for implementing a successful single monetary policy.  
 
 
3.3 Literature review – measuring of synchronisation and 
previous empirical studies  
 
  The approach to measuring the business cycle synchronisation, at a broad level, 
can be categorised into two types. One is the correlation method, and the other 
is known as the shock accounting approach. In this subsection, we will review 
these two approaches and their empirical studies as well.  
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3.3.1 Correlation method 
The correlation method is the one of the most widely used approaches for 
investigating the convergence of business cycles. It evaluates the degrees of 
business cycle convergence by testing if the key output variables (e.g. GDP or 
industrial production (IP)) for the pair of objective countries are moving together 
in the same direction. The most commonly adopted approaches of the 
correlation method are: the dynamic correlation measure (Croux et al. 2001), the 
concordance index (Harding and Pagan 2002) and the phase-adjusted 
correlations method (Koopman and Azevedo 2003).  
 
  Croux et al. (2001) suggest the dynamic correlation measure of business cycle 
synchronisation, which is defined as the co-spectrum between two series over 
the product of the spectra of each series. The advantage of using this method is 
that researchers can estimate the extent of co-movement within a group of 
countries without selecting a base country as a reference. However, this method 
does perform differently between finite and infinite time series. The authors 
define their approach as tending to measure the fluctuations in the series over a 
certain time period, which they call a frequency band. In the case of infinite time 
series, within a certain time period the dynamic correlation between two 
objective series is equal to the regular correlation between two band-passed 
series. In contrast, if we have a time series, which is approaching finite, then the 
equality between correlation of two series and correlation of two band-passed 
series no longer holds. This means that when the dynamic correlation measure of 
Croux et al. (2001) deals with large time series, it tends to produce less accurate 
estimations. Based on the work of Croux et al. (2001), the business cycle 
coherence approach was developed by Hallett and Richter (2004). The 
characteristic of this approach is that the method will be less sensitive to the 
variation of time. That, in turn, allows the research to test the degree of 
correlation between two series for both the cases of single frequency and how 
this changes over time. However, statistically it is difficult to make the judgement 
about the importance of those changes (Hallett and Richter 2004).  
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The second approach – the concordance index method, which is proposed by 
Harding and Pagan (2002) – uses a binary indicator variable of recessions and 
expansions to measure the co-movement between two series. They define the 
index as the percentage of the time when the two series are in the same phase 
of the business cycles. This actually means that although we are still estimating 
the co-movements of two series, this is a nonparametric method since we have 
to measure the business cycles by using the classical method first. Given this 
feature, the index may work more flexibly than parametric-type correlation 
analysis, because it is possible to artificially select the method of defining 
expansion and recession. However, since the index is based on the length of the 
cycles, a drawback of this nonparametric method is that it does not consider any 
other information except length of time.   
 
The phase-adjusted correlation method proposed by Koopman and Azevedo 
(2003) is a model that estimates unobserved components that account for time 
varying between cycles and time varying phase difference. The first feature of 
this method is that the contemporaneous correlation can be separated into parts 
due to differences in the position of phase shift (the cycle of two countries) and a 
‘phase-shift’-adjusted correlation. Second, they allow for time variation in both 
the phase shift and the phase-shift-adjusted correlation. Although this last 
innovation seems valuable, they can only implement their method by imposing a 
monotone time function. In other words, the correlation can either go up or 
down over the sample period. While this provides useful information, visual 
inspection of their cyclical component series suggests that periods of stronger 
and weaker correlation alternate. 
 
The study by Fatás (1997), which uses employment growth as the measure of 
business cycles, concludes that during the period 1966–2002 the correlation of 
cycles of 12 EU countries was higher during the post-EMS period than the pre-
EMS time. By using a large volume of OECD data on industrial production (IP), 
which runs from 1960 to 1995, Artis and Zhang (1999) conclude that the 
European business cycles became more similar after the creation of European 
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ERM. However, their result was not confirmed by a later study. Inklaar and de 
Haan (2001) use the same data source with a similar time period (1960 to 1997) 
as the paper by Artis and Zhang (1999), but, using only an HP filter to measure 
the cycles, they find that the European cycles are better correlated with 
Germany rather than both Germany and the USA as in the previous study. They 
also conclude that the correlation is higher from 1971 to 1979 than 1979 to 1987. 
Therefore, there is no evidence to prove that the business cycles became more 
synchronised after the establishment of the ERM in 1979.  
 
A similar conclusion is drawn by Agresti and Mojon (2001) and Belo (2001). 
They use GDP as the measure of the cycles, and report that the countries of the 
euro area have a high and increasing correlation of cycles over time. Massmann 
and Mitchell (2004), who use monthly OECD IP data from 1960 to 2000, find that 
EMU business cycle convergence has been really mixed over the last four 
decades. According to the authors’ results, despite the mean correlation of EMU 
members being positive on average, they have switched between periods of 
convergence and divergence. Before the mid-1970s, the correlation was moving 
upwards with a peak level of almost 0.8 for most of the 12 EMU business cycles. 
Then the degrees of correlation of cycles gradually fell to zero until the mid-
1980s, but the results are statistically insignificant. During the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the correlation became more volatile. It began with a quick recovery 
that pushed the value of correlation almost back to its previous peak. However, a 
rapid fall followed afterwards in the early 1990s.  
 
The studies that cover a short sample size (from the 1980s to the early 2000s), 
such as Altavilla (2004) and Darvas and Szapary (2004), have found the evidence 
to show that business cycle synchronisation was improved during the run-up 
period to EMU in the 1990s. But the latter do not only rely on the quarterly GDP; 
the authors also focus on the variables of components of GDP. Besides the 
estimation of correlation, Darvas and Szpary (2004) also analyse the volatility and 
persistence of the cycle. Their results suggest that the core EMU members 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium have a higher 
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degree of business cycle convergence than other members of the euro area. The 
countries that have the lowest level of correlation, especially in terms of 
expenditure of consumption and service, are Ireland, Finland and Portugal.  
 
Among more recent literature, Camacho et al. (2008) evaluate the 
synchronisation of European countries with data covering the period from 1960 
to 2004. These authors find evidence that is against the argument of a common 
business cycle, in terms of length, depth and shape, in either the EU or the euro 
area. This result reinforced the argument of de Haan et al. (2007), who present 
findings emphasising the difficulty of choosing an appropriate monetary policy 
stance given the actual differences in the business cycle features. In contrast, 
Enders et al. (2010) conclude that an increase in the correlation of output and 
some of its components has been found during a pre-Euro (1985–96) to Euro 
(1999–2007) period. They, however, do not focus on the divergence between 
core and peripheral Euro area countries. 
 
3.3.2 Alternative measurement – shock accounting  
The correlation methods for both parametric and nonparametric approaches 
that we have mentioned above do not consider the drive element of business 
cycles. Therefore, correlation methods are able to answer the question of 
whether the cycles become similar, but incapable of investigating the factors 
which may contribute to the convergence of business cycles. In comparison to 
the correlation method, the alternative approaches – shock accounting method, 
which are made up by Vector Autoregressive model and factor models, are used 
to answer the above two questions.   
 
The simple review of the shock accounting approach can be seen from the 
general model which is described in Clark and Shin (2000) as:                                   
 tirtitrttir ucbae ,,,,,,   (3-1) 
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The model demonstrated that the shock e in industry i in region r (or 
representing a country) depends on the common shock a, region/country-
specific shock b, industry-i-specific shock c and idiosyncratic shock u. The 
underlying assumption of this is that there is no correlation among various 
shocks, and an industry-specific shock at time t is a shock to all countries but not 
in other industries. This identification assumption seems to be overly restricted; 
however, the authors argue that it in fact can provide a low-bound benchmark 
estimation, which can tell us the importance of industry- or country-specific 
shocks. Although this model is simplified to the general level where dynamics 
cannot be assessed, it is easy for us to see the key point of this type of approach 
(Clark and Shin 2000). Equation (3-1) only represents a simple version of the 
shock accounting approach. The relatively modern approaches, which are based 
in the same spirit, are used to overcome the limitations of correlation analysis of 
business cycle synchronisation. This more sophisticated approach, which can be 
employed in this chapter, is the dynamic factor model (DFM). The basic idea of 
this approach is that the common movement in a cross section of n stationary 
time series can be captured by common factors, and unobservable variables can 
influence the evolution of all series (Breitung et al. 2005).  
 
DFM has more advantages than the other type of shock accounting approach – 
the VAR method (Forni et al. 2000, Sybille 2012). First, factor models can cope 
with many variables without running into scarce degrees of freedom problems 
often faced in regression-based analyses. Exploiting a lot of information can lead 
to more precise forecasts and macroeconomic analyses. A second advantage of 
factor models is that idiosyncratic movements, which possibly include 
measurement error and local shocks, can be eliminated. This yields a more 
reliable signal for policymakers and prevents them from reacting to idiosyncratic 
movements. The final advantage is that factor models can remain agnostic about 
the structure of the economy. This means the analysis does not need to rely on 
tight assumptions, which is sometimes the case in structural models. For instance, 
the structural VAR model, which is also a common approach in this field, requires 
the researcher to take a stance on the variables to decide which one determines 
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the outcome, and where the number of variables determines the number of 
shocks. (More detailed discussion of DFM will be available in the methodology 
chapter.) 
 
  Beine et al. (2000), who apply a time series VAR model with 23 years’ monthly 
IP data of a group of EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands), find that common cyclical movements do not exist among these 
countries. That, in turn, implies these key members of EMU do not constitute an 
OCA area. The later work of Artis (2004) also reaches a conclusion that is not in 
favour of supports to EMU. In addition to this, by using GDP as the indicator of 
synchronisation, the results of this paper contradict his previous work (Artis and 
Zhang 1997 & 1999). The author discovered that actually, among European 
countries, many do not move along a similar phase of cycles; therefore, the 
European business cycle is rather an elusive phenomenon. However, Kaufman 
(2003) has a contradictory result to Beine et al. (2000). He also used the IP and 
points out that the European countries are a coherent group according to the 
cyclical movements.  
 
Monfort et al. (2003) adopt the DFM with a selection of quarterly GDP for G7 
countries over the 22-year period between 1970 and 2002. They point out that 
France, Germany and Italy form a coherent area distinct from the others. This 
result is in line with the paper of Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003), which uses a 
large volume of monthly IP data from 1963 to 1994, and states that for EMU 
countries the correlation with the European component is much stronger than 
the world component. Mansour (2003) estimates the annual GDP growth for 113 
countries by using DFM, and shows that the European factor is generally weaker 
than the world factor. However, he also draws positive conclusions about EMU – 
that is, that the EU is the most integrated region compared to others. In contrast, 
Kose et al. (2003), who use variable of output and its key components 
(consumption and investment) over a similar time period as Lumsdaine and 
Prasad (2003), draw a different conclusion. The authors show that the common 
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European factors only have a minor impact on the fluctuations of European 
aggregates. This implies that there is no evidence of a European cycle.  
 
Siedschlag and Tondl (2011) analyse the impact of trade integration and 
specialisation on the business cycle synchronisation in EMU. The result of this 
paper supports the optimistic view of the euro area. These authors show that the 
deeper trade integration with the euro area had a pronounced direct positive 
effect on the synchronisation of regional output growth within the euro area. 
Industrial specialisation, which is the result of monetary integration, was a 
source of cyclical divergence. However, it also had an indirect positive effect on 
regional output growth synchronisation via its positive effect on trade 
integration. Giannone et al. (2010) and Lehwald (2012) reach similar conclusions 
that emphasise that the business cycle has actually diverged between the core 
and periphery groups. The synchronisation of the main macroeconomic variables 
has increased in the core area of EMU since the creation of the union. In contrast, 
inside the periphery group the co-movements of key variables have declined 
during the post-EMU period. Lee (2012) also has unfavourable results on the 
euro area. His finding is that output and inflation among EMU members was 
moving towards synchronisation during the run-up period to the euro area. 
However, there is little evidence to show that EMU factor still prevailed after the 
operation of a single currency.  
 
 Overall, the evidence on business cycle synchronisation in the euro area is 
mixed and it partly depends on the periods defined and the benchmark that is 
used. However, most of the current evidence suggests that periods of greater 
and lesser synchronisation tend to alternate. Still, there is quite some evidence 
that, during the 1990s, business cycle synchronisation in the euro area increased.  
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3.4 Methodology of analysis – dynamic factor model 
 
In the earlier section, we reviewed the prior literature on business cycle 
synchronisation in the Eurozone. The approaches to evaluating the co-
movements of cycles can be distinguished as the correlation method and the 
shock accounting method. For this particular research, we are aiming to answer 
the question of how the business cycles of the original twelve EMU members 
have converged since the creation of the single currency union. Therefore, we 
need to measure the degrees of synchronisation by considering all twelve 
members’ data; thus, the co-movements of 12 time series of overall economic 
activities are studied. In this subsection, we will explain our chosen econometric 
approach before the presentation of our empirical results.   
     
3.4.1 Dynamic factor model  
For this particular research, we aim to investigate the synchronisation of the 
Eurozone business cycles. Moreover, understanding the potential cause of the 
synchronisation is another objective of this study. Since the Eurozone only has a 
relatively short history and data availability is rather unbalanced across different 
member countries, the problem of a low level of observations of business cycle 
variables may not be avoidable. The macroeconomic-related studies usually face 
the problem of data availability, especially in terms of numbers of observations. 
Since the post-war period, many series of variables have become available across 
the different fields of macroeconomics. However, regardless of the sizes of series, 
the numbers of observations of this macroeconomic series are relatively low. 
They are either in annual form, e.g. 20 to 40 years, or in a quarterly format that 
provides a relatively large data set. This fundamental issue of macroeconomic 
research may only be eliminated through the passage of time. In the short term, 
it still remains crucial to our work, especially when we need to study the 
dynamics of macroeconomic phenomena and policies.  
 
_________________________Chapter 3 Business cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone  
 
70 
 
In terms of methods of research, despite the correlation approach being one of 
the most widely used methods in this field (Artis and Zhang 1995, Belo 2001, 
Fidrmue and Korhonen 2003, Darvas and Szapáry 2005, Gayer 2007, Levasseur 
2008, Kappler et al. 2008, Gouveia and Correia 2008, Gogas and Kothroulas 2009), 
it also suffers several drawbacks. First, the correlation coefficient must be 
estimated at a sub-period of the sample. This means different sub-periods could 
lead to very different estimates of the euro effect on business cycle 
synchronisation (Artis and Zhang 1997 & 1999, Inklaar and de Haan 2001). 
Second, it does not allow for a separation of idiosyncratic components and 
common co-movements. Third, it is basically a static analysis that fails to capture 
any dynamics in the co-movement. Furthermore, in addition to these important 
drawbacks of correlation approach, for this study we are trying to discover the 
business cycle synchronisation for the Eurozone as whole, rather than looking at 
a bivariate correlation of a pair of countries. In order to overcome the problem 
of relatively short data sets of the Eurozone countries, and conduct an analysis 
for the entire EMU, we can adopt the dynamic factor model (DFM) approach to 
conducting this analysis.  
 
Furthermore, since the late 1980s, in comparison to the early definitions of 
business cycles e.g. the classical cycle of NBER and the growth cycle of OECD, the 
views on this topic have been further developed into a much wider international 
context which considers economic interactions among different countries. 
Attention has been focused on the feature of business cycles that was originally 
proposed by Burns and Wesley (1946). The authors state this feature to be the 
co-movement of individual economic series and different behaviour of 
economies during their expansion and contractions. This theoretical concept of 
business cycles can be captured by using DFM, which enables us to obtain the 
common factor from a set of many macroeconomic series. That can eventually 
be used to assess the dynamics of economic activities among different countries, 
which are the indictors of synchronisation of business cycles.  
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Generally, DFM has some advantages over other methods in various respects 
(Forni et al. 2000, Lehwald 2012). First, factor models can cope with many 
variables without running into the scarce degrees of freedom problems often 
faced in regression-based analyses. Exploiting a lot of information can lead to 
more precise forecasts and macroeconomic analyses. For example, in 
comparison to the VAR method, VAR approach attempts to capture the co-
movements among different series requires adequate degrees of freedom, which 
sometimes can be difficult to have  as the available length of the macroeconomic 
data. This is particularly relevant to the case of EMU given that it only has a 
relatively short data set of one decade. A second advantage of factor models is 
that idiosyncratic movements, which possibly include measurement error and 
local shocks, can be eliminated. This yields a more reliable signal for 
policymakers and prevents them from reacting to idiosyncratic movements. The 
final advantage is that the factor model can remain agnostic about the structure 
of the economy. This means the analysis does not need to rely on tight 
assumptions, which is sometimes the case in structural models.  
 
The basic idea of this approach is that the high dimensional vector of time 
series Yt is driven by the latent dynamic unobserved factors ft and vector of mean 
zero idiosyncratic disturbances et, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
factor innovations (Breitung et al. 2005, Stock 2010). The simple DFM model can 
be written as:                        
where, Yt and et represent an N series which is N×1 vector; there are M dynamic 
factors ft and error terms ηt. L represents the lag operator, and the lag 
polynomial λ(L) and ψ(L) are vectors of N×M and M×M respectively. The term 
λ(L) ft represents the common component of Yt, where each individual λ(L) is the 
dynamic factor loading λi(L) for the i
th series Yi,t.  
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There are two main approaches of DFM: the linear space model and the 
generalised dynamic factor model. These are usually also known as parametric 
(first generation) and nonparametric (second generation) models of DFM (Stock 
2010). The former, through the linear state space model, uses the Kalman filter 
to compute the Gaussian likelihood, and the parameters are estimated by 
maximum likelihood, then the Kalman filter is used to obtain efficient estimates 
of the factors (Stock and Watson 1989, Sargent 1989, Quah and Sargent 1993). 
This approach provides optimal estimates of the latent factors. However, the 
main drawback is that this model is usually only capable of handling relatively 
small numbers of parameters and series. The second generation (Forni and 
Reichlin 1998) of estimators entailed nonparametric estimation with large N 
using cross-sectional averaging methods, primarily through principal components 
methods. The key result in this approach is that the principal components 
estimator of the space spanned by the factors is consistent. Moreover, if N is 
sufficiently large, the factors are estimated precisely enough to be treated as 
data in subsequent regressions. The main disadvantage of this approach is that 
this model necessitates a very large number of cross sections of idiosyncratic 
components in order to be valid. 
 
For empirical studies, there is no evidence of which approach is superior to 
another. The principle for selecting the appropriate approach should follow the 
features of these two methods and the available data sets; in other word, the 
size of cross sections that is going to be considered by research. The 
nonparametric method of DFM is the common choice among the recent studies 
on the synchronisation of Eurozone business cycles (Giannone et al. 2010, 
Siedschlag and Tondl 2011, Lehwald 2012, Lee 2012). However, these authors 
have not given any justifications for not selecting the first generation of DFM. 
Similar studies which focus on the G7 and East Asia area (Monfort et al. 2003, 
Moneta and Rüffer 2009) adopt the parametric method, and have shown 
evidence of the capability of parametric methods in research which focuses on 
dozens of countries. The consideration of which type of DFM should be 
employed for a particular study needs to take the numbers of variables of the 
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analysis into account. Obviously, if the research contains large numbers of series, 
then the second generation of DFM has to be adopted, as the first generation 
cannot cope with such problems due to computational issues. However, if only 
limited numbers of variables will be used, then the first generation of DFM 
should not be automatically rejected by researchers.   
 
 Moreover, parametric-based DFM also contains the following advantages. First, 
the method can handle data sets which include mixed frequencies or missing 
data. Second, when the analysis has a flexible range of specification e.g. non-
stationary DFM and idiosyncratic noise with strong cross-correlation, the 
parametric DFM approach can be more efficient than the principal-components-
method-based second-generation DFM method. In contrast, second-generation 
DFM is more appropriate when the model contains large numbers of series. 
However, the performance of principal-components-based DFM will deteriorate 
if there is heteroscedasticity or the idiosyncratic noises have strong serial 
correlation (Stock and Waston 2002). Moreover, it can be inefficient when the 
explanatory power of the factors does not strongly dominate the explanatory 
power of the idiosyncratic noise (Onatski 2012).    
 
Another advantage of the parametric model is that the parametric state space 
formulation can handle data irregularities (Harvey 1989). For example, if some 
series are observed weekly and some are observed monthly, the latent process 
for the factors in DFM can be formulated as evolving on a weekly time scale. But 
the dimension of the measurement equation depends on which series are 
actually observed. That is, the row dimension of matrix for common factors’ 
coefficients (matrix B in Equation (3-5) would change depending on the variables 
actually observed at the given date. Moreover, since this is a fairly flexible model, 
the second advantage is that the model can be used to distinguish between 
common factor for the entire area of research and cross-country spill-over 
effects, which may also contribute to synchronisation of cycles (Monfort et al. 
2003, Moneta and Rüffer 2009). 
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Thus, in this chapter, we will follow the methods of Monfort et al. (2003) and 
Moneta and Rüffer (2009) and employ the first-generation approach of DFM for 
our analysis. Let’s start with the simple static factor model, which can be written 
as: 
 
where the common movement in a cross section of n stationary series Yt can be 
captured by k common unobservable factors; B is an n×k matrix of loading 
coefficients; Ft is a k×1 vector of factors; and t is an n-dimensional stationary 
process. This is also called strict factor model, where t is assumed to be 
uncorrelated. The main drawback of this model is that it does not allow the 
existence of dynamic relations between factors and other variables. Therefore, 
we may introduce the element of dynamics into Equation (3-3) to transfer the 
static model to DFM:        
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Since we are following Monfort et al. (2003) and Moneta and Rüffer (2009) by 
adopting the linear state space model for DFM approach, the model can 
therefore be written as:                        
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and the variance–covariance matrix of the error term ε is assumed to be diagonal:  
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  This model assumes that the cross section of n stationary series Yt depends on 
the country-specific autoregressive component of order one; there are k 
unobservable factors Ft which are common to all series; and the εt and ηt are 
independent Gaussian white noise terms. The matrix B is factor loadings, which 
measures the impact of common factors on each series of Yi. Matrix A is 
assumed to be diagonal, therefore capturing the core notion of the DFM that the 
co-movements of the multiple time series arise from F. For the second equation 
of the state space model, the C matrix is also set to be diagonal, which ensures 
the dynamics of the unobservable factors f are univariate.  
 
In the linear state space model, each matrix and error term is a function of a 
finite dimensional unknown vector of parameters and the past value of vector of 
parameters and the past value of Yt; thus the model is parametric and can be 
estimated by the Kalman filter (Harvey 2008). The Kalman filter provides at each 
step k the likelihood function for k+1 conditional on information given at k. 
Therefore, the log-likelihood function for the entire sample can be constructed 
as a by-product of the Kalman filtering (Monfort et al. 2003). Furthermore, as the 
numbers of time series and observations are relatively small compared with 
microeconomic and large-scale macroeconomic studies, the maximum likelihood 
approach used in the parametric type of DFM does not run into computational 
problems.  
 
Moreover, given the flexibility of this model, which contains a restricted vector 
autoregressive equation, spill-over effects among Eurozone members is 
possibility to be identified by modifying the restrictions on the VAR part of the 
DFM model. This can be done by relaxing the restrictions that we have posed on 
matrix A in Equation (3-5). Initially, matrix A is assumed to be diagonal; if we let A 
become non-diagonal, the model would become a mixture of a first-order VAR 
and a dynamic factor model. The part of any idiosyncratic shock which causes 
spill-over effects will no longer be categorised as a common shock but will, 
rather, be captured by the off-diagonal elements of the A matrix. 
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3.4.2 Variables for measuring overall economic activities 
In this research, we are trying to identify the convergence of the business cycle 
among EMU members; in other words, the co-movements of overall 
macroeconomic aggregates will be studied. For measuring overall economic 
activities, the most widely and commonly used variables for measuring 
synchronisation of business cycles are GDP and industrial production (Monfort et 
al. 2003, Moneta and Rüffer 2009, Giannone et al. 2010, Siedschlag and Tondl 
2011, Lehwald 2012, Lee 2012). The GDP is usually collected on a quarterly basis 
and it is common to include the components of GDP in data, such as 
consumption, investment, or exports. For measuring the synchronisation of 
cycles, there is no consensus view on which particular variable is absolutely 
superior to others. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the broadest possible 
variables of output. Given that the aim of this chapter is to establish the 
understanding of overall co-movements of aggregate economic activities among 
member countries of EMU, we will follow previous works and use real GDP and 
industrial production for this analysis. Furthermore, since the output variables 
are commonly available on an annual or quarterly basis, the monthly industrial 
production data can also be included as an alternative high 
frequency/observation measurement of cycles.  
 
For this research, we aim to investigate the synchronisation of business cycles 
for the Eurozone members after the establishment of EMU. Since the newer 
members of the Eurozone all joined EMU recently, we will only concentrate on 
the original 12 members of the Eurozone (Euro12), which are Austria, Belgium, 
France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. Overall economic activity for the Euro12 countries is 
measured in quarterly real GDP growth rate, which is provided by the Main 
Economic Indicators from OECD. The data period for real GDP growth is from 
1985:Q1–2012:Q2. Quarterly data on consumption, investment and exports is 
collected from Eurostat, covering the periods 2000:Q1–2011:Q1, 2000:Q1–
2011:Q1 and 1999:Q1–2012:Q2 respectively. Consumption is measured in 
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millions of euros at constant price; gross fixed capital formation is used to 
represent investment, which is also measured in millions of euros with constant 
price. Both consumption and investment data are log-differenced to render the 
data stationary. Data on exports is measured in the real rate of growth. Monthly 
real industrial production (IP) growth rates for the period 1980:m1 to 2012:m2 
are collected from OECD Key Short Term Economic Indicators.  
   
 
3.5 Empirical results – synchronisation of Eurozone business 
cycles 
 
In this section, we will present the results from dynamic factor model (DFM) 
analysis to evaluate to what extent the individual aggregate economic activities 
of each member can be explained by the common factors of the whole union, 
and hence to investigate the degree of synchronisation of the Eurozone original 
12 members’ (Euro12) business cycles. The initial step of the analysis in this 
chapter is to estimate the common factor for Euro12’s real GDP growth by using 
the DFM that is specified in Equation (3-5). The specification for this model is 
that the matrix A in Equation (3-5) is set to be diagonal, and there is one 
common factor, which can be used to capture the co-movements of Euro12 
members’ business cycles. This setting of the model restricts each country’s real 
GDP growth at time t only depending on its own previous lag. The co-movement 
of real GDP growth fluctuations among Euro12 members, which may be the 
result of common shocks or spill-over effects between members, are captured by 
the common factor F. Hence, although the model does not directly measure the 
interlinkage among members’ economic activities, we do assume that spill-over 
effects exist in the union.  
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3.5.1 Co-movement and common factor analysis for Euro12 members’ business 
cycles – a comparison between pre- and post-EMU periods  
 
3.5.1.1 Preliminary estimation 
By using the DFM method, we have obtained initial estimates of the 
parameters for Equation (3-5) by using real GDP growth for all Euro12 members 
in the period 1985:Q1–1998:Q4. The estimation of this time period helps us 
establish a comparison benchmark, which can later be used for comparison with 
the results for EMU Stage Three period, to see whether there is any evidence of 
improvements of business synchronisation inside the Eurozone. In Table 3-1 we 
present results for the parameters estimation of DFM. The coefficients for 
idiosyncratic autoregressive αi are significant for most of the series except 
France, Portugal and Spain. Furthermore, the factor loading βi for the Euro12 
common factor is statistically significant for most members besides Luxembourg. 
This indicates that the dynamics of economic growth among most Euro12 
members depend on both of their own autoregressive elements and the Euro12 
common factors.    
 
Table 3-1 Parameter estimation for DFM – Euro12 members’ real GDP growth 
(1985:Q1–1998:Q4) 
  α β  α β 
Austria 0.814 0.399 Ireland 0.933 0.469 
 (0.000)
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.070) 
Belgium 0.648 0.508 Italy 0.653 0.399 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Finland 0.895 0.511 Luxembourg 0.918 0.205 
 (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.635) 
France 0.820 0.468 Netherlands 0.755 0.562 
 (0.695) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Germany 0.804 0.471 Portugal 0.009 0.795 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.973) (0.000) 
Greece 0.290 0.375 Spain 0.079 0.643 
 (0.025) (0.000)  (0.686) (0.000) 
  c    
common factor F 0.980     
 (0.000)    
Yi,t = αiYt-1 + βiFt + εit 
Ft = cFt-1+ηt 
Note: numbers in brackets are the p-values  
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Figure 3-1  Common factor for Euro12 real GDP growth (1985:Q1–1998:Q4) 
 
    Source: produced by the author  
 
The common factor for Euro12, which can capture the co-movements of all 
series in this data set, can be used to identify the dynamic of economic growth 
for Euro12 as a whole by plotting them against the time variable. In Figure 3-1we 
can identify a clear economic downturn during the early 1990s. This common 
recession was triggered by the rise in oil prices caused by the first Gulf War, and 
rising real interest rates in Europe due to the reunification of Germany as the 
Bundesbank responded to the expansionary fiscal policy in Germany by 
increasing its interest rate. Furthermore, during autumn 1992 and summer 1993 
the recession culminated in Europe as the result of the ERM crisis (Jonung and 
Hagberg 2005).  
 
    In order to carry out the comparison of results both pre- and post-EMU, we 
keep the same settings of DFM and run the estimation again for the period 
1999:Q1–2012:Q2. In Table 3-2 we present the estimation of parameters for the 
model by looking into the post-EMU period. Except for France, the dynamic of 
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element at the 10% significance level. The coefficients for each country’s factor 
loading are significant, except for Greece. The interesting part of Table 3-2 is that 
besides Portugal and Spain the values of factor loading βi are generally much 
higher than the values in Table 3-1. Although the factor loading dropped for 
Portugal and Spain, the fall in value is small. Moreover, the coefficient of factor 
loading for Greece is statistically insignificant. This result may provide initial 
evidence to suggest that for Euro12 the synchronisation of cycles may be 
improved during Stage Three of EMU. However, before making any conclusion, 
we need to do a few more tests by using the results which are obtained through 
DFM analysis. Again, by plotting the common factors for the post-EMU period 
(see Figure 3-2), we can clearly identify a significant drop in the dynamic of 
growth since the 2007, which reflects the recent late-2000s global financial crisis. 
And there is another minor decline in the level of economic growth for Euro12 
during the beginning of Stage Three of EMU, which may reflect the bursting of 
the IT bubble in the early 2000s. 
Table 3-2 Parameter estimation for DFM – Euro12 members’ real GDP growth 
         (1999:Q1–2012:Q2) 
 α β  α β 
Austria 0.773 0.805 Ireland 0.543 1.450 
 (0.000)
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Belgium 0.757 0.780 Italy 0.961 0.960 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Finland 0.526 1.248 Luxembourg 0.302 1.457 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.036) (0.000) 
France 0.286 0.685 Netherlands 0.844 0.817 
 (0.127) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Germany 0.961 1.161 Portugal 0.778 0.599 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Greece 0.890 0.321 Spain 0.972 0.553 
 (0.000) (0.214)  (0.000) (0.000) 
  c    
common factor F 0.950    
   (0.000)    
Yi,t = αiYt-1 + βiFt + εit 
Ft = cFt-1+ηt 
Note: numbers in brackets are the p-values  
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Figure 3-2 Common factors for Euro12 real GDP growth (1999:Q1–2012:Q2) 
 
   Source: produced by the author 
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Table 3-3 Cross-country correlation (1985:Q1–1998:Q4) 
  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg  Netherlands Portugal  Spain F 
Austria 1.000             
Belgium 0.585 1.000            
Finland 0.068 0.451 1.000           
France 0.663 0.796 0.552 1.000          
Germany 0.722 0.515 -0.190 0.444 1.000         
Greece 0.303 0.424 0.159 0.380 0.177 1.000        
Ireland 0.233 0.329 0.484 0.285 0.041 0.134 1.000       
Italy 0.450 0.695 0.501 0.781 0.430 0.210 0.095 1.000      
Luxembourg 0.411 0.299 0.026 0.416 0.402 0.274 -0.341 0.313 1.000     
Netherlands 0.561 0.631 0.412 0.579 0.460 0.405 0.471 0.368 0.275 1.000    
Portugal 0.490 0.688 0.463 0.785 0.453 0.276 0.255 0.616 0.363 0.503 1.000   
Spain 0.537 0.707 0.417 0.731 0.458 0.371 0.199 0.536 0.432 0.530 0.883 1.000  
F 0.672 0.694 0.372 0.897 0.563 0.345 0.272 0.702 0.470 0.514 0.818 0.744 1.000 
Source: produced by the author 
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Table 3-4 Cross-country correlation (1999:Q1–2012:Q2) 
  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg  Netherlands Portugal  Spain F 
Austria 1.000             
Belgium 0.933 1.000            
Finland 0.904 0.860 1.000           
France 0.917 0.925 0.910 1.000          
Germany 0.877 0.817 0.837 0.821 1.000         
Greece 0.266 0.306 0.337 0.379 0.056 1.000        
Ireland 0.697 0.709 0.684 0.814 0.477 0.551 1.000       
Italy 0.884 0.880 0.906 0.946 0.858 0.360 0.750 1.000      
Luxembourg 0.835 0.825 0.840 0.870 0.652 0.474 0.786 0.809 1.000     
Netherlands 0.895 0.874 0.853 0.894 0.804 0.428 0.729 0.838 0.830 1.000    
Portugal 0.669 0.705 0.689 0.767 0.568 0.507 0.696 0.746 0.823 0.810 1.000   
Spain 0.759 0.733 0.797 0.846 0.551 0.736 0.880 0.808 0.840 0.826 0.745 1.000  
F 0.856 0.808 0.867 0.865 0.765 0.398 0.751 0.863 0.779 0.875 0.642 0.851 1.000 
Source: produced by the author 
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First, we run a simple cross-country correlation test to generate a brief 
overview of the co-movement among real GDP growth for each member of 
Euro12, and the correlation between common factor of Euro12 and individual 
countries’ economic activities. From Table 3-3 and Table 3-4, we can see that the 
cross-country correlations regarding real GDP growth and common factor have 
generally increased across Euro12 members since the establishment of EMU. In 
Table 3-5, we can see the average value of cross-country correlation of real GDP 
growth has improved significantly for each individual member. The lowest 
degree of improvement is Portugal, but it has increased by 34 per cent compared 
with the post-EMU period. The average correlations for most Euro12 countries 
are between sixties and seventies. Nevertheless, for Greece, despite the average 
cross-country correlations being improved by 41 per cent, the average 
correlation for the post-EMU period is only 0.400. This is even lower than some 
countries’ figures for the pre-EMU period e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, Italy etc.  
 
Table 3-5 Average cross-country correlation for real 
GDP growth 
  post-EMU pre-EMU improves 
Austria 0.785 0.457 72% 
Belgium 0.779 0.556 40% 
Finland 0.783 0.304 158% 
France 0.826 0.583 42% 
Germany 0.665 0.356 87% 
Greece 0.400 0.283 41% 
Ireland 0.707 0.199 256% 
Italy 0.798 0.454 76% 
Luxembourg 0.780 0.261 199% 
Netherlands 0.798 0.472 69% 
Portugal 0.702 0.525 34% 
Spain 0.781 0.545 43% 
             Note: average values are calculated from Tables 3-3 and 3-4  
Moreover, since the co-movement of economic activities among Euro12 
members has improved over the last 12 years, this may indicate that the 
correlation between individual countries’ growth dynamics and common factor, 
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which capture the co-movement of fluctuations of all Euro12 countries’ real GDP 
growth, should also be expected to increase. This can also be seen from Table 
3-3 and Table 3-4. The average value for correlation between Euro12 countries 
and common factors has increased from 0.589 to 0.777. And, not surprisingly, as 
the cross-country correlations for real GDP growth are low in both the pre- and 
post-EMU periods for Greece, the correlation for Greek economic activities and 
Euro12 common factors only improved by 0.054 points.  
 
The results of the correlation analysis show that the co-movements of the 
Euro12 countries’ economic activities have improved over the last 12 years. 
Moreover, the correlation between the common factor and individual members’ 
growth dynamics has also increased between the pre- and post-EMU periods. 
However, this only suggests that, for most Euro12 members, their trends of 
economic growth are generally converging to the trend of Euro12. It could be the 
case that the volatilities of common trend and individual trends are still 
insufficiently matching with each other. Therefore, even when an EMU member 
is on a similar trend as the Eurozone, because of the degree of fluctuations 
between individual and common trends, we still cannot conclude that the 
synchronisation of business cycles has sufficiently improved for the Eurozone to 
conduct a union-wide economic policy. This may be especially important to the 
policymakers. Policy designed for the union as a whole, e.g. monetary policy, can 
be too radical for some countries, and may lead to increases in the local price 
level. However, simultaneously it could insufficient for others, as the decline in 
their national output is far greater than the union trend. Therefore, the 
correlation analysis may only provide some preliminary results for testing the 
degree of business cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone.         
 
Since it is necessary to go beyond correlation analysis, therefore, in order to 
investigate the question of to what extent EMU members’ national cycles 
converge with the common trend for Eurozone, first we can plot the common 
factor and national real GDP growth in a diagram. This graphic analysis will be 
repeated twice for both the pre- and post-EMU periods. Then, we can visually 
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check the trends of each pair, to see whether, besides sharing the same direction 
of movements, the degree of their volatilities is also similar between Euro12 
common trend and national growth dynamics. This would allow us to quickly 
obtain some basic insights into synchronisation of business cycles.  
Figure 3-3 Euro12 common factors vs individual members’ real GDP growth – pre- and 
post-EMU periods 
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France 
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Ireland 
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Netherlands 
Pre-EMU                                      Post-EMU 
  
 
Portugal 
Pre-EMU                                      Post-EMU 
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Pre-EMU                                      Post-EMU 
  
  Note: all diagrams are produced by the author  
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in a narrow range. These countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Spain. The common feature of these countries is that the 
national trends and common trends were already sharing similar paths. However, 
for each country, the volatilities of these two trends were quite different. The 
second group is made up of Ireland and Luxembourg. The similarity and volatility 
of trends for the second group were poor during the pre-EMU period. Since the 
establishment of the Eurozone, the similarity of trends has improved, but 
volatility of national trends still remains high relative to the trend of Euro12 
common factor. In the third group, formed by Finland and Portugal, the national 
trends are such that they seem to be more synchronised during the pre-EMU 
period than the post-EMU period. Finally, Greece forms the final group for 
Euro12 members: no improvements in business cycle convergence are revealed 
by comparing its national growth dynamics with the Euro12 common factors that 
capture the co-movements of Euro12 members’ overall economic activities.  
 
During both the pre- and post-EMU periods, graphically there is no evidence to 
suggest co-movement between national growth dynamics and Euro12 common 
trends. This is also reflected by the results in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4, which show 
that there is only a minor improvement in the level of correlations for Greece for 
both cross-country real GDP growth and correlation with common trend. 
Another interesting finding from the above figure is Portugal. Both correlation 
and graphic analysis show that it is unlike most other Euro12 countries, which 
had improved in the similarity and volatility between trends. However, the co-
movements between Portugal’s business cycle and the Euro12 common trend 
actually declined after its entry to the Eurozone. For the case of Greece and 
Portugal, the results may indicate that for a subsection of the Eurozone, the 
membership of a common currency area has not improved the synchronisation 
of members’ business cycles. Instead, it may lead to decline of the degree of co-
movements between national growth dynamics and union common trend.  
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3.5.1.2 Shock analysis – variance decomposition  
Two tests were conducted to evaluate the extent of cycle synchronisation 
across the Euro12 area. First, we estimated the common factors of the Euro12 
members for both the pre- and post-EMU periods, which successfully identified 
economic downturns that occurred over the last three decades. Then a 
correlation test was conducted to see the similarity between national trends and 
common trend of Euro12. This analysis suggests that, for most series, the 
national growth trends have become similar to common trends since the 
creation of the Eurozone. However, it does not provide evidence for the degree 
of synchronisation in respect of the volatilities of individual and common trends. 
In other words, besides knowing trends are moving at a similar direction to 
Euro12 trend, we also need to understand the degree of dynamics between 
them. Therefore, we take a step further to check the volatilities of trends by 
using graphic analysis. This quick investigation shows that the degrees of 
business cycle synchronisation among members are at different levels. Moreover, 
as Greece and Portugal did not show evidence of cycle convergence, the results 
are mixed for Euro12 as a whole.  
 
Since, we have visually identified the level of business cycle synchronisation, we 
can therefore take a further step, that of using variance decomposition to 
interpret the results of the above graphic test numerically. Furthermore, from a 
theoretical point of view, this method is better than correlation test. We can use 
variance decomposition to identify the dynamic response of national growth 
trends to the shocks of the common factor. Thus to understand to what extent 
the common factor, which captures the co-movement of all Euro12 members’ 
growth dynamics and reflect the common trend of economic activities for the 
entire area, can contribute to the fluctuations of individual members’ economic 
aggregates.    
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Table 3-6 Common factors for Euro12 real GDP growth 
    pre-EMU post-EMU     pre-EMU post-EMU 
Austria 
Steps     
Belgium 
Steps     
2 0.0079 0.0276 2 0.00005 0.0171 
3 0.0220 0.0629 3 0.00012 0.0418 
4 0.0386 0.0952 4 0.00018 0.0670 
5 0.0551 0.1217 5 0.00024 0.0888 
6 0.0701 0.1414 6 0.00028 0.1047 
7 0.0830 0.1545 7 0.00030 0.1134 
8 0.0934 0.1617 8 0.00032 0.1156 
Average 0.0529 0.1093 Average 0.00021 0.0783 
 
  pre-EMU post-EMU 
 
  pre-EMU post-EMU 
Finland 
Steps     
France 
Steps     
2 0.0541 0.0016 2 0.00000048 0.0107 
3 0.0159 0.0032 3 0.00000099 0.0210 
4 0.0297 0.0045 4 0.00000140 0.0290 
5 0.0452 0.0053 5 0.00000170 0.0347 
6 0.0616 0.0059 6 0.00000190 0.0384 
7 0.0780 0.0062 7 0.00000200 0.0405 
8 0.0936 0.0064 8 0.00000210 0.0415 
Average 0.0540 0.0047 Average 0.00000151 0.0308 
 
  pre-EMU post-EMU 
 
  pre-EMU post-EMU 
Germany 
Steps     
 
Steps     
2 0.001 0.0127 
Greece 
2 0.0051 0.0010 
3 0.0031 0.0347 3 0.1164 0.0029 
4 0.0058 0.0606 4 0.0174 0.0056 
5 0.0089 0.0865 5 0.0221 0.0088 
6 0.0121 0.1096 6 0.0259 0.0122 
7 0.0152 0.1284 7 0.0288 0.0158 
8 0.0181 0.1419 8 0.0311 0.0194 
Average 0.0092 0.0821 Average 0.0353 0.0094 
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(Table 3-6 continued) 
  
 
pre-EMU post-EMU   
 
pre-EMU post-EMU 
Ireland 
Steps 
  
Italy 
Steps 
  
2 0.0001 0.0022 2 0.0003 0.0191 
3 0.0003 0.0052 3 0.0009 0.0422 
4 0.0006 0.0080 4 0.0016 0.0625 
5 0.0009 0.0104 5 0.0024 0.0784 
6 0.0013 0.0123 6 0.0030 0.0898 
7 0.0017 0.0137 7 0.0036 0.0970 
8 0.0021 0.0148 8 0.0041 0.1009 
Average 0.0010 0.0095 Average 0.0023 0.0700 
  
pre-EMU post-EMU 
  
pre-EMU post-EMU 
Luxembourg 
Steps 
  
Netherlands 
Steps 
  
2 0.0051 0.00002 2 0.0031 0.0196 
3 0.0154 0.00004 3 0.0080 0.0140 
4 0.029 0.00006 4 0.0132 0.0682 
5 0.0439 0.00007 5 0.0178 0.0873 
6 0.0589 0.00008 6 0.0216 0.1020 
7 0.073 0.00009 7 0.0247 0.1128 
8 0.0857 0.00009 8 0.0270 0.1202 
Average 0.0444 0.00006 Average 0.0164 0.0749 
  
pre-EMU post-EMU 
  
pre-EMU post-EMU 
Portugal 
Steps 
   
Steps 
  
2 0.0041 0.0011 
Spain 
2 0.0028 0.0285 
3 0.0075 0.0028 3 0.0056 0.0744 
4 0.0098 0.0046 4 0.0077 0.1237 
5 0.0113 0.0063 5 0.0092 0.1699 
6 0.0123 0.0078 6 0.0102 0.2104 
7 0.0130 0.0089 7 0.011 0.2450 
8 0.0135 0.0098 8 0.0115 0.2740 
Average 0.0102 0.0059 Average 0.0082 0.1608 
Note: the results with underlines indicate that the coefficients in matrix B for the impact of common factors 
on real GDP growth (Yi,t = αiYt-1 + βiFt + εit) are statistically insignificant at the 5% level 
 
The results of variance decomposition are presented in Table 3-6 for each 
country; we estimate the variance decomposition of real GDP growth accounted 
for by the shock of Euro12 common factors. The method of estimation is using 
the time series vector autoregression method to obtain the variance 
decomposition of the impact of common factor on each country’s real GDP 
growth rate. This enables us to see, with one unit change in national growth 
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dynamics, how the common factor will contribute to such changes at each 
step/quarter. The initial step (first quarter) is not reported given that the lag 
length equals one, which indicates that at the first quarter the only variable 
having an impact on real GDP growth is itself. Hence, we have reported the 
variance decomposition for seven steps (from the second period to the eighth 
period after the initial shock) in Table 3-6. The variance decomposition will be 
calculated for both the pre- and post-EMU periods, in order to draw 
comparisons between the two periods and remain consistent with previous 
graphic analysis. 
 
From the previous graphic analysis in Figure 3-3, we have seen that, even for 
those countries that have trends relatively similar to the co-movements of 
Euro12 as a whole, the volatility of national trends was much different from the 
common trend according to the graphic comparison. We can represent this by 
looking at the values of decomposition of each country at the pre-EMU period. 
The average variance decomposition for each country is generally very low for 
countries like Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and Spain. For most of them, the average impact of common factor shock on 
national real GDP growth is only around 0.05. Austria and Finland have the 
highest response level: above 0.05 for each of them.  
 
However, for Austria, as with some of the other countries, e.g. Germany, 
Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg, the coefficient that represents the 
responsiveness of national real GDP growth to a common factor shock is 
statistically insignificant. Remaining members have statistically significant 
results for the coefficients in matrix B (i.e. for the impact of common factor on 
real GDP growth (Yi,t = αiYt-1 + βiFt + εit)) are statistically significant at 5% level, 
which implies there is an established relation between national real GDP growth 
and Euro12 common trends during the pre-EMU period. However, given the 
very low variance decomposition value, for each unit change of real GDP growth 
only a very small proportion of these changes can be explained by common 
Euro12 factor. These reflect the graphic analysis in Figure 3-3 which implies low 
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convergence between national growth dynamics and overall co-movements 
among the initial 12 EMU members during the pre-EMU period.  
 
Although the business cycle synchronisation among members in Euro12 
countries was low during the pre-EMU period, according to the endogeneity 
hypothesis of OCA  developed by Frankel and Rose (1997), the monetary and 
economic integration in a common currency area should improve the co-
movements of members’ business cycles. This pro-EMU argument, at least for 
some members, is proven by the results for the post-EMU period in Figure 3-3 
and Table 3-6. In Figure 3-3, we have seen that, besides Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal, the remaining members of Euro12 had some 
significant improvements in the degree of business synchronisation. Trends of 
national economic growth, and, more importantly, the volatilities among 
national trends and common factor, are all improved.  
 
In Table 3-6, the estimation of variance decomposition for Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain shows that the trends of 
their national GDP growths are more closely related to the common factor than 
in the pre-EMU period. The size of the impacts is much bigger than the value for 
the pre-EMU period, and more importantly the coefficients for representing the 
responsiveness of national economic growth to a common factor shock are all 
statistically significant for these seven countries at the 5% level. Spain has the 
highest value of variance decomposition, which is 0.1608. This indicates that 
one unit change in the rate of real GDP growth in Spain, 16.08% of the change in 
real GDP growth, can be explained by the Euro12 common factor. This is much 
higher than its value for the pre-EMU period, which is only 0.0082.  
 
Among Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece and Portugal, which are the countries 
identified as having poor business cycle convergence among Euro12 members, 
Ireland and Luxembourg had only very minor improvements since they joined 
the Eurozone. The values of variance decomposition are improved by comparing 
them with their own previous performance; however, they are still very low in 
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relation to those countries which have high degrees of synchronisation. For 
instance, the average variance decomposition for Ireland only improved from 
0.001 to 0.0095; the value of Luxembourg’s increased from 0.0444 (statistically 
insignificant) to only 0.00006. These values are much lower than the other ‘good 
performance’ countries, and while it can be seen from the graphic analysis in 
Figure 3-3 that these two countries’ business cycles appear to be relatively 
converged with Euro12 co-movements, still the degrees of improvements are 
very minor and poorer than the others.  
 
For Greece, there has been no improvement that can be discovered by either 
graphic or variance decomposition analysis. The results of variance 
decomposition for both periods are statistically insignificant, which reflects the 
outcomes from Figure 3-3’s graphic analysis as the volatility of Greek real GDP 
growth is high in relation to Euro12 co-movements. Finally, for Finland and 
Portugal, the values of variance decomposition confirm that the level of cycle 
convergence for these two countries has declined rather than improved since the 
creation of EMU. Membership of EMU is assumed by the endogeneity hypothesis 
of OCA to be able to promote business cycle synchronisation among member 
states through intra-Eurozone trade, but this appears not to be the universal 
case within the euro area. 
 
3.5.2 Explanatory analysis: what drives the synchronisation of Euro12 business 
cycles? 
 
In the previous subsection, we use the dynamic factor model to estimate the 
common factors of Euro12 members’ co-movements of national business cycles. 
The results show that national trends are moving closer to the common trends 
of Euro12 for most countries. However, the degree of synchronisation, which is 
in respect of volatilities of national and common trends, remains different inside 
EMU. Some countries had significant improvements in the convergence of 
cycles; however, this is not a case for the other members. Synchronisation of 
business cycles can provide an ideal basis for conducting a successful union-
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level monetary policy. Thus, the enhancement of convergence of members’ 
growth dynamics is crucial to the task of solving the ‘one size fits all’ issue in the 
Eurozone. For policymakers, it is important to have a better understanding of 
the aggregate economic factors that drive the synchronisation of cycles.  
 
In order to answer this question, in this subsection we will analyse the main 
components of national output by using DFM in Equation (3-5). By estimating 
the common factors of the main components of GDP, we are aiming to evaluate 
the co-movements of these components, to see which common factor or 
factors are closely related to each member of Euro12, and therefore to identify 
the main driving factor in the synchronisation of EMU’s growth dynamic, and in 
the case of each country. The main components of aggregate economic 
activities are: final consumption expenditure, investment expenditure and 
exports.  
 
3.5.2.1 Consumption expenditure  
With the economic integration and removal of trade barriers among European 
Union member countries, the free movement of goods and services may 
indicate that the members’ own consumption expenditure is not necessarily 
constrained by their own domestically produced goods and services. In Table 
3-7 we present the estimation of parameters of DFM for consumption 
expenditures. The coefficient β is statistically significant for all countries; 
however, the values of βs are very low for all countries in Euro12. This may 
suggest that the common factor of Euro12 consumption expenditure has no 
pronounced effects on the consumption dynamics at national level. The 
correlation between consumption dynamics at national level and the common 
factor of Euro12 consumption is provided in Table 3-8. The results of correlation 
are extremely low, which suggests that the fluctuations of national consumption 
expenditure are not on a similar path to that of  the common trends of Euro12.  
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Table 3-7 Parameter estimation for DFM – Euro12 members’ consumption expenditure 
(2000:Q1–2011:Q1) 
  α β  α β 
Austria 0.224 0.0005 Ireland -0.036 0.0018 
 
(0.143)
 
(0.000)  (0.828) (0.000) 
Belgium 0.618 0.0005 Italy 0.009 0.0004 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.956) (0.000) 
Finland -0.136 0.0010 Luxembourg -0.314 0.0009 
 
(0.405) (0.004)  (0.028) (0.002) 
France 0.259 0.0006 Netherlands 0.147 0.0006 
 
(0.112) (0.000)  (0.374) (0.000) 
Germany -0.245 0.0002 Portugal -0.441 0.0006 
 
(0.102) (0.084)  (0.024) (0.000) 
Greece 0.339 0.0012 Spain -0.466 0.0013 
 
(0.017) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.000) 
 
 c    
common factor F 0.926    
   (0.000)    
Yi,t = αiYt-1 + βiFt + εit 
Ft = cFt-1+ηt 
Note: numbers in brackets are the p-values  
 
Table 3-8 Correlation between consumption expenditure and 
common factor of Euro12 consumption (2000:Q1–
2011:Q1) 
 
common factor of Euro12 consumption 
Austria 0.024 
Belgium 0.140 
Finland 0.381 
France 0.203 
Germany -0.144 
Greece 0.398 
Ireland 0.580 
Italy 0.268 
Luxembourg 0.039 
Netherlands 0.360 
Portugal 0.237 
Spain 0.558 
     Source: results are produced by the author  
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Table 3-9 Variance decomposition of consumption accounted 
         for common consumption factors (2000:Q1–2011:Q1) 
    post-EMU     post-EMU 
Austria 
Steps   
Belgium 
Steps   
2 0.0066 2 0.0041 
3 0.0106 3 0.0092 
4 0.0129 4 0.0129 
5 0.0144 5 0.0150 
6 0.0152 6 0.0161 
7 0.0157 7 0.0167 
8 0.0160 8 0.0169 
Average 0.0114 Average 0.0114 
 
  post-EMU 
 
  post-EMU 
Finland 
Steps   
France 
Steps   
2 0.0371 2 0.0024 
3 0.0475 3 0.0039 
4 0.0546 4 0.0047 
5 0.5584 5 0.0051 
6 0.0607 6 0.0053 
7 0.0619 7 0.0054 
8 0.0626 8 0.0055 
Average 0.1104 Average 0.0040 
 
  post-EMU 
 
  post-EMU 
Germany* 
Steps   
 
Steps   
2 0.0001 
Greece* 
2 0.0066 
3 0.0001 3 0.0136 
4 0.0001 4 0.0184 
5 0.0001 5 0.0213 
6 0.0001 6 0.0229 
7 0.0001 7 0.0238 
8 0.0001 8 0.0243 
Average 0.0001 Average 0.0164 
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Table 3-9 continued 
    post-EMU     post-EMU 
Ireland 
Steps   
Italy 
Steps   
2 0.0732 2 0.0056 
3 0.0879 3 0.0093 
4 0.1001 4 0.0113 
5 0.1067 5 0.0124 
6 0.1110 6 0.0130 
7 0.1137 7 0.0134 
8 0.1155 8 0.0136 
Average 0.0885 Average 0.0100 
 
  post-EMU 
 
  post-EMU 
Luxembourg 
Steps   
Netherlands* 
Steps   
2 0.0028 2 0.0024 
3 0.0032 3 0.0348 
4 0.0037 4 0.0409 
5 0.0040 5 0.0442 
6 0.0041 6 0.0460 
7 0.0042 7 0.0470 
8 0.0042 8 0.0476 
Average 0.0033 Average 0.0329 
 
  post-EMU 
 
  post-EMU 
Portugal* 
Steps   
 
Steps   
2 0.0201 
Spain 
2 0.0311 
3 0.0221 3 0.0358 
4 0.0255 4 0.0407 
5 0.0267 5 0.0431 
6 0.0276 6 0.0447 
7 0.0281 7 0.0456 
8 0.0283 8 0.0462 
Average 0.0223 Average 0.0359 
  Note: the results with underlines indicate that the coefficients in matrix B for the impact of common 
factors on real GDP growth (Yi,t = αiYt-1 + βiFt + εit) are statistically insignificant at the 5% level. 
Results for Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal are statistically significant at the 10% 
level 
 
Figures of variance decomposition for each country’s consumption 
expenditure, which is accounted for the impact of common factor of Euro12, are 
presented in Table 3-9. As expected, Spain, Ireland and Finland, and all other 
members of Euro12, have low levels of variance decomposition, commonly 
below 0.1, or have statistically insignificant coefficients in matrix β. This 
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indicates that among those countries that have low variance decomposition, the 
one unit change in the level of national consumption, less than 10 per cent of its 
change can be explained by the impact of common factor (implying that the 
fluctuations in consumption are more volatile than the co-movements of Euro12 
consumptions). Furthermore, the coefficients for representing the impact of 
common factors on national consumption are statistically insignificant for some 
countries that have low values of variance decomposition (e.g. Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Greece). 
 
Therefore, from the low value of variance decomposition and insignificance of 
the coefficients for reflecting impacts of common factor, we can conclude that, 
for most members of Euro12, consumption expenditure does not make a 
pronounced contribution to the convergence of the co-movements of Euro12 
growth dynamics. In contrast to these countries, the dynamics of consumption 
of Spain, Ireland and Finland can be explained by common consumption factor 
shock. But the value for Spain is only 0.0359, which is just about one third of the 
values for Spain and Ireland. This result indicates that consumption is only a 
driving element for overall business cycle synchronisation for a small part of the 
Eurozone.    
 
3.5.2.2 Investment expenditure  
With the free movement of goods and capital within the Eurozone, resource 
investment may not be constrained at the national level. Furthermore, the 
decision to invest may also not be dependent only on the members’ own 
growth dynamics. This may suggest some possibilities of co-movements of 
Euro12’s national-level investment fluctuations. As investment is a key 
component of national output dynamics, if there is some evidence of 
synchronisation of investment dynamics, then investments should have a key 
role in the convergence of Euro12 business cycles. Estimated results of those 
parameters in DFM for Euro12 investment expenditures are presented in Table 
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3-10. We have recovered the unobservable common investment factor for 
Euro12 members. Similar to the results for common consumption factors, the 
values of coefficient β are very small, which may suggest that there is just a very 
low level of co-movements among Euro12 members. Moreover, the coefficient 
β for Greece is statistically insignificant.  
 
 
Table 3-10 Parameter estimation for DFM – Euro12 members’ investment expenditure 
(2000:Q1–2011:Q1) 
  α β  α β 
Austria 0.591 0.002 Ireland -0.230 0.007 
 
(0.000)
 
(0.000)  (0.117) (0.002) 
Belgium -0.141 0.003 Italy 0.062 0.002 
 
(0.352) (0.000)  (0.684) (0.000) 
Finland -0.374 0.004 Luxembourg -0.334 0.005 
 
(0.007) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.018) 
France -0.443 0.003 Netherlands 0.129 0.004 
 
(0.058) (0.000)  (0.462) (0.000) 
Germany 0.001 0.004 Portugal -0.128 0.001 
 
(0.993) (0.000)  (0.424) (0.178) 
Greece 0.358 0.0002 Spain 0.478 0.004 
 
(0.011) (0.933)  (0.001) (0.000) 
 
 C    
common factor F 0.834    
 
 (0.000)    
Yi,t = αiYt-1 + βiFt + εit 
Ft = cFt-1+ηt 
Note: numbers in brackets are the p-values 
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Table 3-11 Correlation between investment expenditure and 
common investment factor of Euro12 (2001:Q1–
2011:Q1) 
 common factor of Euro12 investments  
Austria 0.677 
Belgium 0.569 
Finland 0.516 
France 0.741 
Germany 0.408 
Greece 0.198 
Ireland 0.241 
Italy 0.456 
Luxembourg 0.183 
Netherlands 0.553 
Portugal 0.247 
Spain 0.653 
          Source: results are produced by the author  
  Since the values of coefficient β are low for every member of Euro12, it is not 
surprising to see a low correlation between national investment dynamics and 
trend of common investment factors of Euro12. From Table 3-11, we can see 
that the average value of correlation is only 0.454. France has the highest 
correlation between fluctuation in national investments and common 
investment factor, which is only 0.741. This is 17% lower than the correlation of 
French growth dynamics and common real GDP growth factor. The low value of 
the investment correlation indicates that the national trend of investment does 
not move on a similar path to the common investment factor. 
 
  The second question we will investigate is to what extent the dynamics of 
investments for each member of Euro12 can be explained by the common 
investment factor. This can be used to reflect the convergence between 
national and Euro12 investment dynamics in respect of the volatility of their 
trends. The Euro12 countries can be arranged into two groups according to the 
results of variance decomposition for national investment dynamics accounted 
for common investment factors. The results can be seen in Table 3-12. 
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Table 3-12 Variance decomposition of investment accounted for 
common consumption factors (2000:Q1–2011:Q1) 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Austria 
Steps 
 
Belgium 
Steps 
 
2 0.0161 2 0.0715 
3 0.0395 3 0.1030 
4 0.0621 4 0.1237 
5 0.0802 5 0.1372 
6 0.0921 6 0.1461 
7 0.0985 7 0.1521 
8 0.1009 8 0.1561 
Average 0.0612 Average 0.1112 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Finland* 
Steps 
 
France 
Steps 
 
2 0.0607 2 0.000004 
3 0.0720 3 0.000006 
4 0.0854 4 0.000007 
5 0.0925 5 0.000008 
6 0.0977 6 0.000008 
7 0.1010 7 0.000008 
8 0.1032 8 0.000008 
Average 0.0766 Average 0.000006 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Germany 
Steps 
  
Steps 
 
2 0.0044 
Greece 
2 0.0016 
3 0.0073 3 0.0038 
4 0.0090 4 0.0058 
5 0.0100 5 0.0073 
6 0.0101 6 0.0084 
7 0.0110 7 0.0091 
8 0.0113 8 0.0097 
Average 0.0079 Average 0.0057 
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Table 3-12 continued 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Ireland 
Steps 
 
Italy 
Steps 
 
2 0.0191 2 0.0017 
3 0.0247 3 0.0034 
4 0.0302 4 0.0045 
5 0.0337 5 0.0052 
6 0.0361 6 0.0056 
7 0.0379 7 0.0058 
8 0.0391 8 0.0059 
Average 0.0276 Average 0.0040 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Luxembourg* 
Steps 
 
Netherlands* 
Steps 
 
2 0.0224 2 0.1330 
3 0.0265 3 0.1794 
4 0.0323 4 0.2135 
5 0.0355 5 0.2357 
6 0.0380 6 0.2510 
7 0.0397 7 0.2617 
8 0.0409 8 0.2694 
Average 0.0294 Average 0.1930 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Portugal 
Steps 
  
Steps 
 
2 0.0190 
Spain 
2 0.00002 
3 0.0256 3 0.00005 
4 0.0311 4 0.00008 
5 0.0350 5 0.00009 
6 0.0372 6 0.00011 
7 0.0389 7 0.00011 
8 0.0401 8 0.00012 
Average 0.0284 Average 0.00007 
  Note: the results with underlines indicate that the coefficients in matrix B for the impact of 
common factors on real GDP growth (Yi,t = αiYt-1 + βiFt + εit) are statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level. Results for Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
are statistically significant at the 10% level 
 
The first group contains countries like Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy 
and Spain. The Euro12 common factor for investment do have a statistically 
significant impact on these countries’ national investment dynamics. However, 
the levels of the effects are divergent among countries in the first group. Austria 
and Ireland have the highest values of variance decomposition – 0.0612 and 
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0.0276 respectively. For the other four countries, despite the common 
investment factor being able to explain their investment dynamics as proven by 
the variance decomposition, the values are very low among them. Hence, the 
fluctuations of investments between these two countries are poorly converged 
with the overall co-movements of Euro12 investments. 
 
 The second group is made up by the rest of the countries in the Euro12 area 
whose variance decompositions are statistically insignificant. The variance 
decompositions of those countries are also generally low in value. Greece, as 
usual, has the worst results – 0.0057 for the average value, and the coefficients 
in matrix B are statistically insignificant. The statistically insignificant variance 
decomposition estimations for these countries reflect the fact that the volatility 
of these countries’ investment dynamics and common investment factors 
diverged from each other during the post-EMU period. Hence, this suggests that 
investment expenditures do not contribute to the overall convergence of the 
Euro12 aggregates activities for these members of the Eurozone. Since Table 
3-12 provides us with mixed results, which split the Euro12 area generally into 
two groups, we see that the investment expenditure only plays some role in the 
synchronisation of business cycles in Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and 
Spain, and it is only pronounced for Austria and Ireland. Meanwhile, for 
countries like Belgium, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, the co-movements of their national investment dynamics and 
common trends of Euro12 also remain divergent.  
 
3.5.2.3 Exports expenditure  
Trade has been recognised as a key driving force of business cycle 
synchronisation for a common currency by the endogeneity hypothesis of OCA 
(Frankel and Rose 1997). Therefore, in this subsection we will focus on the 
exports of each member state of Euro12. The ideal data for this analysis 
concerns intra-trade between the members of the Eurozone. However, intra-
trade data is only available at the annual level. The data set is too small for 
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estimating the co-movements of export dynamics in EMU for the post-EMU 
period. Thus, total exports are selected as the alternative to the data on intra-
exports.   
 
The parameter estimations are presented in Table 3-13. The coefficient β is 
statistically significant for all members of Euro12. Moreover, the values of β are 
much higher than the results in the previous two estimations, which are for 
consumption and investments. The common export factor is successfully 
captured by our DFM with high values of coefficient β. Hence, we may expect to 
see better results in correlation analysis than the previous estimations for the 
other two main components of national output.             
Table 3-13 Parameter estimation for DFM – Euro12 members’ exports expenditure 
(1999:Q1–2011:Q2) 
 
α β  α β 
Austria 0.600 3.632 Ireland 0.866 1.388 
 
(0.000)
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.015) 
Belgium 0.475 2.964 Italy 0.831 3.902 
 
(0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Finland 0.174 4.557 Luxembourg 0.749 3.304 
 
(0.240) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
France 0.741 3.042 Netherlands 0.797 2.802 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Germany 0.680 4.163 Portugal 0.638 3.010 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Greece 0.438 3.669 Spain 0.445 3.050 
 
(0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
  C    
common factor F 0.882    
   (0.000)    
Yi,t = αiYt-1 + βiFt + εit 
Ft = cFt-1+ηt 
Note: numbers in brackets are p-values  
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Table 3-14 Correlation between investment expenditure 
and common investment factor of Euro12 
(1999:Q1–2011:Q2) 
 
common factor of Euro12 investments 
Austria 0.872 
Belgium 0.794 
Finland 0.779 
France 0.820 
Germany 0.810 
Greece 0.630 
Ireland 0.597 
Italy 0.832 
Luxembourg 0.686 
Netherlands 0.769 
Portugal 0.657 
Spain 0.721 
            Source: results are produced by the author 
The correlation of national export dynamics and the trend of common factor is 
greater than in the results we obtained for consumption and investment. The 
average correlation among the Euro12 members is 0.747, which is 65% higher 
than the average value of the correlation for consumptions and common 
consumption factor. The highest value of correlation is for Austria, which is 
0.872. Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Italy also have relatively high 
levels of correlation, which are either above 0.8 or very close to it. Although we 
have a much higher average correlation for exports than consumption and 
investments, we still cannot conclude that the trends of exports at national level 
for Euro12 countries are generally on a similar path to that of the co-
movements of the entire region. Countries like Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and Portugal have a low level of correlation – 0.630, 0.597, 0.686 and 0.657 
respectively. The Netherlands and Spain have higher correlation coefficients; 
however, the value is just around 0.75. Therefore, although we have a higher 
average correlation for Euro12 countries, for each country, the results are 
mixed. 
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Following the method of the previous two subsections, we will estimate the 
variance decomposition for the national-level export dynamics accounted for 
common export factor. It would enable us to see how common factor can 
explain the dynamics of exports for each member of Euro12, which can help us 
form views on the volatility of national export dynamics and common co-
movements among Euro12 members, thus understanding if trading has 
contributed to the overall cycle convergence inside EMU.  
 
Table 3-15 Variance decomposition of exports accounted for common 
exports factor (1999:Q1–2011:Q2) 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Austria 
Steps 
 
Belgium 
Steps 
 
2 0.0339 2 0.0251 
3 0.0639 3 0.0541 
4 0.0847 4 0.0786 
5 0.0973 5 0.0942 
6 0.1034 6 0.0989 
7 0.1055 7 0.0963 
8 0.1057 8 0.0934 
Average 0.0743 Average 0.0676 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Finland 
Steps 
 
France 
Steps 
 
2 0.0022 2 0.0246 
3 0.0046 3 0.0513 
4 0.0063 4 0.0725 
5 0.0072 5 0.0855 
6 0.0077 6 0.0904 
7 0.0079 7 0.0903 
8 0.0079 8 0.0889 
Average 0.0055 Average 0.0629 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Germany 
Steps 
  
Steps 
 
2 0.0096 
Greece 
2 0.0015 
3 0.0195 3 0.0033 
4 0.0266 4 0.0049 
5 0.0302 5 0.0061 
6 0.0314 6 0.0068 
7 0.0314 7 0.0073 
8 0.0312 8 0.0076 
Average 0.0225 Average 0.0047 
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Table 3-15 continued 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Ireland 
Steps 
 
Italy 
Steps 
 
2 0.0029 2 0.0241 
3 0.0077 3 0.0490 
4 0.0132 4 0.0677 
5 0.0185 5 0.0791 
6 0.0232 6 0.0840 
7 0.0271 7 0.0850 
8 0.0302 8 0.0847 
Average 0.0154 Average 0.0592 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Luxembourg 
Steps 
 
Netherlands 
Steps 
 
2 0.0214 2 0.0287 
3 0.0512 3 0.0637 
4 0.0780 4 0.0938 
5 0.1031 5 0.1147 
6 0.1185 6 0.1249 
7 0.1264 7 0.1268 
8 0.1287 8 0.1252 
Average 0.0784 Average 0.0847 
  
post-EMU 
  
post-EMU 
Portugal 
Steps 
  
Steps 
 
2 0.0084 
Spain 
2 0.0102 
3 0.0197 3 0.0205 
4 0.0298 4 0.0338 
5 0.0369 5 0.0405 
6 0.0408 6 0.0432 
7 0.0421 7 0.0436 
8 0.0422 8 0.0432 
Average 0.0275 Average 0.0294 
 
 
In Table 3-15, the variance decompositions are statistically significant for all 
members of Euro12. The Netherlands has the highest value of variance 
decomposition among Euro12 countries. Finland and Greece have variance 
decompositions that are the lowest among Euro12 members – 0.0055 and 
0.0047 respectively. For the other countries whose variance decomposition is 
_________________________Chapter 3 Business cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone  
 
111 
 
also statistically significant, the range of the value of their results is between 
0.0225 and 0.0784. These results suggest that the common exports factor for 
Euro12 do have some importance to the individual national export dynamics for 
most countries, and can be treated as a main driving element of cycle 
synchronisation in EMU. However, the levels of importance vary across these 
members of Euro12 area. Therefore, again, we have mixed results for the 
driving elements of business cycle synchronisation. Nevertheless, since the 
common export factors can explain the export growth for every member of 
Euro12, thus the co-movements of export dynamics are relatively important for 
understanding the synchronisation of overall economic activities in the 
Eurozone compared to consumption and investment expenditures. 
 
3.5.2.4 Drivers of co-movements for each country 
Here, we will provide a summary of the driving element for each country. In 
Table 3-16 we present the average variance decomposition for all the key 
components of national output, in order to identify the driver of co-movements 
of Euro12 business cycles for each member. Among these three key 
components of national output, consumption expenditure is only important to 
explain the synchronisation of cycles for Finland, Ireland and Spain. For 
investment expenditure, the co-movements of Euro12 investment dynamics 
statistically cannot explain the fluctuations of national-level investments for 
Belgium, Finland, Greece Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal. Moreover, 
the variance decompositions are low for those countries whose variance 
decompositions of investments are statistically significant, e.g. France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain. Export growth is a relatively important economic aggregate, 
which can be used to explain the co-movement of export growth dynamics for 
all of the Euro12 members. In particular, it is statistically significant for the four 
major economies in the Eurozone, who hold a large proportion of the overall 
output of EMU.  
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Table 3-16 Average values of variance decompositions 
for Euro12 countries 
  Consumption Investments Exports  
Austria 0.0114 0.0612 0.0743 
Belgium 0.0114 0.1112 0.0676 
Finland 0.1104 0.0766 0.0055 
France 0.0040 0.000006 0.0629 
Germany 0.0001 0.0079 0.0225 
Greece 0.0164 0.0057 0.0047 
Ireland 0.0885 0.0276 0.0154 
Italy 0.0100 0.0040 0.0592 
Luxembourg 0.0033 0.0294 0.0784 
Netherlands 0.0329 0.1930 0.0847 
Portugal 0.0223 0.0284 0.0275 
Spain 0.0359 0.00007 0.0294 
   Note: figures in this table are from Table 3-9, Table 3-12 and Table 3-15  
 
At the individual level, for the case of Austria, France, Ireland, Italy and Spain, 
all three key components are statistically significant, which indicates that the 
convergence of the dynamics of these three output components is important to 
understand the synchronisation of their business cycles with common Euro12 
trend. For Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg, only investment dynamics has no 
statistically significant contribution to their synchronisation of cycles; 
consumption has no significant role for Germany’s cycle convergence with the 
other members of the Eurozone; and for the Netherlands, Portugal and Greece, 
only exports make a contribution to overall business cycle synchronisation.  
 
Although, for these countries, the convergence of the co-movements of some 
or all output components were contributing to the overall synchronisation of 
economic activities, the values of variance decompositions are unbalanced 
among them. For the case of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, only co-movements of exports have a relatively 
important role for explaining the overall economic activity synchronisation in 
Euro12 for these three countries. Consumption is the main driving element of 
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convergence of cycles in Finland, Ireland and Spain. Greece has the lowest 
synchronisation of business cycles within the Euro12 area.  
 
Despite the exports showing some positive impacts on business cycle 
convergence, the low value of the variance decomposition implies the low 
degree of synchronisation among Greek exports and common co-movements of 
Euro12 exports. For Finland and Portugal, overall business cycle synchronisation 
had declined since they joined EMU; this can probably be explained as each of 
these two countries only has one component of GDP that has pronounced 
contributions, while the other two either have insignificant or minor impacts on 
the convergence of their domestic economic activities and Euro12 common co-
movements. 
 
3.5.3 Spill-over effects between some members of Euro12  
  In the DFM model Equation (3-5), the matrix A is set to be diagonal. This 
restriction of the model implies that there are no links between the current 
economic activities of each country. Common growth factor, which capture the 
co-movements of Euro12 countries’ growth dynamics, might imply a common 
shock that causes the fluctuation of real GDP growth for the entire union. Or it 
can also reflect an asymmetric shock to a country that eventually spills over to 
other members of the Eurozone, thus affecting the overall co-movement of 
economic activities in the Eurozone. In addition to the above results of business 
cycle synchronisation in Euro12, we may also be able to investigate to what 
extent the synchronisation is caused by the common shocks and spill-over 
effects.  
 
Since the restriction of our DFM allows the common factors to capture the co-
movement of cycles which can be caused by either common shocks or spill-over 
effects, we can relax our restriction by allowing the matrix A to become a non-
diagonal general matrix. Therefore, the first equation in Equation (3-5) has been 
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transformed to a standard first-order vector autoregression equation. This 
allows coefficient α in matrix A not only to capture the effect of each member’s 
own lagged growth, but also enables the matrix A to capture any spill-over 
effects between countries. The common factor f will no longer capture the 
idiosyncratic shock, which causes the spill-over across countries, as a common 
shock to the entire region.   
 
Although theoretically we can use the non-diagonal matrix A to capture the 
asymmetric shocks which cause the spill-over effects, this analysis may be 
difficult to apply to the entire Euro12 membership, given that we are aiming to 
identify the degree of synchronisation which is caused by the spill-over effects 
in the Euro12 area. However, the relatively short data set means that the length 
of quarterly real GDP growth is not sufficient for our analysis for the entire 
Euro12 area. Therefore, we will concentrate on the five biggest economies of 
the Eurozone, which are France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, and 
use the monthly real industrial production growth as the approximation for 
overall economic activities for the post-EMU period. 
  
In Table 3-17, we have presented the variance decomposition for both 
diagonal A matrix and non-diagonal A matrix DFMs. If the non-diagonal A matrix 
could successfully capture the spill-over effects between these five major 
economies, then we would expect to see that the variance decomposition for 
diagonal A matrix DFM is greater than that for non-diagonal A matrix DFM. For 
Spain, the variance decomposition is 14% higher than the values from non-
diagonal A matrix DFM analysis. This indicates that in Spain nearly 14 per cent of 
the synchronisation of aggregate economic activities, which is originally 
identified by the original common IP factor, is due to the lagged spill-over 
effects from the other four major economies in the Euro12 area. In the case of 
Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, the variance decompositions that 
accounted for the original common IP factor are lower than that for the non-
Diagonal A matrix model. This suggests that the DFM with non-diagonal A 
matrix failed to capture the spill-over effects for Spain and Italy. 
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Table 3-17 Variance decomposition for the Big 5 Euro12 members’ IP accounted 
for common IP factor (1980:m1 to 2012:m2) 
   Diagonal A matrix   non-Diagonal A matrix 
France Step 2 0.0028 
  
0.0220 
  
 
Step 3 0.0041 
  
0.0524 
  
 
Step 4 0.005 
  
0.0811 
  
 
Step 5 0.0055 
  
0.1054 
  
 
Step 6 0.0059 
  
0.1251 
  
 
Step 7 0.0062 
  
0.1410 
  
 
Step 8 0.0064 0.0051 
 
0.1540 0.0973 
 
Germany Step 2 0.0078 
  
0.0054 
  
 
Step 3 0.0211 
  
0.0168 
  
 
Step 4 0.0360 
  
0.0326 
  
 
Step 5 0.0507 
  
0.0513 
  
 
Step 6 0.0641 
  
0.0716 
  
 
Step 7 0.0759 
  
0.0923 
  
 
Step 8 0.0862 0.0488 
 
0.1126 0.0547 
 
Italy Step 2 0.0079 
  
0.0186 
  
 
Step 3 0.0200 
  
0.0496 
  
 
Step 4 0.0325 
  
0.0837 
  
 
Step 5 0.0440 
  
0.1162 
  
 
Step 6 0.0538 
  
0.1450 
  
 
Step 7 0.0620 
  
0.1698 
  
 
Step 8 0.0690 0.0413 
 
0.1910 0.1106 
 
Spain Step 2 0.0029 
  
0.0083 
  
 
Step 3 0.0076 
  
0.0118 
  
 
Step 4 0.0128 
  
0.0142 
  
 
Step 5 0.0178 
  
0.0159 
  
 
Step 6 0.0223 
  
0.0172 
  
 
Step 7 0.0262 
  
0.0181 
  
 
Step 8 0.0295 0.0170 
 
0.0189 0.0149 
 
Netherlands Step 2 0.0075 
  
0.0065 
  
 
Step 3 0.0190 
  
0.0179 
  
 
Step 4 0.0311 
  
0.0308 
  
 
Step 5 0.0424 
  
0.0435 
  
 
Step 6 0.0524 
  
0.0552 
  
 
Step 7 0.0611 
  
0.0659 
  
 
Step 8 0.0688 0.0403 
 
0.0754 0.0422 
 
Source: produced by the author 
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The failure to capture the spill-over effects in the other four countries could 
be due to the inherent weakness of this analysis. Since the first equation in the 
DFM, which contains the non-diagonal A matrix, only allowed lagged spill-over 
effects to be captured by the model, it is incapable of capturing the within 
period or high-frequency spill-over effects. Moreover, industrial production only 
reflects some parts of overall economic activities; therefore, the finite coverage 
of IP may imply the analysis omitted other important economic aggregates that 
are probably under the influence of the spill-over effects from other fellow 
members. This approach of identifying the impacts of spill-over effects on co-
movements of business cycle only succeeds in the case of Spain. However, the 
results do imply that the spill-over effects may have a role for the development 
of business cycle synchronisation in EMU, or, at least, for some members.  
 
 
3.6 Summary of results and conclusion  
 
  In this chapter, we have examined the business synchronisation of Euro12 
members by using the dynamic factor model (DFM). In contrast to previous 
empirical studies for EMU (Breitung and Eickmerir 2005, Lehwald 2012, Lee 2011) 
that employed the second-generation DFM approach, we have employed the 
first generation approach. We have shown that for the case of the Eurozone, this 
finite variable approach is capable of producing statistically significant results for 
a study which focuses on the regional level rather than the global level. 
 
  First, we estimated the unobserved common factor which can capture the co-
movements of Euro12 growth dynamics. Then, a conventional correlation test 
was used to investigate to what extent the movement of national growth trends 
is on a similar path to Euro12 common trends. The results show that the 
correlation between national real GDP growth and Euro12 common factors 
generally improved after the creation of the Eurozone, except in the case of 
_________________________Chapter 3 Business cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone  
 
117 
 
Portugal. Hence, since the creation of the euro, for the majority of members of 
Euro12, national growth dynamics are generally moving in the same direction as 
the co-movements of the entire Euro12. This result may be important to 
policymakers since it suggests that, for most major economies in EMU, they all 
need the same type of union-level monetary policy.  
 
Nevertheless, the requirements of the same type of monetary policy may not 
necessarily suggest that the ‘one size fits all’ issue does not exist inside EMU, 
although most major members, who hold a majority share of Eurozone GDP, will 
need the same type of policy; however, the individual needs of policy may still 
remain divergent if the degree of fluctuation of growth dynamics differs across 
members. Therefore, graphic and variance decomposition analysis was carried 
out after we obtained the correlation coefficients for Euro12. The results 
suggested a mixed result. For Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain, the synchronisation of cycles in respect of the volatility 
of national and common trends is improved significantly. However, for the rest 
of the countries in the Euro12 area, there have been no pronounced 
improvements. In particular, for the case of Portugal and Finland, the 
synchronisation of cycles declined rather than improved.  
 
Our findings have drawn different conclusion from a recent empirical study 
(Lee 2011), which suggests that the synchronisation of cycles only increased 
during the run-up period of EMU, but that there is no evidence to show that the 
improvements continued after the creation of EMU. The results here are in line 
with other recent empirical studies (Kaufman 2003, Montoya and Haan 2007, 
Giannone et al. 2010, Lehwald 2012). They have confirmed the argument that 
has been put forward by Sinn et al. (2011), who suggest that the introduction of 
EMU may encourage imbalance between member states rather than delivering 
the universal enforcement of economic convergence, and that, after the 
establishment of EMU, the single currency area has caused a divergence 
between core and periphery groups of Euro12.  
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The synchronisation of growth dynamics has improved in countries like 
Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, as well as several other relatively 
small economies such as Austria and Belgium. In contrast to the core group 
countries, the improvement of synchronisation of business cycles in periphery 
group of EMU is poor, and there is generally only some improvement of the 
correlation between national growth dynamics and trends of Euro12 common 
growth factors; however, the volatilities between fluctuations of national GDP 
growth and co-movements of Euro12 cycles remain relatively high. These 
undesirable results of business cycle synchronisation are especially severe in 
Greece and Portugal. For Greece, there is only an insignificant improvement in 
the value of correlation coefficients, and no improvement in variance 
decomposition has been statistically detected. The synchronisation of business 
cycles for Portugal has declined in terms of both correlation and volatility of its 
own growth dynamics and common Euro12 growth factors. Therefore, the 
endogeneity hypothesis of OCA theory may only be the case for the core group 
of EMU. The integration of economic activities does not guarantee a better co-
movement of cycles for the entire Eurozone. Our results also raise a question 
about membership of EMU: should those countries in the periphery group be 
included in EMU in the first place?    
 
Following the basic estimation of the synchronisation of Euro12 business 
cycles, we have also evaluated the co-movements of three key components of 
national output: consumption, investments and exports. By estimating the 
synchronisation of these key economic aggregates, we are able to identify 
which aggregates may play an important role for understanding the 
synchronisation of overall economic activities. In the previous literature, which 
also employed DFM, this area was ignored, or partially ignored, by the authors. 
In Lee (2012), the author only concentrates on the overall level of output, but 
did not explorer the driver of the co-movements of overall economic activities. 
Lehwald (2012) considers two components of national output, which are 
consumption and investment. We draw a similar conclusion as that author, who 
discovers that the members of Euro12 generally have different drivers of 
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synchronisation of cycles. However, Lehwald (2012) does not include export in 
his analysis, which has a crucial role in Frankel and Rose’s (1997) endogeneity 
hypothesis of OCA.  
 
 It is only the synchronisation for Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and 
Portugal that consumption cannot be statistically used to explain, and it has 
minor contributions to overall convergence in France, Italy and Luxembourg. 
Investments are more important than consumption to explain the drivers of 
convergence in co-movements of economic activities for Austria and Ireland, 
but has no pronounced impacts for Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal or Spain. Overall, the integration 
of trade is key to improving the convergence of cycles inside the Eurozone, and 
should be treated as the main policy objective for EMU members, in order to 
improve the probability of implementing an appropriate union wide appropriate 
monetary policy.  
 
At the union level, exports are more important than the other two 
components of output. They can be used to explain the co-movements of 
economic activities for all members of Euro12. However, for Greece and Finland, 
the low variance decompositions imply low degrees of convergence in terms of 
export activities among these two countries and overall Euro12 co-movements. 
This also reflects our results from basic estimation, which suggest the 
endogeneity hypothesis is only true for some parts of the Eurozone. 
 
Finally, we have also attempted to use the DFM approach to identify to what 
extent the synchronisation of business cycles is caused by the spill-over effects 
that may be caused by an idiosyncratic shock to certain countries. To my best 
knowledge, this analysis has not been implemented by previous empirical 
studies, at least for those that employed the DFM approach. However, due to 
the limitation of the data set, we only conducted this analysis on France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands by using industrial production rather 
than real GDP. We detected that the spill-over effect does have a substantial 
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share in the synchronisation of cycles for Spain. However, we failed to uncover 
the impact of spill-over on the co-movements of cycles for Germany, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands. This can be due to the feature of the model that only 
allows the matrix A in Equation (3-5) to capture the lagged spill-over effects. 
Hence, this might suggest that there would be a possibility of the existence of 
high-frequency or within-period spill-over effects in Spain and France. We were 
not able to identify the share of spill-over effects in causing synchronisation for 
every country we selected; however, given the positive results for Spain, this 
does shed light for possible further research into this area where we need a 
better model to capture the high-frequency or within-period spill-over effects.  
 
  Overall, we recovered some evidence which suggests that the synchronisation 
of business cycles is improved for most countries in the Euro12 area except 
Portugal and Greece. However, only correlation of trends is generally improved 
for most countries. The degree of volatility between national growth dynamics 
and trends of common growth factor is only improved within these countries 
from the core group of Euro12. Rather than having union-wide improvements in 
the convergence of economic activities, which was argued by the endogeneity of 
OCA theory, instead, the imbalance between core and peripheral countries 
occurred after the creation of the Eurozone. Therefore, after 12 years of 
operation of EMU, in terms of business synchronisation, there is still a substantial 
challenge for the ECB to deliver a union wide appropriate monetary policy, which 
points to the reason behind constant increases in the level of national debt and 
overuse of fiscal policy among some EMU members. 
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Chapter 4  
Effectiveness of the ECB single monetary policy in 
the Eurozone 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) stipulates that the institutional 
framework of EMU monetary policy is to be a centralised system managed by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). However, this framework of EMU has been subject 
to ongoing debate among academics. The centre of the debate focuses on a 
practical problem of common monetary policy in the Eurozone – the ‘one size fits 
all’ issue (Feldstein 1997, Obstfeld 1997, Sinn and Reutter 2001, Wickens 2007), 
which can arise due to the existence of heterogeneity of the monetary 
transmission mechanism (MTM)16 and lack of business cycle synchronisation17 
among members of EMU.  
 
                                                          
16
 The findings of literature which evaluates the monetary transmission mechanism (MTM) across the 
Eurozone or European countries remains controversial. During the pre-EMU period, Dornbush (1998) argues 
that the effect of a monetary shock is similar in Germany, the UK and France but smaller in Sweden and Italy. 
Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998) conclude that in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands the 
effect of monetary policy on output takes longer to occur, but is almost twice as great as in France, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden, Portugal and Denmark. Similar findings are also confirmed by Whitely (1997) and Eharmann 
(1998). In contrast, other research carried out during the pre-EMU period argues that the heterogeneity of 
the MTM is not significant in Europe. For example, Gerlach and Smets (1995) find that the effects of 
monetary policy are relatively homogenous across European countries; however, it is more effective in 
Germany than others. The empirical works conducted during the post-EMU period also remain controversial. 
The ECB (2002) and Angeloni et al. (2003) have stated that it is difficult to detect the systematic difference 
in the MTM across EMU members. Peersman (2004) also drew a conclusion which shows the MTM is 
relatively homogenous within EMU where the effects of monetary policy in the Eurozone are relatively 
uniform. However, other literature still casts doubt on the homogenous nature of the MTM in EMU (Mojon 
2001, Clausen and Hayo 2006).  
17
 This, in the end, can cause the rise of the problem of inappropriate ECB monetary policy at the national 
level even when the MTM tends to be homogeneous among members (Artis et al. 2004, Grauwe 2009). For 
detailed empirical results of business cycle synchronisation among EMU members, please see Chapter 3.  
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  If the ‘one size fits all’ issue exists in EMU, the monetary policy may be 
appropriate in terms of reacting to the needs at the Eurozone level, but can be 
inappropriate to some members of EMU, which, in turn, makes the monetary 
policy less effective if we consider national-level information. The member 
governments, who do not see ECB monetary policy as the appropriate measure 
for their domestic needs, may have to rely on fiscal policy to offset the impact of 
shocks whilst poor economic performance raises the risk premium of national 
debts. This would have a further negative impact on EMU economic recovery, as 
the cost of serving national debt will generally increase across members, which 
can cause a sovereign debt crisis in some countries. Therefore, the 
understanding of effectiveness of ECB monetary policy is crucial to assess 
whether EMU is an economic system which can be stabilised through 
manipulation of monetary instruments.     
 
  Among previous studies, which were produced to uncover the dynamic 
relations among monetary shocks and macroeconomic variable movements (e.g. 
Butzen et al. 2001, Peersman 2001, Valderrama 2001, Chatelain et al. 2002, 
Vermuelen 2002, Rabanal 2003, van Aarel 2003, Peersman 2004, Rafiq and 
Mallick 2008, Favero and Giavazzi 2008, Martinz-Carrascal and Frenando 2008, 
Weber et al. 2009, Peersman 2011), there are several issues that have attracted 
our attention. First, the focus of previous literature is either on the union-wide 
aggregates or on the national-level data for some selected key Eurozone 
members. However, such an angle for research can be problematic given that 
both union-level and key economy approaches only use limited information, 
which omits data of other EMU members. Therefore, an understanding of the 
effect of ECB monetary policy cannot be adequately obtained. 
 
Second, many studies (Mojon 2000, Valderrama 2001, Butzen et al. 2001, 
Angeloni et al. 2002, Chatelain et al. 2002, Vermuelen 2002, Angeloni et al. 2003, 
Assarsson et al. 2004, Martinz-Carrascal and Frenando 2008) estimate the effect 
of monetary shocks through a specific channel of the MTM, which, in turn, may 
indicate several issues. First, given the narrow concentration on a specific 
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channel of the MTM or a single driving force, the result could omit other 
channels which may also have substantial effects on real economic activities. 
Second, empirically it is difficult to separate a specific channel from the others; in 
fact, different channels are actually co-intervening with each other. Therefore, 
these results are capable of assessing the effects of a monetary policy through a 
particular channel of the MTM, but generate an inconclusive explanation of the 
overall effects of monetary shocks. 
 
Third, despite the VAR method being one of the most frequently used 
approaches to assess the effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables 
(Peersman 2001, van Aarel et al. 2003, Rabanal 2003, Peersman 2004, Favero 
and Giavazzi 2008, Weber et al. 2009, Peersman 2011), the time series VAR 
approach may not be appropriate for use in studying the post-EMU period in 
terms of the impacts of monetary policy on EMU economies. This problem is due 
to the short operational history of EMU, which only generates limited time series 
observations that can lead to low degrees of freedom when the analysis seeks to 
contain multiple endogenous variables.  
 
Therefore, this empirical study chapter mainly contributes to the existing 
literature through the following points. First, adoption of the panel vector 
autoregression (PVAR) approach: the use of panel data techniques tackles the 
problem of data limitation and the asymptotic results are easier to derive from 
panel data. The dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to monetary 
shocks during the post-EMU period can be recovered from the consideration of 
national-level information of every member of EMU. Thus, this study enables us 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy within the euro area 
without falling into the problem of narrow focus, on either only union aggregates 
or a few members. 
 
Moreover, the implementation of the PVAR method, particularly in respect of 
delivering benefits of rich observations and allowing endogenous interactions 
between variables within the system, allows us to build a model that allows 
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multidirectional causality to exist between the monetary instrument and various 
macro-variables. Hence, we can recover the dynamics among monetary policy 
and other variables, which indicate the overall economic performance of EMU 
economies without having the issue of low degrees of freedom. Third, through 
consideration of various aggregate variables simultaneously in a single PAVR 
model, this analysis will be carried out independently of any specific channel of 
the MTM. 
 
In the following sections of this chapter, we will begin with a review of the 
fundamental economic theory that is used by the ECB for implementing the 
single monetary policy for the entire EMU. This will be followed by a section 
reviewing relevant previous literature. The fourth subsection focuses on the 
PVAR model that is used as the econometric approach for our empirical analysis. 
Finally, through the last two subsections, this chapter will present our empirical 
results to assess the effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy and our 
conclusion for this chapter.  
 
 
4.2 Review of theories of monetary policy – new consensus 
view and post-Keynesian critiques   
 
Before starting the empirical section of this chapter to investigate the 
effectiveness of ECB monetary policy, it is essential to review some economic 
theories which help us to understand the underlying general principles that have 
been used by the monetary authority to design and implement their policy. For 
EMU, current economic operations (e.g. monetary policy) are largely based on 
the latest mainstream macroeconomic model, which is known as the new 
consensus macroeconomics (NCM) model. In this subsection of Chapter 4, we 
will review relevant background theories of monetary policy, in particular, to 
understand how monetary policy can be used to influence the key 
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macroeconomic variables (i.e. price and output) within the framework of NCM. 
Moreover, in order to critically understand the mechanism lying behind the 
implementation of monetary policy, it is necessary to compare NCM with other 
heterodox schools. Therefore, the main critiques from the school of post-
Keynesians on NCM monetary policy will also be reviewed here.  
 
4.2.1 Monetary policy and the new consensus model  
Over a long period of time, the theories of macroeconomics were distinguished 
by different schools of thought, which possessed different views on how the 
economy works at the aggregate level, hence providing different arguments as to 
the role of short-run economic stabilisation policies. However, those models (i.e. 
classical, new classical, Keynesian, new Keynesian etc.) have one after another 
failed to successfully explain and provide solutions to the fluctuations of macro-
economy. Since the 1990s, a new model has been established which aims to 
combine the strength of different schools of thought, and therefore to create a 
better model which can be used as a more appropriate tool to study 
macroeconomics (Fontana 2009). This new model is known as the new 
consensus macroeconomics (NCM) model which combines the elements of new 
classical economics, monetarism and new Keynesians. For example, NCM shares 
the idea of a vertical Phillips curve in the long term, but downward-sloping curve 
in the short term; prices are sticky in the short run and economic agents have 
rational expectations etc. In other words, it is a model which is based on the 
neoclassical system and shares the insights of monetarists and new Keynesians; 
thus, it is also referred to as a new neoclassical synthesis (Goodfriend and King 
1997, Fontana 2009).   
 
NCM can be explained based on three equations model, which contains the IS 
curve equation, the Phillips curve equation and the monetary policy (MP) 
equation (Carling and Soskice 2005). First, NCM focuses on the relationship 
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between output gap, real interest rates and exogenous private and public 
demand. The simple IS equation can be seen as:                             
 
ite
EX
tet rYDYY    
(4-1) 
 
where (Yt – Ye) measures the difference between the actual output at time t and 
equilibrium output Ye: output gap at time t; 
EX
tD  is the exogenous demand shock 
from both private and public sectors at a given period of time; rt-i is the lagged 
real interest rates and α represents the sensitiveness of interest-rate-related 
spending (e.g. investments). By moving both Ye to the left-hand side of Equation 
(4-1), we can obtain the simple form of IS curve that emphasises the level of 
output:                     
 
it
EX
tt rDY    (4-2) 
 
Both equations show very similar characteristics to traditional IS curve equation, 
which implies the output (or output gap) depends on current level of fiscal policy 
and autonomous investment (shifts of IS curve) and is negatively related to the 
level of real interest rates (slope of IS curve). However, the NCM-IS curve 
equation also has its own feature, which is different from the traditional version. 
The NCM-IS curve contains a forward-looking element rt-i. Monetary authority 
has a forward-looking mentality, and sets a level of real interest rate in the 
previous period to control present output (output gap).  
 
In the case of the Phillips curve equation, NCM shares the same view as 
Monetarists by adopting a downward-sloping short-run Phillips curve which 
allows the existence of the unemployment–inflation trade-off, and a long-run 
vertical Phillips curve (Carling and Soskice 2005). Therefore, inflation will increase 
if unemployment is below the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
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(NAIRU) (positive output gap), and vice versa for the situation of negative output 
gap. The equation of the Phillips curve can be seen as follows:                
     tettt YYE   1  (4-3) 
 
From Equation (4-3), we can see that the current level of inflation 
t  is 
determined by the expected future inflation at time t+1 (the expectation is based 
on previous inflation and other price-relevant information) and the level of 
contemporaneous output gap. Moreover, εt represents unexpected price shocks. 
The term  1tE   is important as it indirectly implies the creditability of 
monetary authority, hence affecting the position of the short-run Phillips curve18.    
 
Finally, the third MP equation looks at how the monetary authority sets the 
level of interest rate in relation to its policy goal (i.e. price stability/inflation-
targeting). In NCM, the interest rate is the policy instrument, which the central 
bank can use explicitly to control inflation and output; moreover, it also indicates 
the replacement of LM by the MP curve since the money supply is endogenously 
determined (Romer 2000). The most famous and widely accepted monetary rule 
(interest policy rule) is the Taylor rule, which proposed the monetary authority 
should respond to changes in both price and aggregate demand in order to 
maintain price stability or achieve the target inflation (Taylor 1999). In other 
words, the central bank needs to change the interest rate if inflation deviates 
from its target or positive output gap appears in the economy.   
 
According to the Taylor rule (Taylor 1999), the equation of MP can be written 
as follows: 
    etTtntt YYri  21   (4-4) 
 
                                                          
18
 For discussion of the credibility and the time inconsistency issue of monetary policy, please see 
Chapter 5.  
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where it is the nominal interest rate which central bank directly controls; t  is the 
level of inflation and (πt - π
T) measures the deviation of inflation from its target; 
and 
1 , 2 are the parameters that represent the weights of deviation of inflation 
and output gap on the decision of interest-rate-setting. Since it is the real 
interest rate that has impact on economic activities rather than the nominal rate, 
we can rearrange Equation (4-4) as follows: 
 
The element r n is the natural rate of real interest rate, which is the rate when 
actual output is equal to the potential level (Williams 2003); moreover, if the left-
hand side of Equation (4-5) equals zero, then it implies that the monetary policy 
is consistent with the inflation and output targets (Carlstrom and Fuerst 2003).  
  
The central bank reacts to the observed inflation and output gaps to set 
nominal interest rates to force the economy into moving, or keep it around its 
target inflation level; however, it is commonly agreed that the monetary policy 
may not have immediate effects on inflation but with some lags (Friedman 1961, 
Batini and Nelson 2001, Carling and Soskice 2005). Carling and Soskice (2006) 
refer to the previous empirical study which was conducted by the Bank of 
England (1999), thus adopting the two lags model of NCM monetary policy to 
explain the process of inflation adjustments. Here, for the purposes of 
demonstrating how monetary policy affects an economy at the aggregate level, 
we will follow Carling and Soskice (2006) to illustrate the process of how interest 
rate policy can be used to affect output and inflation.  
 
The two lags model argues that monetary policy may only affect inflation two 
time periods later. For example, if the central bank observes that inflation has 
deviated away from its target level in the current period, it has to think ahead 
about the objective level of output (output gap) in the next period, which will 
    etTtnt YYrr  21   (4-5) 
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eventually lead to the inflation level in the second period after the initial 
monetary policy shock in period zero.  
 
Figure 4-1 NCM three-equation model  
 Source: figure is drawn by the author, based on the graphic analysis in Carling and Soskice (2006)  
   
In Figure 4-1, the initial disequilibrium that was observed by the monetary 
authority is at the point A when the economy is at period zero. At point A, the 
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actual output Y0 is greater than the potential output Ye that is associated with the 
long-run Phillips curve (LRPC). This positive output gap leads to a higher level of 
inflation π0 that is way above the inflation target π
T. Assuming the private 
economic agents also observe the inflation level π0, the short-run Phillips curve 
(PC) will be PC(π0), which will cause inflation to increase further to π1. Since the 
PC(π0) and Y0 give inflation π1, the central bank knows the constraint of their 
monetary policy is a new short-run PC PC(π1) at period one. Moreover, assuming 
that the MP curve the central bank adopts is MP1, the desirable position in the 
short run is where MP1 interacts with PC (π1). For these reasons, the central bank 
will set the interest rate to r0 at period 0, the higher costs of borrowings will 
discourage interest-rate-related private spending, and thus the output will drop 
to Y1 at period one given the upward movements on the IS curve. This decline in 
output (negative output gap: Y1 < Ye) will give a lower level of inflation at π2 
when the economy is at period two. 
 
Because the central bank always thinks ahead, it understands the monetary 
policy at period zero is insufficient to bring inflation bank to its target; however, 
the output can be seriously dampened. In period one, policy makers in central 
bank would know that if they introduced another round of monetary policy, the 
short-run PC they would face after the initial monetary shock would be PC(π2). 
Thus, the interest rate will be set at r1 which will give output Y2 at period two and 
inflation π3 at period three. With this forward-looking mentality, the central 
bank can continually adjust the interest rates at each period of time, which will 
allow the economy to move along the MP curve towards target inflation and 
output (πT and Ye). Assuming there are no other external or policy shocks, the 
economy will eventually move back to an equilibrium point (on LRPC) where the 
natural rate of interest rn equals actual interest rate; moreover, since inflation 
and output are at their target and potential levels respectively, Equation(4-5) has 
a value of zero.  
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Now, let’s consider another situation in which the central bank demonstrates 
relatively less inflation-averse but more unemployment-averse in its monetary 
policy; then the MP curve becomes steeper (MP2 in Figure 4-1)
19. The economy 
still begins with point A, and the output Y0 and PC(π0) at period zero will lead to 
π1 at period one. This time, because the central bank is less inflation-averse, the 
desirable position for this economy to be (back on MP curve) is where PC(π1) 
cuts cross the MP2. Therefore, according to this constraint, the central bank will 
set the interest rate to r0* at period zero, which will give a smaller negative 
output gap compared with the previous example ({Y1* - Ye} > {Y1 - Ye}). Due to 
this smaller upward movement on the IS curve, the deflationary pressure is also 
weaker in this case. At period two, inflation is π2* rather than π2; moreover, the 
downward shift of the short-run PC is also smaller (from PC(π1) to PC(π2*)). For 
this unemployment-averse central bank, it will take a much longer time to adjust 
inflation back to its target level.  
 
 4.2.2 Critiques of new consensus model monetary policy  
Since NCM has arisen among neoclassical and new Keynesian economists (e.g. 
Goodfriend 1997, Woodford 2002, Romer 2000, Taylor 2000, Walsh 2002), it is 
not surprising to see that the critiques of NCM are from post-Keynesian 
economists (Lavoie 2004 & 2006, Rochon 2004, Setterfield 2004, Smithin 2004, 
Palley 2006, Monvoisin and Rochon 2006) who argued that NCM is actually 
nothing new but only the newest incarnation of mainstream macroeconomic 
theories.  
 
The first critique of NCM focuses on the rule of monetary policy; in particular, 
the argument emphasises the reason for absence of the monetary aggregates 
(disappearing of LM curve). In our previous demonstration of NCM monetary 
policy, we have seen that the interest rate has been used by the central bank as 
the policy instrument to alter the output and inflation according to the deviation 
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 For detailed discussion see Carling and Soskice (2005 & 2006).  
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of inflation and output from their target and equilibrium levels (Taylor rule) 
(Romer 2000). This implies that the meaning of monetary policy is actually 
referring to the interest rate policy rather than the traditional ‘monetary 
aggregate policy’, which was emphasised by Friedman in his expectation-
augmented Phillips curve model. Therefore, despite NCM adopting Friedman’s 
idea of long-run vertical PC and short-run downward-sloping PC, the monetary 
policy instrument NCM argued should be used is interest rate rather than money 
supply (Taylor 1999).  
 
The reason for this is that, first, according to the Taylor rule, changes in the 
level of interest rate are a reaction to the changes in the output gaps and 
inflation, rather than a response to the changes in the level of money supply (see 
Equation (4-5)). Second, in contrast to the traditional exogenous money supply in 
Friedman’s expectation-augmented Phillips curve model, the central bank 
actually has little control over the border money; therefore, in fact, the money 
supply is endogenously determined, which means that the dynamics of monetary 
aggregates are the response to the needs of the economic system (Allsopp and 
Vines 2000). Hence, the monetary authority uses the central bank base rate as 
the monetary policy instrument rather than altering market interest rate through 
control of the money supply, and the monetary aggregates have a minor role in 
the making of monetary policy (McCallum 2001, Romer 2000).           
 
Post-Keynesians agreed that money is endogenously determined; in fact, the 
theory of endogenous money plays a central role in post-Keynesian theory 
(Rochon 1999, Fontana 2003). However, the endogeneity of the money supply in 
post-Keynesians’ perspective is different from that of NCM. It seems more like an 
implicit rather than explicit theoretical concept in NCM. Cecchetti (2000) states 
that based on many countries’ evidence border money is difficult to control, but 
the monetary base or narrow definition of money still can be effectively 
managed by the central bank; hence, targeting monetary aggregates as the 
policy instrument is no longer feasible and effective. Setterfield (2004) assessed 
the NCM view of endogenous money supply and argued that the interest rate 
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policy is preferred to the money targeting policy by the monetary authority given 
that the demand for money is unstable in view of NCM. Hence, the choice of 
interest rate policy is mainly motivated by practical issues of contemporary 
monetary environment.  
 
For post-Keynesians, the endogenous money supply is well defined by the 
economic theory20 (Fontana 2003). More importantly, the endogenous money 
supply is not only referring to the border money; it also includes the monetary 
base which is controlled by the central bank (Rochon and Rossi 2007). There are 
two main theories which have been established to explain the endogeneity 
characteristic of the money supply, known as the accommodationist and 
structuralist approaches (Pollin 1991). The accommodationist approach is also 
known as a horizontalist approach (Moore 1988), given that the model contains a 
horizontal credit–money supply function at the given rate of interest. This 
horizontal money supply function implies that the central bank is forced to 
accommodate any rise in demand for reserves at the given rate of interest due to 
increase in bank lending; hence the money supply is exclusively credit driven in 
this approach (Moore 1988, Lavoie 1992, Rochon 1999).  
 
In contrast to the accommodationist view, structuralists also agree the 
endogenous money supply is fundamentally caused by the demand for credit of 
private economic agents (Arestis 1997); however, the infinitely elastic credit-
money supply function was rejected in the structuralist approach (Dow 1996, 
Sawyer 1996). In this post-Keynesian view of endogenous money supply, the 
money supply is argued as being dually dependent on monetary-authority-
controlled reserves and the asset and liability management practices of 
commercial banks; therefore, if the central bank refuses to accommodate 
increasing demand for credit by raising the level of reserves, through their own 
initiatives commercial banks may still be able to obtain funds from other financial 
institutions (Palley 1988, 1994).  
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 For detailed discussion, see Fontana (2003). 
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Even though accommodationists and structuralists are distinguished by 
different views on the elasticity of the credit–money supply function, both 
approaches see money arising as the product of increase in demand for bank 
credit and the central bank as having little or no control of it. This consensus on 
endogenous money supply leads to both NCM and post-Keynesian theory 
agreeing on the disappearance of the LM curve which is based on the exogenous 
money supply theory. However, post-Keynesians criticised the rejection of LM 
curve as an illusion given that the positive relationship between output and 
interest rate that is contained in the LM curve has not been broken (Monvoisin 
and Rochon 2006). The reaction of interest rates to the output fluctuation in 
NCM is an administrative response since the fluctuation of output will affect the 
central bank’s decision on interest rate through the monetary policy rule (i.e. 
Taylor rule), rather than a market determinate phenomenon in the standard 
Keynesian macroeconomic model.  
 
The second post-Keynesian critique of NCM monetary policy emphasises the 
policy objective of inflation-targeting. From the monetary policy curve (see 
Equation (4-5)), we can see that the setting of interest rates is a response to 
deviation of inflation from its target; moreover, the interest rate will affect the 
price level through the adjustments of output gaps by altering the interest-rate-
related spending and the short-run Phillips curve (see Equation (4-3) and 
Equation (4-4)). Therefore, this model implies that the adjustments of inflation 
contained in this model are particularly focused on demand pull rather than cost 
push inflation. If the main determinant factor of observed high inflation is due to 
the rise in the costs of production (i.e. oil price shock), the interest rate policy 
may not effectively affect the price level but lead to dampening of output and 
rising unemployment (Arestis and Sawyer 2004).   
 
The third critique focuses on the Taylor rule and, in particular, one of its key 
elements – natural rate of interest. In Equation (4-5), we can see that the rn is an 
exogenous variable that has an impact on the setting of the central bank policy 
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rate; however, the policy rate has no influence on the natural rate. Moreover, 
the other two equations in the NCM model have no role to determine rn. 
Therefore, if the central bank has a different policy rate relative to the natural 
rate whilst the output and inflation are at their equilibrium and target levels, 
then this inappropriate central bank policy rate can jeopardise the stability of the 
economy (Woodford 2001).  
 
Since the natural rate of interest is so important to the NCM model, in 
particular, for setting an appropriate policy rate to achieve economic stability, it 
is crucial to accurately estimate the value of rn. However, post-Keynesian 
economists criticise the estimation of the natural rate of interest as a difficult 
task and usually arbitrary (Smithin 2004, Arestis 2009). Rochon and Setterfield 
(2007), who refer to Smithin (1994 & 2007), argue that there is actually no 
natural rate of interest given that the rate is based on the existence of a 
continuous aggregate production function which had long been rejected by 
heterodox economists. Moreover, post-Keynesians also argue that even the 
natural rate of interest can be successfully identified; however, it is not the sole 
condition for achieving equilibrium – through appropriate use of fiscal policy, the 
macroeconomic objectives can also be achieved (Smithin 2007, Wray 2007).   
 
Finally, post-Keynesians follow the traditional Keynesian view on determinacy 
of investment and reject the simple interest/investment relation implied by the 
IS function in the NCM model, and argue that there is a more complex 
relationship between interest rate and investment (Kriesler and Lavoie 2007). In 
fact, the quantity of credit available in the economy has a more influential role 
on investment than the interest rates, which is the price of credit (Kriesler 1997). 
Empirically, the new Keynesian economist Taylor (1999) has also found that the 
interest elasticity of investment is non-linear and asymmetric. The negative 
effect of interest rate policy on output, and in particular, on investment spending 
is more pronounced during the period of economic boom; however, it is more 
likely to be ineffective for stimulation of investment and output in times of 
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recession. Hence, using the interest rate as the instrument of monetary policy, 
especially during times of recession, is considered to be a ‘pushing on a string’ 
type policy (Nevile and Kriesler 2001).   
  
Give these criticisms of NCM monetary policy, in particular using central bank 
interest rates as the policy instrument, the Post-Keynesians generally view 
monetary policy is an ineffective policy tool relative to the view of NCM. 
However, among post-Keynesian economists, there are two types of view on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. The first can be seen as an ‘extreme’ view of 
monetary policy. Those post-Keynesians who support this view (Lavoie and 
Seccareccia 1999, Smithin 2007, Wray 2007, Godley and Lavoie 2007) argued 
that monetary policy is not reliable and usually ineffective for altering aggregate 
output, and that fiscal policy is more capable of achieving macroeconomic 
objectives such as full employment, and monetary policy could become more 
flexible in terms of setting real interest rates to achieve better distribution of 
income21. In contrast to the ‘extreme’ view, the second group is relatively 
moderate as to monetary policy. They (Moore 1988, Fontana and Palacio-Vera 
2006, Palley 2006 & 2007, Fontana 2007) believe that the monetary policy 
(interest rate policy) can be used as a counter-cyclical tool to adjust economic 
activities at the level of fine-tuning; however, fiscal policy is still relatively 
important than monetary policy.   
 
To summarise this subsection, by adopting the mainstream new consensus 
macroeconomics (NCM) model we have demonstrated how monetary policy can 
be used to achieve price stability through adjustments of interest-rate-related 
spending. We have also discussed the post-Keynesian critiques of the NCM view 
of monetary policy, whose arguments are mainly focused on the IS and MP 
curves. Although, post-Keynesian economists prefer fiscal to monetary policy as 
the tool for stabilising short-term business cycles, there is barely a consensus 
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among NCM and some of the post-Keynesians on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy.  
 
  
4.3 Channels of the MTM and relevant literature  
 
The MTM is a process which describes the impact on real economic activities 
from changes in monetary instruments. The effectiveness of the monetary policy 
is determined by two fundamental factors. First, the price has some degree of 
rigidity; and second, the financial structure of the credit market. To policymakers, 
it is useful to understand the overall effectiveness of monetary policy, which 
could enhance the probability of better monetary policy in terms of timing and 
effectiveness. There are three major channels of the MTM: the interest rate 
channel (also known as traditional cost channel), the asset price channel and the 
credit channel, where adjustment of monetary instruments can pass through its 
influence to the real macroeconomic variables such as output, and inflation. Each 
channel has its own emphasis which provides various explanations of linkages 
between monetary policy and economic performance at the aggregate level. 
Through the discussion of each channel of the MTM here, we will summarise the 
fundamental theories and empirical studies of monetary policy through different 
channels, in order to provide a broad and essential picture of effectiveness of 
monetary policy, and therefore to provide a starting point for this research.  
 
4.3.1 Interest rate channel 
The interest rate channel is a traditional model of MTM which is widely used as 
the typical textbook case (e.g. Keynesian ISLM models). The Keynesian ISLM 
model indicates that the central bank or policymaker could use, for example, an 
expansionary monetary policy to maintain or improve the output level as 
denoted by the following: M ↑ => ir ↓ & I↑ => Y↑. It works in the following 
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sequences: at a given level of interest rate, increase in real money balance (M ↑) 
from the central bank could be perceived as the excessive of cash to households. 
Thereby, households will reduce the real money balance by exchanging cash for 
bonds, which will lead to a fall in interest rate (ir ↓), thus encouraging 
investment as the cost of borrowing becomes cheaper.  
 
This traditional channel of the MTM is also known as the neoclassical money 
view of the MTM. The standard model (Jorgenson 1963 and Poterba 1984) views 
the user cost of capital as a determinate factor of the level of investment, which 
the interest rate has a direct effect on. The model can be written as follows:                            
  dEitPUC cc  )()1(   (4-6) 
 
where UC is the user cost of the capital, Pc is the relative price of the capital, t is 
the marginal tax rate, i is the nominal interest rate, E(πc) represents the 
expected appreciation of value of capital, and d denotes the depreciation of 
capital. To transfer the nominal terms of Equation (4-6) to real terms, we can 
introduce inflation into the model by adding the expected inflation rate πe. Thus, 
Equation (4-6) can be rewritten as follows:  
 




 dEitPUC ecec })({})1{(   (4-7) 
where })1{( eit   is the real after-tax interest rate, and })({ ecE    is the 
expected real appreciation of value of capital.  
 
The argument of this model is that, if the expected inflation rate πe is sticky, the 
value of })({ ecE    tends to be constant at least in the short run. Therefore, 
the adjustment of short-run nominal interest rates can alter upwards the user 
cost of the capital, hence influencing the decision of spending on investment. 
Taylor (1995) empirically tests this channel for both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 
He suggests that this channel is more significant in the USA compared with 
European countries (the UK, Germany and Italy). In order to contradict the 
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doubts about the assumption of sticky price, Taylor (1998) shows that the price 
stickiness exists in both the macro- and micro-level data analysis; in particular, 
here it referees to stickiness in wage-setting. 
 
  Among empirical studies, the discussion of the significance of the interest rate 
channel remains controversial. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) doubt the 
significance of the interest rate channel, suggesting that it is difficult to measure 
the impact on the real side of the economy from monetary policy through the 
interest rate channel. Rabanal (2003 & 2007) also argue that the interest rate 
channel is not significant in the USA or euro area. In contrast, Taylor (1995) 
suggests that monetary shocks through the interest rate channel have a 
significant influence on decisions about spending. Barth and Ramey (2001), 
Revenna and Walsh (2006), and Chowdhury, Hoffmann, and Schabert (2006) also 
reach a similar conclusion: that the interest rate channel plays an important role 
in monetary transmission.  
 
There are couple of factors that are crucial to affecting the effectiveness of the 
traditional interest rate channel. First is the assumption of price stickiness. Taylor 
(1998) provides an overview of empirical evidence to prove the existence of price 
and wage stickiness at both macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. 
Monetary shocks can alter the upward/downward pressures on the cost of 
capital only if the price is sticky, at least in the short run. By adopting the Fisher 
equation:                       
 )1()1(1 ,,,
e
kttkttktt ri     (4-8) 
 
where ktti ,  denotes the nominal rate of interest for the time period from t to t+k, 
kttr ,  is the real interest rate from time t to t+k, and 
e
ktt ,  is the expected 
inflation at time t for the time period of t to t+k.  
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The equation implies that an increase in the nominal interest rate by the 
central bank leads to a rise in real interest rate, if the expectation of inflation 
remains constant or at least there are some degrees of stickiness in the 
adjustment of inflation expectation. Therefore, if the πe is highly volatile, or at 
least moving away from a value of zero, the changes in the short-run interest 
rates may only generate a relatively small impact on real interest rates which 
firms need to pay for the financing of the investment. In the context of EMU, due 
to the different levels of domestic inflation and economic performance, the 
inflation expectation may differ across members at the national level. However, 
the Eurozone base rate is set based on EMU aggregates; this would imply the 
probability of the ‘one size fits all’ issue for the union. The member who has a 
relatively high expectation of inflation may find the user cost of capital is actually 
decreasing relative to the increase in the ECB interest rates, and vice versa in the 
low-inflation-expectation countries.  
 
The second factor relates to the time horizon of which interest rates influence 
the decision of spending. Because capital assets are usually long-lived (e.g. lands, 
premises or machinery), firms and households may value the cost of acquiring 
new capital against the adjustments of the capital’s value over a long period of 
time. In other words, real interest rates and the expectation of the appreciation 
of capital value that affect decisions on spending may be related to the expected 
life of the capital assets (Boivin et al. 2010). This implies that the real long-term 
interest rate has a key role in influencing the level of spending.  
 
However, real long-term interest rates cannot be directly adjusted by the 
central bank; instead, the short-term nominal rates are actually used to form the 
policy tool, which aims to alter the macroeconomic performance. The 
mechanism of how the controlled adjustment of short-term nominal interest 
rate transforms the long-run real interest rate fundamentally depends on the 
price stickiness and expectations (Mishkin 1996). In principle, the long-term real 
interest rate is an average of expected future real short-term interest rates. The 
lower level of short-term nominal interest rate would lead to the lower long-
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term real rate. Previous empirical studies have confirmed the existence of the 
above relationship between short-term and long-term real rates (Roley and 
Sellon 1995, Mehra 1996, Buttigilione et al. 1997, Anderssona et al. 2006). 
However, due to the difficulties of measuring the price stickiness and 
expectation, it is hard to estimate the impact on the long-term real interest rate 
from fluctuation of the short-term nominal rates. 
 
Only a few (e.g. Mojon 2000, Angeloni et al. 2002, Chatelain et al. 2002) 
empirical studies have been done on the traditional interest rate channel, which 
mainly focused on the pre-EMU period beside Chatelain et al. (2002). Mojon 
(2000) states that due to the difference in the structures of financial markets and 
balance sheets of firms and households, the interest rate channel is 
heterogeneous among EMU members. Nevertheless, the author also argues that 
the heterogeneity of the MTM can be relieved by a single money market and ECB 
monetary policy. Ageloni et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive summary of a 
batch of research projects which were conducted by the Monetary Transmission 
Network of the ECB. They conclude that both the interest rate and the credit 
channel exist in EMU area. However, the homogeneity of the interest rate 
channel remains relatively low across the Eurozone members. Chatelain et al. 
(2002) also test both the interest rate and credit channels for the euro area by a 
method that Chatelain describes as a ‘narrow and wider’ approach. With panel 
data at the micro level, he selects four major EMU members (Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain), and assumes the firm’s investment to be the only interest-rate-
sensitive spending variable. This work concludes that the cost of capital is 
sensitive to the fluctuations of interest rates where the cost also plays a crucial 
role in determining the level of investment. The interest rate channel was found 
in all four key European countries during the first two years of the post-EMU 
period, but the effectiveness remains heterogeneity.  
 
Alongside the above empirical works, which focus on the traditional interest 
rate channel, many empirical works on the interest rate channel have switched 
to a different direction (Rabanal 2003, Chowdhury et al. 2006, Ravenna and 
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Walsh 2006, Tillmann 2008 & 2009, Hulsewig et al. 2009). The distinguishing 
feature between the traditional interest rate channel and the new approach is 
their focus on the supply-side perspective. Instead of explaining the cost channel 
of the MTM through the ‘interest rate changes – user cost of capital – 
investment’ relationship, this new approach looks at the linkage of ‘interest rate 
change – cost of capital – inflation changes’. The supply-side version of the 
interest rate channel tries to explain the issue of ‘price puzzle’ (i.e. the 
phenomenon of the inflation rise following the contraction in monetary policy). 
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) suggest that the daily business of firms relies on 
borrowing working capital from financial intermediaries, and the price puzzle is a 
consequence of the supply-side version of the interest rate channel. For example, 
before firms can sell their final products in the goods market, they have to 
borrow to finance the cost of production such as labour, raw materials, etc. This 
also applies to the ongoing investment of firms, which also rely on funds from 
the financial markets.  
 
Moreover, the change of short-term interest rates is not only affecting the 
demand of investment as the theory of user cost of capital suggested; however, 
it also has some relatively immediate effects on the real side of the economy. 
The price of final goods in the market will rise eventually, because firms have to 
pay more on their loans of working capital which are used to finance production 
factors. The significance of this channel depends on the structure of the 
economy. Henzel et al. (2007) suggest that monetary policy does act as a cause 
of supply-side shocks to the economy, as the increase in the interest rate can 
lead to a rise in the marginal cost of firms. But they also claimed that this would 
be more likely to happen to those industries which are relying on short-term 
finance for production. 
 
 In the context of the euro area, the empirical results of this channel remain 
controversial. Rabanal (2003 & 2007), by adopting a Bayesian framework, 
estimates a small-scale macroeconomic model and finds that the cost channel is 
not quantitatively significant in both the euro area and the USA. In contrast, 
________Chapter 4 Effectiveness of the ECB single monetary policy in the Eurozone  
 
143 
 
Tillmann (2008) argues that the supply-side version of the interest rate channel 
actually matters in both the USA and EMU. The author also states that, despite 
the USA financial market being more recognised as a market-oriented system 
while the euro area is closer to a bank-based financial system, the structure of 
financial markets is a minor influence on the existence of the channel. In contrast, 
Henzel et al. (2009) confirms the findings of Rabanal (2003 & 2007) and suggests 
that the cost channel in the euro area is insignificant. Moreover, the cost channel 
is only sufficient to generate the price puzzle if the degree of nominal wage 
stickiness is high or there is a low degree of price stickiness. In addition to the 
former, other studies recognise the existence of the supply-side version of the 
interest rate channel, but they also argue this channel is not pronounced in EMU 
compared with the USA (Chowahury et al. 2006, Hulsewig et al. 2006 & 2009). 
 
The attention to the interest rate channel seems to have been switched from 
the demand side to the supply side of the economy. But to the best of our 
knowledge we did not find any literature either at the theoretical or empirical 
level which leads us to ignore the traditional interest rate channel. Of course, the 
purpose of monetary policy is to stabilise the fluctuations of price and the policy 
should not be used as a demand management tool, as this will only generate 
higher inflation in the long term. However, in practice, monetary policy does 
form a tool which can facilitate the growth of the economy, especially in the 
short run. The 2008 financial crisis gives us an example of monetary 
interventions. All major monetary authorities in Western countries, e.g. the ECB, 
the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve in the USA, were conducting 
expansionary monetary policies to rescue the economy from the danger of a 
long-term slump. Therefore, the relationship between the monetary instruments 
and the macroeconomic variables is still worth investigating, especially to 
policymakers when an appropriate policy needs to be established to offset 
economic shocks.  
 
As we have already mentioned, price stickiness is a key element to the 
traditional interest rate channel. If the price/wage is highly volatile in response 
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to the present economic stance, then it is likely to have a weak traditional 
interest rate channel as the interest rate and the price changes will occur with a 
small time gap. In the case of the Eurozone, increased price flexibility is assumed 
to be one of the advantages to the Eurozone members following the granting of 
EMU membership, as monetary union will encourage improvements in factor 
mobility and flexibility across the union (Sibert 1999, Sibert and Sutherland 2000). 
Because membership implies the loss of monetary independence and restricted 
fiscal policy, it will encourage members to enhance policy reforms in the labour 
market to improve price and factor flexibility.  
 
However, the improvements in price and factor mobility are likely to be 
constrained by the inevitable social and political costs of labour market reforms. 
Hallett et al. (2006) argue that the market is more flexible in the US than the 
Eurozone due to reform fatigue in EMU; in particular, wage flexibility is very low 
in the core compared with periphery member states. Dhyne et al. (2009) have 
produced a comprehensive report on the price rigidities in the euro area, which 
covers the post-EMU period. They argue the economic integration of EMU brings 
a negative impact to labour market flexibility rather than improvements to it. It 
shows that, inside the Eurozone, no fewer than 75% of firms can only adjust their 
wages once a year or even less frequently; price adjustments of goods and 
services are general relatively easier, but still no more than 50% of firms are able 
to adjust the price annually. Verhelst and Van den Poel (2010) also suggest that 
price rigidity is more severe in Europe than the USA, which is blamed on the 
aggressive short-term price strategy in the USA. The empirical results of 
wage/price rigidity in the euro area have shown indications of some failure in the 
reform of members’ labour markets. However, in the context of the interest rate 
channel, the low degree of price and wage flexibility in the Eurozone may suggest 
the probability of a place for the traditional interest rate channel to operate in 
EMU.   
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 4.3.2 Asset price channel 
The traditional interest rate channel emphasises the interest rate as the only 
cost of the acquisition of capital assets that determine the level of spending in 
the economy. However, altering interest rates also affects the price/value of 
assets, which is the determining influence on the level of spending. This is the 
reason why the Keynesian model has received objections from monetarists, who 
argue other prices also have a crucial role in determining macroeconomic 
outcomes, such as currency and equities, which forms another major channel of 
the MTM – the asset price channel.  
 
Exchange rate channel  
In an open economy, in the case of uncovered interest rate parity22, in terms of 
returns it is indifference to hold bonds in the form of either domestic or foreign 
currency. Because the expected arbitrages are identical to both domestic and 
foreign bonds, change in the domestic interest rate would lead to a differential 
between the domestic and foreign interest rates. This implies the possibility of 
arbitrage by switching the existing holdings of bonds from a low interest rate 
currency to a high interest rate currency. Therefore, the changes in monetary 
policy may lead to alterations in the exchange rates.   
 
Dynamics of exchange rates have direct impacts on macroeconomic 
performance in the form of output. The mechanism of the exchange rate channel 
can be shown by the following: MS ↓ / i ↑ =>E↑ => NX ↓ => Y↓, where NX 
denotes the net exports, and E represents the exchange rate. Once the monetary 
authorities adjust interest rates upwards, foreign investors may start to adjust 
their wealth portfolio by switching some of their assets into the currency with a 
higher interest rate (Wickens 1985, Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995). The increase in 
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 Interest rate parity is uncovered when the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied without the use of 
a forward contract to hedge against potential exchange rate fluctuations. Investors are 
indifferent among the available interest rates in two countries; because adjustments of the 
exchange rate between those countries are expected to eliminate the potential arbitrage (e.g. 
the euro return on euro deposits is equal to the euro return on foreign deposits).  
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demand for domestic currency will create an upward pressure on the exchange 
rate, thereby leading to the appreciation of this currency. This can cause the 
decline of international competitiveness of exports and the imports become 
more favourable due to the relatively low prices. If other variables are assumed 
constant, the fall in net exports can lead to shrinkage in the level of national 
output. However, domestic inflation may be under downward pressure as the 
price of imports drops.  
   
  Globalisation and, in particular, the rise in cross-border production and trade 
indicate the importance of the exchange rate channel in the open economy 
perspective. For instance, with the share of international trade in the economy 
for a given change in import price expanding, the effect on domestic inflation 
should be more significant (Mishkin 2009). Hence, in the sense of globalisation 
and economic integration the economy may become more sensitive to economic 
shocks from overseas trading partners.  
 
However, this is particular to the Eurozone because it has been commonly 
considered as a closed economy; thus the empirical analysis of the MTM usually 
excludes the exchange rate channel (Mojon and Peersman 2001, Peersman 2004, 
Cecioni et al. 2010). One reason behind this assumption is the relatively low 
proportion of trade in the overall weight of GDP. The trade to GDP ratio in EMU 
in 2008 was 40 per cent that is just 10 percentage points higher than the USA 
which is commonly treated as a closed economy (Cecioni et al. 2010). However, 
the relatively low trade to GDP ratio does not necessarily mean that the impact 
of the exchange rate on macroeconomic variables (e.g. inflation) is not 
pronounced in the Eurozone. In fact, it was suggested that this has an important 
and direct impact on domestic price fluctuations (ECB 2000). 
 
  Nevertheless, there are only a few empirical studies on the exchange rate 
channel in the case of EMU, with mixed results. Among them, Angeloni et al. 
(2003) find the impact on the exchange rate from monetary policy is difficult to 
measure inside the Eurosystem since the movements in both exchange rates and 
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interest rates closely linked at high frequencies. Thus, it is difficult to identify 
which is the actual cause of the change in another. Boivin and Giannoni (2008) 
find no evidence to show there is a systematic influence of global factors (e.g. 
exchange rates) on major macro-variables. Galati et al. (2007) have shown that, 
instead of following the assumption of interest parity conditions, interest rate 
differentials between domestic and foreign markets are always offset by the 
movements of exchange rates. Changes in the short-term interest rate would 
lead to one-to-one movements in the exchange rate, which magnify the effects 
of changes in interest rates on the real side of the economy. Favero and Giavazzi 
(2008) argue that it is inconsistent with the empirical evidence to treat the euro 
area as a closed economy since the long-term interest rates in the Eurozone 
respond to both US and European variables (e.g. inflation, output gap and short-
term rates), and the US variables are more important to the long-term rates than 
these local variables, at both the pre- and post-EMU periods.  
 
Despite the mixed results of the empirical studies, it is unadvisable to accept 
the assumption of the euro area being a closed economy as granted, since the 
trade GDP ratio is marginally higher than the USA (Cecioni et al. 2010); nor does 
the closed economy assumption simplify the empirical analysis. In fact, ignoring 
the foreign sector could cause the omission of important explanatory variables 
and be harmful to the understanding of overall effectiveness of EMU monetary 
policy. Thus, foreign variables such as foreign short-term rates and exchange 
rates with major trading partners need to be included, at least, as exogenous 
variables to the model.  
 
Equity effects  
  Besides affecting the price of currency, monetary policy also has impacts on real 
economic activities through its effect on the valuation of firms’ assets. This forms 
the second approach to the asset price channel, which emphasises the relation 
between variation of the equity price and the level of spending.  
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Tobin’s q theory (Tobin 1969) suggests that monetary shocks impact on the 
level of spending, because they can lead to a fluctuation of equity price. In theory, 
firms are motivated to conduct investments through issuing new equities at a 
high price level, if the market value of the firm is higher than the cost of 
replacement capital and the acquisition of new machineries and premises. Tobin 
(1969) defined this relationship by using a parameter q, which is calculated by 
market value of the firm divided by the cost of capital replacements (or cost of 
investments). If the value of q is high across the firms, it indicates that the 
investments will tend to be high at the aggregate level, and vice versa for the 
case of the low q value. Moreover, the theory also assumes that the share price 
represents all available information about a firm because the equity market is 
sufficiently efficient, which means the fundamental value of the firm can be 
measured by the stock market valuation. The price of equity, therefore, should 
reflect the current and future expectation value of the firm. This means the q 
value is the only necessary factor to use for evaluating investment demand of 
firms. The asset price channel through Tobin’s q can be denoted as: MS ↑ / i ↓ => 
Peq↑ => Tobin’s q ↑ => I ↑ => Y.  
 
  If we assume monetary authorities increase the money supply, which means 
there could be excessive supply relative to demand, households may replace the 
excessive money balance by other financial assets. Equity may become more 
popular than bonds given the decline in the interest rates (Mishkin 1996). As the 
consequence of a rise in demand of equities, values of firms are improved 
through higher share prices in the equity market. Eventually, investments will 
increase as the cost of capital acquisitions becomes lower relative to the value of 
firms – a higher Tobin’s q value. The mechanics of Tobin’s q theory seem 
straightforward; however, the main drawback of the theory is that the key 
variable – marginal q – is unobservable23. In practice, this theory usually fails to 
predicate investment behaviour of firms (Blanchard et al. 1993, Chirinko 1993, 
Bond et al. 2000, Bond and Cummins 2001, among others).  
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  . 
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Thus, in practice, the average q can be used, alternatively, if the production and 
cost functions adhere to the constant return of scale, and a firm is a price taker 
in all markets (Hayashi 1982). The simple form of an investment equation can be 
written as follows (see Bond and Cummins 2001):              
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k
tp  represents the price of capital at time t, δ is the rate of capital depreciation. 
1)1(  t
K
t
t
Kp
V

 is defined as the average q of a firm at time t with the capital 
asset of (1- δ)Kt-1 that is carried from the past. If the value of marginal q > 1, the 
market price of the firm is greater relative to the cost of replacement capital, and 
then the new investment can be financed by issuing a number of shares against 
the existing capital assets of firms.  
 
However, this alternative approach was criticised by empirical studies as the 
average q model has failed to explain movements in investment. One of the main 
criticisms suggested that rather than following the key assumption of the 
average q model, the fluctuation of share prices in the market is not purely 
caused by the fundamentals (Bond et al. 2000, Bond and Cummins 2001). The 
theory assumes that the movements in fundamentals should be reflected by 
changes in price of equities which represent the true value and all available 
information of firms. Even though theory assumes that the information can be 
fully accessed by market participators, the speculative nature of financial 
markets is too important to be ignored. Bond and Cummins (2001) argue that 
investments cannot be purely explained by share price, because the valuation in 
the equity market significantly deviates from the fundamental value24 of listed 
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 The fundamental value is given by the market value less the speculation component; and the 
fundamental components are proxied by the value of sales, dividends, cash flow, and earning 
forecasts. 
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firms, which can be explained by the omission of the speculative bubbles in 
financial markets.  
 
  Two methods can be used to remodify the standard average q model. First, the 
components of speculative bubbles are introduced into the analysis. Second, 
some other financial variables (e.g. cash flow, stock of liquid asset and working 
capitals etc.) are added into the investment equation. For the former method, 
Anderson and Subbaraman (1996) find that for Australia the fundamental 
component has a stronger impact than market equity price on the investment, 
which cannot be explained by the speculative component. Chirinko and Schaller 
(2001) showed the evidence for Japan during the late 1980s whereby investment 
was affected by the market bubbles during that period of time. In the case of the 
latter approach, Alonso and Bentolila (1994) detect the elasticity of investment 
to equity market movements in Spain, which are relatively low due to the poor 
financial market developments at that time. Ashworth and Davis (2001) 
investigate the G7 countries and find that the average q is only significant for 
France and Japan. Assarsson et al. (2004) used a multivariate error-correction 
model to suggest that, besides the average q model, other variables such as real 
output and capital gearing also determine the level of investment in Sweden.    
 
Although these remodified Tobin’s q methods, which were widely applied at 
the micro level in the previous literature, provide some useful extensions to 
overcome the weakness of the original theory in empirical applications, this may 
not be the case at the macro level of analysis. Because only public listed 
companies are capable of accessing funds from equity markets, while other small 
or medium enterprises can only obtain credit externally (e.g. bank loans or credit 
from non-banking financial firms), this might be one reason why empirical 
research is more concentrated on the credit channel to demonstrate the MTM. 
In this chapter we aim to evaluate EMU monetary policy at the aggregate level to 
consider the impact on the overall level of output and inflation, rather than 
solely focusing on a specific industry (e.g. firms are listed in the equity markets). 
Thus, the Tobin’s q theory seems too unilateral to be used solely to explain the 
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MTM of EMU at the macro level. However, because of the above weakness of 
Tobin’s q theory, it is not necessary to ignore the asset price channel in our 
analysis. The equity price can be at least partially used to explain business 
investments (Alonso and Bentolila 1994, Assarsson et al. 2004). Furthermore, it is 
an important factor which affects the firms’ ability to access external funds.  
 
4.3.3 The credit channel 
The money view of the MTM (e.g. interest rate channel and asset price channel) 
emphasises the impact of prices or costs of the capital stock on aggregate 
demand. In contrast, the credit view of the MTM – the credit channel – argues 
that the fluctuations of aggregate spending are the result of the imperfect and 
asymmetric information in the financial market, which affects the real side of the 
economy through bank lending and balance sheet channels. In this view, the 
difference between the costs of funds raised internally – retaining earnings – and 
the costs of external financing – issuing equity or loans – reflects the external 
financial premium. The size of it represents the degree of imperfection in the 
credit market.  
 
The credit channel is usually twofold: the bank-based channel (e.g. the bank 
lending channel and board credit channel, which includes banks and other non-
bank credit providers) and the balance sheet channel. The former suggests that 
the dynamics of monetary contractions lead to changes in the adverse selection 
problems between creditors and borrowers, which affect the volume of loans 
supplied to borrowers. The latter emphasises that changes in monetary policy 
affect the financial stance of the borrowers.  
 
 In the view of the bank lending channel, the changes in real economic activities 
directly depend on the volume of credit supply from the banks. Banks have a 
special role to provide a channel to small and medium firms that can only access 
the credit market through bank loans (Bernanke and Blinder 1988, Stein 1998). 
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For example: MS ↑ / i ↓ => Bank deposits ↑ => Bank loans ↑ => I and C ↑ => 
Y↑. Expansionary monetary policy through reducing the liquidity ratio leads to a 
rise in money supply, which will increase the available funds of the bank loans 
and lower the interest rates. Thus, borrowers can obtain loans more easily for 
investments and probably also raise consumptions of households if the spending 
partially depends on the bank loan (e.g. credit cards and short-term loans).  
 
There are two conditions that have to be met, in order to make the bank 
lending channel work (Kashyap and Stein 1995). First, firms (at least some of 
them) must rely on loans from banks, as they are not able to raise funds from 
stock markets; second, the central bank must be able to adjust the level of the 
loan supply in the private banking sector. However, the key implication of this 
channel is that monetary policy is important to the small and medium firms, but 
is less crucial to the large firms that have a wider choice of ways to access credit. 
Therefore, the bank lending channel is more popular at the micro level but 
incapable of explaining the overall assessment of macroeconomic variables 
(Kashyap et al. 1993, Bernanke 1993, Valderrama 2001 and Butzen 2001, among 
others).  
 
The broad credit channel, which includes all financial intermediaries in the 
market, is designed in response to the weakness of the bank lending channel. 
The value of financial intermediaries’ assets or, in other words, the balance sheet 
stance of those financial intermediaries will determine the supply of credit. The 
balance sheet of banks can be affected by monetary policy in two ways. First, 
expansionary policy can raise the asset price of banks which will immediately 
improve the balance sheets of banks. Second, the lower short-term interest rates 
would mean the higher net interest rate margins that banks profits are made 
from will improve the balance sheets of banks over time.  
 
  However, the changes in the institutional structure of financial markets have 
made the bank-based channel generally less important than before. First, the 
development in financial products makes the monetary policy less pronounced 
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through these channels. Altunbas et al. (2009) suggests that the recent 
developments, such as asset securitisation, augment the bank’s liquidity, 
reducing the impact of contractionary monetary policy on funds of banks. Hence, 
it reduced the importance of the bank lending channel of the MTM. In the case 
of moral hazard, Altunbas et al. (2009) also argues, asset securitisation can 
transfer at least part of the credit risks to other financial market participators, 
allowing banks to reduce the risk of loan repayment default. Thus, banks are 
better sheltered by intensive asset securitisation against the monetary shocks. 
Purnanandam (2007) also shows that derivatives cause contractionary monetary 
policy to become less effective in controlling bank lending behaviour. 
Furthermore, globalisation and European economic integration also lead to the 
weakening of the bank-based channel. The cross-border merger and acquisition 
created internationally based large banks that are capable of responding to 
domestic liquidity shocks by transferring assets between different 
regions/countries and headquarters, which is necessarily making the domestic 
bank-based channel less effective (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2009). 
 
The alternative approach to the bank-based channel of the MTM is the balance 
sheet channel, which was developed during the 1980s and 1990s (Bernanke and 
Gertler 1989, Gertlerand and Gilchrist 1994, Oliner and Rudebush 1996). This 
channel arises from the issues of asymmetric information which present 
between banks and borrowers, and emphasises the linkage between the 
financial stance of borrowers and volume of credit supplied by financial 
intermediates. The balance sheets of borrowers, which perform as financial 
health indicators, can be used to assess risks of potential defaults (e.g. how much 
collateral firms can use to guarantee their liabilities). An increase in net worth of 
borrowers implies more available collateral for loan credits, thus adverse 
selection becomes low, which means a rise in lending for investments. In 
contrast, lower net worth of borrowers would indicate a rise in the moral hazard 
problem, because it implies that the owners are more likely to engage in risky 
investment as they have less of an equity stake in their firms. Since high-risk 
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investment may imply the high probability of default, less credit will be offered 
to borrowers for their investment.  
 
Monetary policy can affect the balance sheets of firms in several ways. First, it 
can improve balance sheets by increasing firms’ cash flow, since a fall in the 
short-term interest rates can reduce the interest expenses of firms’ existing loans. 
With higher cash flow, firms have a better finance stance, which allows them to 
conduct investment projects either through internal funds or by applying for 
loans from financial markets. Second, monetary policy can influence the equity 
price of firms as we mentioned earlier. Thus, improvements in the net worth of 
firms through higher share prices indicates more collateral available for liabilities 
(e.g. adverse selection), and owners of firms have less intention to conduct risky 
projects (e.g. moral hazard). Thus, funds from loans become more easily 
accessed by the firms, which will ultimately increase the level of investments. 
Mishkin (2007) argues that monetary policy could influence the net worth of 
borrowers, which is reflected by the stance of their balance sheets. Given the 
asymmetric information in the market, the assets of borrowers are collateral for 
their loans, and their value is a straightforward indicator of potential loss if the 
borrower defaults on the loan repayment. Empirical studies (Bondt 2004, 
Ashcraft and Campello 2007, Angelopoulou and Gibson 2007) suggest that the 
balance sheet channel is important to transmit the impact of monetary policy on 
spending and output in the euro area, the USA and the UK respectively.  
 
The balance sheet channel is equally applied to household consumption. In 
principle, changes in the value of household assets (e.g. housing price) have 
direct effects on net worth of households. Since the problem of asymmetric 
information also exists between lenders and households, thus, changes in net 
worth of households could affect their ability to access credit, similar to the case 
of firms (Hatzious 2005, Benito et al. 2006). Aoki et al. (2004) suggest that the 
balance sheet channel for households has an important role, which is 
represented by the increase in responsiveness of consumption to changes in 
housing price. Muellbauer (2008) argued that the asset price may only be a 
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causal direct influence on consumption; however, it at least manifested the 
better ability of households to access credit by applying loans against housing 
wealth.  
 
Moreover, in countries with well-developed financial markets, consumer 
spending may react to changes in monetary policy more sensitively through this 
channel. Calza et al. (2007) demonstrate that the correlation between the 
household consumption and housing price is related to the mortgage market 
characteristics in OECD countries; the elasticity of household consumption and 
output tends to be bigger in countries with more developed financial markets. 
Goodhart and Horfmann (2008) and Assenmacher and Gerlach (2008) also 
confirm that the responses of output to changes in housing price and monetary 
policy is stronger in Western industrialised countries like the UK, France, 
Germany and the US during the recent period than it was before.   
 
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish the credit channel and the interest rate 
channel (Ciccareli et al. 2010). The credit channel emphasises the relationship 
between monetary instruments and level of loan supply. In contrast, the money 
view of the MTM focuses on demand for credit. However, both demand and 
supply of credit are unobservable variables. It is possible these two channels may 
operate simultaneously when monetary shocks occur. For example, a tightening 
in monetary policy can lead to shrinkage in volume of loan at the aggregate level, 
which can be explained through both money and credit views of the MTM. In the 
money view, decline in loan volume is through the interest rate channel as a 
higher market lending rate causes the drop in the demand for loans. In the credit 
view, decline in the supply of loans is responsible for the lowering of aggregate 
loan level.  
 
In the presence of the credit channel, the interest rates on credit may respond 
faster to monetary shocks than the default risk-free interest rates. This implies 
that the interest rate spreads can be used as the method of identifying the credit 
channel in practice (Zurlinden 2005). However, this approach relies on the 
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availability of the data, which may not be available in all EMU countries. In 
addition, it is also difficult to apply a uniform method to all members, as the 
system of banking and financial markets remains heterogeneous across the 
Eurozone (Lensink 2002). Furthermore, there are another two factors which may 
also affect the identification of the credit channel. First, if credit rationing25 exists 
in the system, the interest rate spreads may not be discovered with the existence 
of the credit channel. This is because lenders may ration credit as a response to 
the monetary shocks, hence the spreads between interest rates of risky and 
default risk-free credit could remain unchanged. Second, there is a possibility of 
identifying the existence of the credit channel with the absence of its crux. For 
instance, following a contractionary monetary policy, the economy can be 
suppressed as the decrease in growth rates. This would imply a worse general 
economic environment and the higher probability of bankruptcies of some firms. 
A possible consequence is that the interest rate spreads of default risk-free and 
risky credit may widen even without the assumption of asymmetric information.  
 
 In order to solve the identification problem of the credit channel, the empirical 
studies have focused on the cross-sectional implications of the data at the micro 
level (e.g. data at the firm and bank level). Most of them only focus on the 
national level or on a small group of EMU countries. For example, Vermuelen 
(2002) investigates the importance of the balance sheet channel in Germany, 
France, Italy, and Spain; Martinz-Carrascal and Frenando (2008) also focus on the 
balance sheet channel of six euro area countries with help from the micro data; 
Valderrama (2001) and Butzen et al. (2001) estimate the bank lending channels 
in Austria and Belgium respectively. Valderrama (2001) uses the VAR method to 
suggest that monetary policy has a distributional effect in Belgium, as small firms 
are more sensitive to monetary shocks than large firms. Because the micro 
identification method only concentrates on the specified sector of the economy, 
it only provides some limited analysis. This implies the micro data approach is 
                                                          
25
 Credit rationing is the case where borrowers are denied loans even when they are willing to 
pay a higher interest rate. This is because individuals and firms with risky investment projects are 
the ones who are willing to pay the highest interest rates. Thus, higher interest rates increase the 
adverse selection problem and lower interest rates reduce it (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). 
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unable to evaluate the overall effects on macroeconomic variables from the 
monetary shocks (Kashyap and Stein 2000). In addition, because loan demand 
and supply cannot be directly observed in the market, the micro data method 
restricts the assumptions of loan demand changes by using actual granted credit, 
which implies the difficulties of quantifying the relative impact on real activities 
of changes in loan demand and supply. 
 
Overall, among these existing empirical studies, the results are rather mixed. 
Many studies have focused on a specific channel, which may come with several 
issues. First, these results are incapable of assessing the overall effectiveness of 
monetary policy. By only concentrating on a specific channel of the MTM or a 
single driving force, they could omit others which may also have a substantial 
effect on real economic activities. Moreover, these channels and forces may 
work in the same direction as the specified channel/driving force to enhance the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, or they may operate in a different direction 
which actually brings a negative impact on policy goals. Second, it requires some 
empirical methods to isolate these specific channels from other potential factors, 
but it is difficult to separate a specific channel from others. In fact, different 
channels are actually co-intervening with each other (Worms 2004, Black and 
Rosen 2007) (e.g. the asset price and balance sheet channels). Hence, it would 
generate a limited and inconclusive explanation of the overall effects of 
monetary shocks if the analysis simply focused on a specific channel of the MTM. 
In contrast with previous empirical works, through being independent from any 
specific channel of the MTM, we will analyse the aggregate level date to check 
the overall impact of monetary policy on real economic activities as a whole at 
both union and national level. 
 
Moreover, a large proportion of the literature was produced to uncover the 
dynamic relations between monetary shocks and macroeconomic variable 
movements (Butzen et al. 2001, Peersman 2001, Valderrama 2001, Chatelain et 
al. 2002, Vermuelen 2002, Rabanal 2003, van Aarel 2003, Peersman 2004, Favero 
and Giavazzi 2008, Martinz-Carrascal and Frenando 2008, Weber et al. 2009, 
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Peersman 2011). Among them, the focus is either on the union aggregates, or on 
the national level for some selected Eurozone members. However, the 
understanding of the effects of EMU monetary policy cannot be studied based 
solely on the union-level aggregates. Furthermore, the concentration of research 
is also inappropriate if it relies on the national-level data of a few major 
economies. Moreover, both approaches analyse the effects of monetary policy 
by using only limited information and omitting the data of other members of the 
Eurozone.  
 
Finally, among existing literature, the vector autoregression (VAR) method is 
one of the most frequently used approaches to assess the effects of monetary 
policy on macroeconomic variables (Peersman 2001, van Aarel et al. 2003, 
Rabanal 2003, Peersman 2004, Favero and Giavazzi 2008, Weber et al. 2009, 
Peersman 2011). The benefit of using VAR to estimate the effects of the central 
banks’ actions is its ability to deliver empirically credible responses of 
macroeconomic variables without imposing burdensome restrictions on the 
dynamic structure of the model. Like other time series methods, the VAR system 
is also heavily dependent on the scale of the time series data. Therefore, the 
common issue of the previous literature is that the adequacy of the VAR method 
is questionable due to the relatively small time span of available data on EMU. 
The data for some major members of EMU, e.g. Germany and France, may be 
sufficiently large to run a time series VAR, and these countries contribute a large 
proportion of union-level GDP and other macro aggregates. However, the results 
from studying these key EMU members are too narrow to be used as the proxy 
of the whole union.  
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4.4 Methodology – panel vector autoregression model  
 
 
  In the previous section, we reviewed the recent empirical literature studying 
the impact of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables for both Eurozone 
members and other major developed economies. Given the complexity of 
channels that monetary policy takes to influence overall economic activities, 
there is no single monetary transmission mechanism that can be solely used to 
study the question of the overall effects of monetary policy instruments on key 
economic aggregates. Moreover, it also requires complex methods to isolate a 
chosen MTM from other MTM channels, which usually means a partial focus in 
the research. Since we aim to check the overall effectiveness of the ECB’s 
monetary policy on the Eurozone’s macroeconomic performance, rather than 
studying any individual MTM channel, we need an appropriate econometrics 
technique which allows us to establish an approachable and comprehensive 
method to implement this empirical analysis. Thus, in this subsection of Chapter 
4, we will review a chosen method that will be adopted for the purpose of 
evaluating the overall impacts of ECB monetary policy.  
        
 
4.4.1 Vector autoregression (VAR) estimation  
Sims (1980) suggests that using a traditional large-scale econometrics model 
restricted by its ‘incredible’ assumptions on identification, where variables are 
segmented into the categories of endogenous and exogenous to the model, 
ignores the possibility of interdependence between variables, as well as being 
incapable of testing such interdependence relationships. In response to the 
weakness of traditional methods, Sims (1980) suggests that if simultaneity is 
truly the case among variables, then the interdependence of variables needs to 
be considered, therefore all variables should be treated as endogenous to the 
testing model.   
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  The main criticism of applying VAR methods to study monetary policy states 
that the behaviour of private agents is forward-looking rather than backward-
looking, but VAR cannot measure the forward-looking component of monetary 
policy, thereby VAR is incapable of properly measuring the monetary shocks. In 
particular, the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is suggested 
as a popular alternative to the VAR method (Rabanal 2003 & 2007, Huelsewig et 
al. 2006, Lee 2009). Nevertheless, a different strand of literature (Ball 1999 & 
2000, Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002) argues that the backward-looking models are 
appreciable in at least two important aspects. They tend to offer a good fit with 
the data, and their dynamics closely resemble those filtered with VARs. Despite 
the increase in popularity of the DSGE approach, the VAR method still retains its 
position as one of the most commonly used approaches to study the impacts of 
monetary policy.  
 
In addition, as we have mentioned earlier, there is no comprehensive model 
which covers all channels of the MTM. Each MTM theory only focuses on a 
particular channel with concentration on a relatively small number of variables. 
Under this weakness of theories of the MTM, the VAR method offers a flexible 
analytical system where dynamic relationships can be quantified based on a 
minimal theoretical structure (Arias 2007).  
 
The simple two-variable, first-order case of the VAR system can be written as:               
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xttttt
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uyxyx
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 (4-10) 
The values of tx and ty  depend on each other’s current and past values and their 
own current values. The error terms xtu  and ytu are uncorrelated white noise 
disturbances with constant variance. Equation (4-10) can be written into a more 
compact format as:                        
 ttt uZAAAZ  110  (4-11) 
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which represents the following: 
                    





































yt
xt
t
t
t
t
u
u
y
x
y
x
1
1
22
12
21
11
20
1012
21
      
1
  
1






  
                               A             Zt             A0                 A1                Zt-1           ut   
  The simple VAR system represented by equations Equation (4-10) cannot be 
directly estimated, because of the correlation among xt with uyt and yt with uxt. 
Therefore, we can multiply Equation (4-11) by A-1, which helps us to generate a 
standard reduced form of the VAR system:                         
 
ttt UZZ  110  (4-12) 
where 0 = A
-1
A0; 1 = A
-1
A1 and tU =A
-1
 u t. The standard form of the VAR model 
does not present the estimation problems of the structural form, which we 
mentioned in an earlier paragraph. In this reduced form of the two-variable VAR 
system, the errors tU  are composites of the white noise processes u t and 
therefore have zero means and constant variances and are individually serially 
uncorrelated.  
 
  More generally the VAR system can be written as:                
 
t
p
l
ltt YBBY '''
1
21 

   (4-13) 
 
Where Y’ is a k × 1 column vector of endogenous variables; B1 is k × 1 column 
vector of specific intercepts; B2 is k × k parameter matrices; η’ is the k × 1 white 
noise error term, which allows the tolerance of serial correlation to appears in 
the model E (ut ut+s) ≠ 0 (s ≠ 0), ηt = ρut-1 + stochastic disturbance.  
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4.4.2 Format of data set – using panel data instead of time series  
Time series is a common selection and a popular format of data sets available 
for macroeconomic studies. It is favoured by economists because of its rich 
properties in variety estimation methods and massive quantities of empirical 
application of them. However, the unbiased estimates of parameters not only 
rely on the correct specification of models and application of appropriate tests; it 
also and more importantly requires the data set to contain sufficient large 
numbers of observations of well-defined data items obtained through repeated 
measurements over time – the large T. However, if the size of T is small, the 
estimated coefficients may not represent the true value, even when the t-value 
and F tests are significant. 
 
An insufficient number of observations over a small time period may shatter 
the estimation of parameters. This could be the real issue in the research on 
monetary policy in the euro area. The short operational history of the Eurozone 
had already become a concern for empirical research: ‘Unfortunately, studying 
the monetary policy transmission process in the euro area is difficult at this stage, 
due to the extreme scarcity of data’ (Angeloni and Ehrmamm 2003). There are 
several ways to count the length of the euro area; if we treat the formal starting 
point of the Eurozone as Stage Three of EMU, which is from January 1999, the 
euro area only has 12 years’ history up to the year 2011.  
 
However, if we adjust the period of changeover – replacing individual members’ 
old national currencies by euro notes and coins between 1999 and January 2002 
– the history of the euro area shrinks down to nine years. Of course, we could 
include Stages One and Two of EMU, to expand the size of T from 12 years to 19 
years. However, it does not provide significant improvements on the size of the 
data: there only would be 19 observations on each variable for each member 
state if annual data is assumed to be used. Of course, we can use quarterly data 
instead (monthly data are not commonly available to aggregate macro data), and 
therefore have bigger expansion on the number of observations for each 
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member state, X1 = 76, based on which the size of the data should be sufficient 
for time series analysis. Nevertheless, the issue attracting attention here is the 
availability of quarterly data for each EMU member.  
 
Sousa (2010) applies VAR method with quarterly data from 1980:1 to 2007:4, 
which estimated the euro area and its eight major economies separately. The 
author find that a substantial fall in wealth follows monetary contraction, the fall 
in housing wealth lasting much longer than financial wealth in the euro area. 
Gelain (2008) applies the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) 
to union-level quarterly time series data, to test the credit channel of the MTM 
in the euro area. Furthermore, Rafiq and Mallick (2008) apply VAR methods to 
time series quarterly data on France, Germany and Italy to estimate the impacts 
on output by monetary shocks, their data covering 1980:1 to 2005:4. All these 
works estimate a specific channel of the MTM at union level or/and with 
comparison to a few major euro members to broaden the picture. Their data 
covers up to the last 30 years with a minimum of at least 80 observations, which 
seems to be sufficient to run a time series analysis.  
 
However, if the research aims to include all member states to produce a 
comprehensive study of Eurozone, sufficient and consistent length of time series 
data may not be feasible for all 17 member countries. If quarterly data is 
available for each variable of each single country, but the data covering the 
1980s for the former communist countries (e.g. Slovakia, Estonia etc.) is 
unreasonable to use, because their economy was managed under the planned 
economy regime at that time, the figures may be invalid to be tested under the 
economic theory based on the market economy regime. The time period the 
data therefore should cover is from no earlier than the 1990s up to now, if all 
current EMU member states are included in this study. Thereby, we can 
eliminate the potential problematic data from the former communist period.  
 
Furthermore, a small data set will typically suffer a lower degree of freedom if 
dummy variables are included in the model which aims to take the effects of 
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certain events on the error terms. The solution to overcome the above 
fundamental problem of this research is using panel data to increase the 
numbers of observations. For each variable we choose, assuming only annual 
data is applied, we can obtain at least N×T = 17 × 20 = 340 observations, where N 
= 16 entities, T = 20 years. Macroeconomic panel data is usually rarely available 
for researchers, but we can collect the time series data for each EMU member, 
and pool them into a single data set to create our ‘artificially’ made panel data. 
This method is also known as the pooled cross-sectional time series data.  
 
 4.4.3 VAR combined with panel data – panel vector autoregression (PVAR) 
Like other time series methods, the VAR system is also heavily dependent on 
the scale of the time series data. Due to the relatively small time dimension of 
available data, the adequacy of the VAR method is questionable. For instance, 
the issue of using time series VAR method is the decision of how many lags 
researchers should put into the model. During estimation of the multivariable 
VAR system, their lags can seriously consume the degrees of freedom, in 
particular with small time period data sets. To overcome this drawback, we could 
pool the time series across the different union members to generate a panel data 
set, which can substantially increase the efficiency and the power of the analysis.  
 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) provide a benchmark study on applying the VAR 
method to the panel data. The original motivation is to suggest that the 
advantage of the VAR model – the capability to analyse the dynamic relationship 
between variables and the causal relationship among them, which can be equally 
applied to the panel data. In particular, they mean applying the VAR method to 
microeconomics, as the data on micro units is usually short in time series, but 
rich in panel data. Despite the original motivation of PVAR being to apply VAR to 
micro databases, the advantage of this method is that it can also be applied to 
macroeconomic research. Gavin and Theodorou (2005) argue that by adopting a 
panel approach in a macroeconomic framework, it helps to uncover common 
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dynamic relationships which might otherwise be obscured by individual country-
level analysis. The PVAR method is now becoming popular for cross-country 
analysis of the monetary policy (Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach 2008, 
Goodhart and Hofmann 2008, Boivin et al. 2009). 
 
Moreover, PVAR is the application of the VAR method to panel data, but the 
principle of the model is the same as its time series counterpart, which means 
the model can be easily applied to test the dynamic relations among variables 
and only requires minimum restrictions on the model, especially compared with 
another alternative macroeconometric model – the dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model (DSGE) (Canova and Ciccarelli 2013). In the case of the DSGE 
model, it builds up a ‘large and complex’ framework that contains multiple 
sectors, agents, markets; each market’s constraints are specified and agents in 
each sector of the economy are assumed to maximise their goal (or minimise the 
loss) subject to those constraints. Since the DSGE model attempts to cover the 
entire economy, it is usually seen as, probably, one of the most 
comprehensive/advanced techniques we can use to study macroeconomics. In 
particular, it helps to evaluate and provide good analysis on the impact of the 
government’s economic policies.  
 
However, unlike a straightforward ‘pure’ econometric method, the DSGE 
model can be seen as a combination of a mathematic modelling of a ‘designed’ 
economic scenario with an econometric estimation of it. As the first step in 
building up this model, relevant economic theories have to be selected to create 
the ‘designed’ economic scenario. The new consensus macroeconomics (NCM) 
model is commonly used as the theoretical building blocks of DSGE, which 
contains some of the key neoclassical concepts such as rational behaviour and 
expectations of agents, and the market tending to clear itself after the short-run. 
Given such restrictions on how the economy should behave at a micro level, 
which collectively explains the macroeconomic activities at the aggregate level, 
the outcome of this kind of model is possibly misleading.  
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First, the assumption of the rational expectation of economic agents can be 
problematic. The Lucas theory argues that, by using all available current 
information, average expectation of all economic agents tends to be equal to the 
‘true’ future events, which also matches the predictions of relevant economic 
theory (Lucas 1972). One of its implications is the rational behaviour of agents. 
As agents are able to ‘perfectly’ predict the future outcome from current events, 
future uncertainty tends to be unimportant; therefore, economic agents are less 
likely to behave irrationally given that others’ behaviours will average the 
irrational behaviour out. Since rational expectation theory emphasises that 
today’s value of a variable (e.g. price) depends on expectation of the future price; 
in other words, future price also depends on expectations of the future’s future 
price. This relation can extend to the infinite.  
 
However, as rational expectation operates under the assumption of unique 
future market equilibrium, the model can be undetermined when we extend the 
equation to infinity, which may contain multiple future equilibriums. Hence, this 
implies the existence of possible future uncertainty, which prevents economic 
agents behaving rationally at all times. According to the prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), with the presence of uncertainty, the behaviours 
of agents are not in line with neoclassical assumptions of maximising profit and 
utility, and economic agents’ behaviours are more likely to be risk-averse. 
Therefore, the behaviour of economic agents is unlikely to be constant over time; 
economic decisions are largely affected by the changes in uncertainty and 
expectation. In fact, human behaviour may not be fully explained by the 
probability theory, but can be understood using the ‘animal spirits’ argument 
which was suggested by Keynes in 1936 as an approach to explain investment 
behaviour and consequently macroeconomic performance.  
 
Moreover, another issue with the theoretical foundation of the DSGE model is 
its assumption of a clear market. The market is assumed to be always moving 
towards equilibrium. This relies on well-behaved economic agents with good 
quality and good availability of information (their rational 
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expectation/behaviour). However, since the assumption of rational expectation 
and behaviour of economic agents can be overly optimistic, it is not surprising to 
see the assumption of a clear market receiving a lack of empirical support. For 
example, Akerlof (1970) proves that under many circumstances markets do not 
tend to be optimised and not even clear. Spence (1974) and Stiglitz (2003) both 
argue that due to the asymmetric information in the market, there are no 
automatic adjustments that allow the economy to reach full employment 
automatically. Moreover, Williamson (2002) has developed a ‘transaction theory’ 
which argues that, due to the difficulties and costs of collecting information, it is 
impossible or too expensive to gather all required information for each economic 
transaction; hence, frictions during the market adjustment process are inevitable 
and prevent the full adjustments from taking place.                     
     
Therefore, since the basic theoretical foundation of the DSGE model has its 
shortcomings in relation to the realistic economic environment and behaviour of 
agents, the DSGE model should not assume that the designed economic scenario 
could always permanently and automatically move towards a unique equilibrium 
if the model was built with more realistic assumptions. However, if we allow the 
model to contain more realistic assumptions of the real world, then the outcome 
of the model may show a path of an economy moving towards an unbalanced 
and disequilibrium economy, which requires government intervention through 
active fiscal or monetary policy. This is in conflict with the fundamental policy 
implication of NCM or neoclassical macroeconomics theories.  
 
In addition to the issues of DSGE’s economic theoretical assumptions, in terms 
of its practice – model estimation – it also has some shortcomings. The key issue 
of the DSGE model relates to identification of parameters. Canova and Sala (2009) 
have summarised these identification problems of which the DSGE model usually 
experience26.  First of all, the mapping between structure parameters and 
                                                          
26
 Only relatively small numbers of studies have been done to address the problem of 
identification for the DSGE model. This is mainly due to its computational issues. For more details, 
see Iskrev (2008).  
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reduced form statistics is not unique given that the population objective function 
does not have a unique maximum or minimum. This indicates that different 
models with potentially different interpretations may not be distinguishable. This 
problem is known as observational equivalence. The second problem is under-
identification, which happens when the objective function is constant for all 
values of that parameter in a selected range. For example, parameters can 
disappear from the solution of rational expectations. Weak identification is 
another identification issue DSGE model may have, even when all parameters 
can enter the population objective function separately, and the population 
function does have a unique maximum/minimum. But the curvature may be 
small, which means different values of the parameters around the 
neighbourhood may lead to the same value of the objective function.  
 
Moreover, another source of identification problems is small sample size. 
Under such conditions, the significant bias on parameter estimates can arise, 
which induces economic dynamics that differ from those of the true data-
generating process. This problem can be especially relevant to this research. As 
we are trying to estimate the impact of the ECB’s monetary policy during the 
post-EMU period which started from 1999, the sample size of those key 
macroeconomic variables only consists of  several dozen observations.  
 
Overall, the advantage of the DSGE model implies its potential problems. Due 
to its complexity and full coverage of the whole economy, this model usually 
requires many restrictions to allow each element of data and each sector of the 
economy to coordinate with the others, and hence, to allow the model to work. 
That means the model may contains overly strict assumptions which means the 
study tends to be a benchmark analysis (Canova and Ciccarelli 2013). The realistic 
assessment which policymakers need for understanding the impacts of their 
policy under real world conditions may not be always fully addressed.  
 
In comparison to this, PVAR as an alternative model for study policy impacts 
for macroeconomic analysis, which assumes every variable is endogenous, tends 
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to discover the information underlined by data without imposing many 
restrictions on the analysis. Since all variables are endogenous and assumed to 
be correlated with each other, this assumption allows the PVAR to have similar 
features to the DSGE model, which enables us to study an economic problem 
more closely to the real world situation, but it is easier to implement. Moreover, 
the panel data approach enables us to solve the problem of limited small sample 
size, which is the current issue in EMU-related empirical research. Furthermore, 
the DSGE model is a time-series-based analytical approach, whilst we are trying 
to analysis EMU as whole, but do not wish to lose the information from the 
national level; hence, the panel data method was chosen to be used, which 
allows us to take the members’ data into account and also improves the sample 
size, which is crucial to the estimation bias.  
 
  The particular technique to be used here is that of pooling the time series data 
across different entities to form a panel data set. The fundamental idea behind 
this method is that all entities are characterised by the same regression equation 
at all points in time. The standard form of the estimation equation is:              
 



K
K
itkitkt eXYi
1
  (4-14) 
 
where the i= 1…n, N entities; K = 1,…k, K regressors; t= 1…T, T time dimension; α 
is the common intercept for all entities; βk represents the coefficients of each 
regressors; and eit is the error term for each entity. However, this standard form 
of panel data equation has one major drawback, which is that the intercept and 
coefficients of each regressor are assumed to be identical for each entity.  
 
  As we are applying the panel approach to the VAR method, it is necessary to 
consider the issue of panel data analysis. The fundamental assumption of the 
panel data method is that it assumes the underlying structures of cross-sectional 
units are the same. Here, this refers to the economic structures of EMU member 
countries being the same. However, this restriction is usually violated in practice, 
which may especially be true for our research.  
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The ECB runs the union-level monetary policy across the whole region; in 
principle the policy is independently made, and no individual or group of 
members is capable of pulling the weight of policy toward to their own interests. 
Therefore, the euro area monetary policy is designed to stabilise the union-level 
economy based on union-level data. In the case of this chapter, we are not only 
aiming to estimate how monetary policy affect the real economy based on union 
level aggregates, or simply adding a small number of major members into the 
estimation (e.g. Dornbush 1998, Ramaswamy and Sloek 1998, Peersman 2004, 
Clausen and Hayo 2006, Gelain 2008, Rafiq and Mallick 2008, Sousa 2009 & 
2010). We aim to analyse the effects of monetary policy in EMU through using of 
national level data, which includes all existing member states of the Eurozone. In 
respect to the differences of economic structure among the members, the 
intercept and the coefficients of regressors are likely to be different across the 
entities. If we establish the model without building individuality into the model, 
the error term will be forced to absorb the effects of individuality of members, 
Var (eit) ≠ σ
2 a constant (i = 1,2…n).  
 
One way to overcome this drawback of the panel method is to introduce fixed 
effects; therefore, individual heterogeneity can be built into our model. Verbeek 
(2004) states that introducing fixed effects intuitively makes sense if each 
individual in the sample is ‘one of a kind’, and cannot be viewed as a random 
draw from some underlying population. This interpretation may be more 
appropriate when K denotes countries. Thus, the standard form of our PVAR 
model can be written as:           
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where Y’i,t is k × 1 column vector of endogenous variables of each N entities, i = 
1,2,…N. B1 is i × 1 vector of common intercept. B2(p) is the kp × i matrix of slope 
coefficients of K endogenous variables of the N entities; p is the lag order. Fi is 
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country-specific fixed effects. δ’i,t is the i × 1 column vector of the white noise 
error term.  
 
The standard way to estimate a VAR system like Equation (4-15) is applying OLS 
methods, which severely depends on the numbers of observations. This is known 
as a Hurwicz-type bias that is inherently live with dynamic modelling. As the 
Hurwicz-type bias approaches zero if numbers of observation go to infinity, it 
may not always receive much attention in time series analysis because VAR 
studies usually contain sufficiently large numbers of observations. However, it 
could be an issue common to the panel data approach as the Hurwicz-type bias 
does not depend on the size of cross sections (Nickell 1981). Even when cross 
sections go to infinity, the size of the bias still negatively depends on the 
numbers of time series dimensions in panel dynamic models with fixed effects.  
 
In order to overcome this weakness of panel dynamic estimation, an 
alternative estimator – GMM – has been proposed to replace the standard OLS 
estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991, Arellano and Bover 1995). Since the fixed 
effects may cause bias due to the correlation between our country-specific 
effects Fi and lags of dependent variables, we can apply the Helmert procedure 
(Arellano and Bover 1995) to eliminate this bias, which is also referred to as 
forward mean differencing, i.e. the contemporaneous correlation can be 
removed by applying forward mean differencing after time-demeaning our 
variables instead of normal mean differencing (Bos and Stam 2011). Since the 
Helmert transformation preserves the transformed variables and lagged 
regressors are orthogonal, coefficients can be estimated under the GMM system 
by using lagged regressors as instruments.   
 
4.4.4 Benchmark PVAR 
From the above section, we have established the baseline econometrics 
technique for this chapter: 1) by pooling the time series data across the different 
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entities (EMU and euro members), panel data will be created to overcome the 
possible issue of a short data set, which is mainly caused by the relatively short 
history of EMU; 2) a PVAR method27 will be applied to estimates of the responses 
of different variables to monetary shocks at both union and national levels. In 
this subsection, we will present more details about the methodologies for this 
chapter.  
 
In some previous literature it is not unusual to see that the Eurozone has been 
described as a closed economy with the exclusion of the exchange rate channel 
of the MTM (Mojon and Peersman 2001, Peersman 2004 and Cecioni et al. 2010). 
At the first stage, we will analyse the MTM in the closed economy model; it 
implies that the variables we choose will exclude those that may contain the 
international features, e.g. effective exchange rates, balance of payments, 
variables of foreign trading partners etc.  
 
  The general form of the model is a restricted version of the multi-country VAR 
approach that is raised by Canova and Ciccarelli (2009), which takes the general 
form of Equation(4-15):                            
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where Y’i,t is k × 1 column vector of endogenous variables of each N entity, i = 
1,2,…N. B1 is i × 1 vector of common intercept. B2(p) is the kp × i matrix of slope 
coefficients of K endogenous variables of the N entities; p is the lag order. Fi is 
country-specific fixed effects. δ’i,t is the i × 1 column vector of white noise error 
term.  
 
 
                                                          
27
 The panel VAR estimation will be performed by using the updated version of Love’s (Love 2006) 
PVAR STATA automatic dofile (unofficial third-party STATA upgrade package), which was written 
by Dr Yujun Lian at Lingna College, Sun Yat-Sen University.  
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4.4.5 Data set  
Source of data  
  Our macro-level panel data covers the period from 2000:Q1, when the first 
wave of EMU creation was completed (Greece joined EMU), to 2011:Q3, which 
forms N*T=810 observations for all EMU members. Given the overall goal of this 
chapter (e.g. trying to estimate the impact of ECB monetary policy on the overall 
economic performance and also see its impacts on the other subsections of the 
economy that are relevant to the transmission of the monetary policy; moreover, 
to study the interactions between those key areas of the MTM and overall 
economic activities), we include various variables which form different channels 
of the MTM into our PVAR model. The endogenous variables in basic estimation 
are: real GDP (RGDP), real short-term ECB interest rates (IR), quarterly share 
markets indices (SI), housing price index (HPI), inflation (HICP); monetary base 
(M1); and real effective exchange rate (EER); these will be considered as well 
after the completion of basic estimation.  
 
RGDP data, narrow money supply (M1) and real effective exchange rates are 
all collected from the Eurostat database. Short-term interest rates are measured 
by the quarterly central bank interest rates. Due to data unavailability for Estonia 
for the period 2000 to 2010, quarterly money market interest rates are used as 
the alternative measurement. Cyprus joined the Eurozone after 2007, hence the 
national central bank interest rates are chosen to be used for this period. The 
inflation rate is measured by the percentage changes in the consumer price 
index, which are published by the IMF.  
 
  Housing price index (HPI) data for countries like Germany, Ireland, Italy 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia is collected from the Bank 
of International Settlements (BIS). However, the BIS only provide half-year data 
for HPI, and expected Portuguese data is monthly; therefore, linear 
interpretation was conducted to convert half-year data to quarterly data for 
these countries. Data for Estonia is unavailable for the period 2000:Q1–2003:Q2. 
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HPI for Cyprus is only available from the ECB database, which covers the period 
2006:Q1–2011:Q3. For Slovenia data is available from 2003, which is collected 
from the ECB (2003:Q1–2011:Q1) and BIS (2011:Q2&Q3). HPI data is from 
Eurostat, which covers the period 2006 to 2011. Share market index data is all 
collected from Eurostat, but with some missing data. Data for Cyprus can only be 
found from 2004. Data for the period 2010:Q4–2011:Q3 is unavailable for 
Slovenia.  
 
Ordering of data  
The focus of this chapter is to produce impulse response functions that help us 
to estimate the response of one variable in the system to the shocks of another 
in the PVAR system while others are holding constant. A particular order has to 
be set up, since the assumption of identification, which is the variable that comes 
earlier in the order, affects the following ones contemporaneously as well as 
with a lag. The variable coming later only affects the previous one with a lag. This 
is a usual convention of the VAR system; since the variance–covariance matrix of 
errors is unlikely to be diagonal, to isolate shocks to one of the VAR errors it is 
necessary to decompose the residuals in such a way that they become 
orthogonal (Durlauf and Blume et al. 2010). 
 
Therefore, in our basic estimation the orthogonalised shocks will be recovered 
by adopting Cholesky decomposition with the following ordering of variables: 
                           SI  HPI  IR  HICP  RGDPY   
According to standard monetary theory (Christiano et al. 2000) and common 
practice of empirical studies of it (Peersman 2001, van Aarel et al. 2003, Rabanal 
2003, Peersman 2004, Favero and Giavazzi 2008, Weber et al. 2009, Peersman 
2011), output and price are placed before the interest rate in the ordering of 
endogenous variables The other two endogenous variables are stock market 
index and housing price index. At this stage we will order housing price before 
the stock market. We are assuming that, in response to monetary and 
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macroeconomic shocks, housing price is relatively stickier than share market 
price.  
 
4.4.6 Lag length selection 
  Before we start conducting the analysis through the PVAR model, it is essential 
to select an appropriate lag length, which is just the same as running a 
conventional regression of time series VAR. In general, there are two ways to 
select lag length. First, maybe, is the relatively unpopular one is that by methods 
of runing the analysis many times to generate the residual sum of squares (RSS) 
for each lag length, e.g. lag length = 1,2,3,4,…. By comparing the values of these 
RSS, we would able to select a lag length which could produce better results. 
However, the problem of this approach is that we may have a few lag lengths 
that produce very similar, or even almost identical, values of RSS. If this is the 
case, we may have to select one subjectively. 
 
  In order to overcome the above weakness, the information criterion can be 
used as the alternative approach, which may be more popular than the former, 
to decide the appropriate lag length for analysis. Three main information 
criterion (IC) methods are widely adopted in empirical studies: Akaike’s IC (AIC), 
Baysian IC (BIC) and Hannan and Quinn’s IC (HQIC). The equations of these three 
IC methods are listed as below: 
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where M represents the numbers of endogenous variables; Vˆln defines the 
value of RSS; k is the number of parameters that can also be written as M 2×p; 
and N * is the total numbers of observations that can be calculated as N *= N × 
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(T-p). The fundamental ideas of these three IC methods are actually the same: 
using the sum of RSS and the numbers of parameters as the judgemental criteria 
for lag length selection. 
 
    The term M×ln(2π)+M, which appears in all three equations, is a constant 
term that is not related to goodness of fit or numbers of parameters. That means 
this constant term will not change if the lag length changes. Therefore, following 
the suggestion of Lϋtkepohl (2004), we can eliminate M×ln(2π)+M from all three 
equations to get:  
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It is not unusual to find that the results of the above three IC methods are 
different. Hence, the subjective selection of lag length may not be fully avoided. 
In this case, we may follow Lϋtkepohl (2004) who suggested that BIC and HQIC 
may be more preferable to the AIC given that the AIC is usually a more 
conservative method that usually gives a relatively large lag length when the 
sample towards infinite. In contrast, BIC and HQIC will tend to produce a smaller 
lag length. The bigger lag length can consume degrees of freedom significantly, 
hence, this difference between these three IC methods is more relevant to a 
relatively small sample. 
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4.5 Empirical results – the effectiveness of ECB single monetary 
policy    
 
  In this section, we will present the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of 
the ECB’s union-wide monetary policy by adopting the PVAR method as our 
econometrics technique, which enables us to estimate the impact of the policy 
on the Eurozone through the consideration of national-level data collectively 
rather than simply using union-wide aggregates. The analysis begins with 
evaluating the overall effects of ECB interest rate policy on the entire Eurozone 
(17 current members), followed by a study of the original 12 members who 
joined EMU during the wave. Since some members had poor adherence to the 
Maastricht Convergence Criteria during the pre-EMU period (and were also badly 
affected by the 2007–8 financial crisis), we also tried to investigate whether ECB 
monetary policy had been more effective for those core members of the 
Eurozone who generally achieved better performance in terms of business cycle 
synchronisation than for those troubled periphery members, most of whom have 
low degrees of cycle convergence.  
 
Finally, we added monetary aggregates and exchange rates into our analysis. 
For the former, we aimed to see if the Eurozone’s economic activities were 
sensitive to money supply shocks, in order to see if it is possible to use the 
monetary base to alter economic aggregates, especially during a time of 
recession when either interest rate policy has reached its limited (liquidity trap) 
or a low rate is simply not enough to stimulate economic recovery through 
altering investment expenditure. Regarding the latter, having exchange rates 
added into our analysis, which allows us to take an open economy view in our 
model, helps us to see if the degree of exchange rate pass-through to domestic 
price can be a problem to EMU’s economic recovery when currency depreciates 
during times of economic hardship. 
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4.5.1 Panel unit-root test 
    As with time series regression analysis, panel regression estimation is also 
likely to be affected by the presence of unit roots. Hence, in order to perform a 
PVAR analysis of the chosen variables above, it is necessary to carry out a unit-
root test as a standard procedure. In this chapter, we have chosen Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (IPS), which is based on the well-known Dickey-Fuller procedure. IPS 
suggests a more flexible and computationally simple unit-root test for panel data, 
which allows error variance and heterogeneity of the dynamics across entities 
(Barbreri 2006). It also requires fewer time observations, but still maintains the 
power of the test. Moreover, unbalanced panel data is allowed in the IPS test, 
and its t-bar test performs better when N and T are small (Im et al. 1997 & 2003).  
 
  IPS begins by specifying a separate augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression 
for each cross section with individual effects and no time trend: 
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The t-bar is then standardised and it is shown that the standardised t-bar statistic 
converges to the standard normal distribution as N and T  .  
 
We conducted an IPS test on all variables and, from Table 4-1, we can see that 
variables’ inflation (CPI) and short-term real interest rates (IR) are stationary at 
the 1% significance level for Eurozone data. A null hypothesis of non-stationary 
cannot be rejected for the other four variables RGDP, HPI, SI, M1 and EER at both 
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1% and 5% significance levels. In order to render our data stationary, we take the 
logarithm transformation through the first difference of log which transforms the 
data to the form of its own percentage change. Therefore, we will estimate our 
variables as L∆RGDP, CPI, IR, L∆LHPI, L∆SI, L ∆M1 and L∆EER.  
 
Table 4-1 IPS Panel unit-root test Eurozone 
data – 17 members 
RGDP 0.4872 (0.6869) 
HICP -2.9526*** (0.0016) 
IR -4.1930*** (0.0000) 
HPI -1.5102 (0.0655) 
SI 0.3833 (0.6493) 
M1 7.5122 (1.0000) 
EER -0.2113 (0.4163) 
 Note: *** represents rejection of H0: all panels contain 
unit roots at the 1% significance level. Values in 
brackets are p-values 
 
 
4.5.2 Results of basic estimation – interest rate shock 
 
4.5.2.1 Analysis of existing members of the Eurozone (17 members) 
Before the PVAR analysis can be conducted to study the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, it is crucial to decide the length of the lag in our estimation. The 
information criteria approach is employed here to help us to select an 
appropriate lag length for our PVAR model. The results are displayed in Table 4-2. 
It is not surprising to see AIC picks up a bigger lag length than the other two since 
AIC is a conservative method that usually gives a relatively big lag length. 
However, BIC and HQIC, which tend to give small lag length and allow better 
degrees of freedom to the model, have not reached the same conclusion here. 
HQIC and BIC suggest lag length 5 and lag length 3 respectively. Since the 
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difference between HQIC and BIC are not significant, therefore, lag length 5 will 
be selected here given that the value lies between the results of AIC and BIC.         
    
Table 4-2 Three Information Criteria test for Lag Length 
Selection – 17 Eurozone members (2000:Q2–
2011:Q3) 
AIC BIC HQIC 
-13.7753
 
-13.0537 -13.4693 
-14.1983 -13.2953 -13.8486 
-14.4381 -13.3465
* -14.0149 
-14.5315 -13.2435 -14.0316 
-14.6299 -13.1370 -14.0498
* 
-14.6295 -12.9227 -13.9654 
-14.5986 -12.6684 -13.8467 
-14.6700 -12.5059 -13.8258 
-14.7371 -12.3281 -13.7962 
-14.9308
*
 -12.2646 -13.8879 
 
 
The results of the basic PVAR model for the existing 17 Eurozone members are 
displayed in Figure 4-2. It shows that the impulse responses of real GDP growth 
(approximated by log-differenced real GDP), domestic inflation rate, growth 
rates of housing price and stock price (approximated by L∆LHPI and L∆SI) to one 
standard deviation of monetary policy shock implied by the panel regression, 
together with two standard error bands (i.e., 5% and 95%), obtained by Monte-
Carlo simulation with 1000 repetitions. The impulse responses are typically 
significantly different from zero at the 95% level, because of the large amount of 
information that comes from using the panel approach. 
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Figure 4-2 Impulse-response for effects of monetary shocks (interest rate) on Eurozone 
(17 members) 
                   Real GDP Growth                                                   Inflation  
  
                     Housing Price                                   Stock Market Price  
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
     
 
    The response of real GDP to monetary policy shocks, which is reported in the 
impulse response pattern in Figure 4-2, shows that real output growth will 
decline soon after the initial monetary shock takes effect, and this negative 
dynamic response will last until quarter 8. However, since during the period of 
the first to third quarters and the period beyond quarter 6, the zero line has 
been located within the area between two error bonds, therefore the impulse 
responses of real GDP growth to a monetary shock are only statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence interval during the period quarter 4 to quarter 
5. One unit shock of monetary policy, which is identified by a 100-base-point 
increase in central bank interest rate, will lead to an accumulated fall in GDP 
growth by almost 27 base points (see Table 4-3) within a period of 4th and 5th 
quarters. 
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Table 4-3 Statistically significant response of 
real GDP growth to monetary shock 
– Euro17 
Period 4 5 
Response  -0.1384 -0.1269 
Total response: -0.2653 
                                Source: produced by the author  
 
  This result is partially in line with the early study of Peersman and Smets (2001) 
who report the output of the euro area will fall from its peak value of 12 base 
points around period 3 in response to a standard interest rate shock, but most of 
their results are statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval. Although 
in the early study the authors show that monetary shock has statistically 
significant impacts on Eurozone output for most periods within their estimation 
period, Peersman and Smets (2001) use area-wide data, thus the analysis lacks 
the consideration of the national-level information. By adopting the panel data, 
which enables us to conduct an analysis based on national-level data, our results 
only show that monetary policy has some effect on EMU members at certain 
times. This difference confirms the previous study of Rafiq and Mallick (2008) 
who conduct a time series VAR analysis on the effectiveness of EMU monetary 
policy in Germany, France and Italy respectively and conclude that the response 
of output (magnitude and timing) to monetary policy shock remains different 
between these three major EMU members contribute nearly 70% of the 
Eurozone’s GDP. Moreover, our results also imply the conclusion in Chapter 3, 
which found that the business cycle convergence among EMU members is 
relatively low, thus the ECB’s monetary policy will not be appropriate to every 
EMU member all the time.  
 
In the case of inflation, from Figure 4-2 we can see that inflation among 
countries in the Euro17 area will decline immediately after the initial monetary 
policy shock, and the negative response of inflation lasts until the end of the 
fourth quarter, but changes with a diminishing rate. The overall drop in the level 
of inflation, if no other shocks occur, is nearly 2.19 percentage points (see Table 
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4-4) and the magnitude of monetary shock reach its peak in quarter 1. The result, 
displayed here, suggests ECB monetary policy is an effective policy tool for 
controlling the level of inflation among EMU members with strong impacts in 
terms of both magnitudes and timing.  
 
Table 4-4 Statistically significant response of inflation to monetary shock – Euro17 
Period 0 1 2 3 4 7 
Response  -0.4977 -0.5626 -0.5256 -0.4571 -0.1147 0.2518 
Total response between the period quarter 0 to quarter 4: -2.1877 
 Source: produced by the author 
  
Figure 4-3 Effectiveness of ECB monetary policy  
 
Source: figure drawn by the author 
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By comparing the impulse responses of both inflation and real GDP growth to 
a standard deviation of monetary shock, some interesting information is implied 
by the above results. Inflation will react to the monetary shock more rapidly than 
output of the Eurozone members. This phenomenon might indicate that, for 
EMU, it has a relatively steep short-run Phillips curve (PC) and inflation-averse 
monetary rule curve in the context of the NCM three-equation model, or at least 
one of these situations may exist (Carling and Soscike 2005). If an economy has 
an independent central bank (e.g. the ECB) that usually conducts a more 
inflation-averse monetary policy than those politically dependent central banks, 
the monetary policy curve is less steep for the independent central bank (MP1 in 
Figure 4-3).  
 
Moreover, if this economy had a steep PC, this would allow the monetary 
authority to adjust inflation towards target level with relatively small changes in 
the level of output. Assume the economy is at point A in Figure 4-3, where the 
actual inflation π0 is higher than the target level πT. The inflation-averse central 
bank can use interest rate policy to alter inflation down to π1 by cutting output to 
Y1, thus the economy will move to short-run optimal point B where PC1 intersects 
with MP1. However, if the central bank is not politically independent, it is not 
unusual to assume this monetary authority has a flatter MP curve in NCM. If this 
is the case and the Phillips curve is relatively flat as well, then the optimal point 
in view of this central bank is point C which indicates that the relatively big fall in 
output (output fall to Y2) only gives a smaller drop in inflation to π2.  
 
Further to the above result of inflation response, from Figure 4-2, we see that 
inflation rises between the  5th and 9th  quarters and the statistically significant 
impacts of monetary policy on inflation during this period appear at the seventh 
quarter with a value of 0.2518 (see Table 4-4). This result might imply the 
existence of a ‘price puzzle’ within the Eurozone, or at least in some of its 
members. The price puzzle reflects the view of the supply-side version of interest 
rate channels (Ravenna and Walsh 2006, Henzel et al. 2007), which suggests the 
daily business of firms relies on borrowing working capital from financial markets 
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where firms can borrow funds to facilitate their production activities before 
receiving revenue from sales. Moreover, this also applies to the ongoing 
investment of firms, which also rely on funds from financial intermediaries. The 
above result shows price will rise after monetary tightening, but the degree to 
which it rises is not significant and the statistically significant impulse response 
can only be found at quarter 7. This finding is generally in line with the previous 
studies, which indicate the existence of a moderate price puzzle in European 
countries (Peersman 2001, Henzel et al.2007, Assenmacher-Wesche 2008).  
 
Following a monetary policy shock, the dynamic response of housing price will 
begin a fluctuation around the zero line for 5 quarters, then be followed by falls 
in its growth rate for another 7 quarters before the recovery of positive growth 
in housing price (see Figure 4-2). Despite the results in Figure 4-2 showing some 
pronounced impacts of an interest rate policy shock on housing price, none of 
the impulse responses of the growth rate of housing price index of EMU 
members are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This result 
provides evidence for confirming the conclusion of Becker et al. (2007) who 
argue that interest rate policy is not effective in dealing with asset price bubbles. 
Hence, even though the ECB tried to use interest rate policy to cripple the 
housing boom inside the Eurozone before the 2007–8 financial crisis, it may not 
be an effective policy tool to fulfil the role but can discourage output growth 
instead.  
 
From Figure 4-2, we can see that, for the case of share price index, its 
response to a monetary policy shock starts with a small-scale falling in the 
growth rate during the period quarter 2 to quarter 4. However, these negative 
impulse responses are statistically insignificant. The growth rate of share price 
will become positive again from quarter 5 until the end of our estimation period 
(15 quarters), but the statistically significant response begins from the 7th  
quarter. This result implies that the stock market will recover from a negative 
monetary policy shock at a similar time as the end of the negative response of 
GDP growth. Similar findings were provided by Assenmacher-Wesche (2008), 
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which predicted real GDP and stock price will recover almost simultaneously – 
that is, 7 quarters after a monetary shock.  
Figure 4-4 Impulse response of GDP growth to the shocks of housing price and share 
price growth – Euro17 
          Response to housing price shock                 Response to share price shock 
 
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
Table 4-5 Statistically significant response of real GDP 
growth to housing and share price shocks – 
Euro17  
 Housing price shock 
Period 0 3 
Response  0.0008 0.0013 
Total response: 0.0021 
 
 Share price shock 
Period 0 1 
Response  0.0085 0.0067 
Total response: 0.0152  
               Source: produced by the author 
  Since we are adopting the VAR approach on the panel data set of EMU 
members, we are not only able to study the dynamics of GDP growth to a 
monetary policy shock, but the responses of GDP growth to the shocks of other 
endogenous variables in our model can also be recovered. In Figure 4-4, we are 
presenting the impulse responses of GDP growth to one unit standard deviation 
of growth rates of housing price and share price respectively. By comparing two 
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impulse responses from the above figure, we can see that the share price shock 
has a bigger impact than the shock of housing price on the rate of GDP growth, 
but with the same length of statistically significant impacts. For the case of 
housing price shock, real GDP growth will increase immediately with a 
statistically significant response of 0.08 basis point and 0.13 basis point at period 
0 and period 3 (see Table 4-5).  
 
    In contrast to the housing price shock, the share price shock has a relatively 
pronounced effect on real GDP growth, except the statistically significant 
responses are also only found in the early periods of our estimation time horizon. 
Following a unit shock in share price (1 percent point increase in the growth rate 
of share price index), the growth rate of GDP will have statistically significant 
responses in period 0 and period 1 with the real GDP growth rate increasing by 
0.87 and 0.67 basis points respectively. From these results (see Table 4-5 and 
Figure 4-4), we can see that the equity channel and balance sheet channel 
(household balance sheet) both exist inside the Eurozone. However, both 
channels only have short-term effects on the output growth but with different 
levels of accumulation impacts over their effective period.  
 
4.5.2.2 Analysis of original members of the Eurozone (12 members) 
Following the analysis of the existing 17 members of the Eurozone, here we 
would like to perform the same PVAR estimation on the original 12 members of 
EMU to see whether ECB monetary policy can be more effective for them; 
moreover, by checking the possible differences between the results of the 
Euro17 and Euro12 data sets, we may also able to see if the heterogeneity of the 
MTM existed among old and new members. In Figure 4-5, we present the 
impulse response of real GDP growth, inflation, growth rates of housing price 
and share price index to a monetary policy shock that is still measured by one 
standard deviation of real central bank interest rate. Following a monetary shock, 
which is triggered by the ECB’s union-wide monetary policy, in terms of timing of 
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the impacts, the impulse response for GDP and inflation among Euro12 members 
is similar to the results of the Euro17 data set (see Figure 4-2). Real GDP growth 
will drop after quarter 1 until quarter 8, but the statistically significant results can 
only be found at quarter 4 and quarter 5. Although the timing of the effects of 
monetary policy on real GDP is similar between Euro12 and Euro17 areas, the 
magnitude is different. The peak of the impact for the Euro12 area appears at 
quarter 4 with a value of -0.1115 (see Table 4-6), which means the growth rate of 
GDP will drop by about 11.2 basis points when the monetary policy is having its 
maximum impact on the real economy. This impact is smaller than the peak 
value we discovered for the Euro17 area by about 2.7 basis points. Moreover, 
the accumulation of effects in the Euro12 area is also smaller than in the Euro17 
area.   
Figure 4-5 Impulse-response for effects of monetary shocks (interest rate) on Eurozone 
(12 members) 
                       Real GDP Growth                                 Inflation 
  
                       Housing Price                                              Stock Market Price
 
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
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Table 4-6   Statistically significant response of real 
GDP growth to monetary shock – Euro12 
Period 4 5 
Response  -0.1115 -0.0866 
Total response: -0.1981 
                           Source: produced by the author 
 
    In the case of inflation’s response to the ECB’s monetary policy, with a 1 per 
cent point increase in the real central bank interest rate, the same as the result 
for the Euro17 area, inflation will drop immediately after the effects of shock 
take place until quarter 4. The difference from the result of Euro17 is that, in 
terms of timing, the ECB’s monetary policy seems to have a longer impact on 
inflation in the Euro12 area; statistically significant responses can be also found 
in the period between quarter 11 and quarter 14. Moreover, despite the result 
showing that inflation will respond positively to a negative monetary policy shock 
in quarter 7, this result, which may indicate the existence of ‘price puzzle’, is not 
statistically significant at the level of 95% confidence interval.  
 
Table 4-7 Statistically significant response of inflation to monetary shock (Euro12) 
Period 0 1 2 3 4 11 
Response  -0.3477 -0.4643 -0.4419 -0.4319 -0.2410 -0.1256 
Period 12 13         
Response  -0.1294 -0.1035         
Total response between period quarter 0 to 
quarter 4:  
 -2.2853     
Source: produced by the author 
 
    Similar to the response of GDP to monetary shock, in terms of the magnitude, 
the impulse response of inflation to a monetary shock is also different between 
the Euro12 area the Euro17 area. From Figure 4-5 and Table 4-7, we can see that 
during the first period (from quarter 1 to quarter 4), the accumulation impacts of 
a monetary shock on inflation is -1.9268, which is just 0.2609 percent points 
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lower than the contemporaneous response of inflation for the Euro17 area, 
which is -2.1877. Furthermore, since the ECB’s monetary policy can impact on 
inflation over a longer time horizon, the overall response of inflation is -2.2853, 
which is much higher than the overall response of inflation for the Euro17 area 
given that the total impact is just -1.675 if we count the ‘price puzzle’.  
 
    By combining the results for inflation and real GDP, we can see that over the 
15-quarter estimation period, for the Euro12 area, following a monetary shock 
the overall drop in the growth rate of real GDP is -0.1981percent points which 
will be accompanied by a -2.2853 percent points decline in inflation. This result 
may suggest that the ECB’s monetary policy is more effective for the Euro12 area 
in terms of controlling inflation, with a relatively low weakening effect on 
aggregate economic activities. 
 
Regarding the impulse response of housing price to a monetary policy shock in 
the Euro12 area, the result in Figure 4-5 leads to the same conclusion as the 
outcome of Euro17 analysis. Although the growth rate of housing price will 
respond to a monetary shock negatively among Euro12 members, all the impulse 
responses, which we obtained over 15 estimation periods, are statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, as in the Euro17 area, we conclude that there is no 
strong evidence to show a pronounced relationship between housing price and 
central bank interest rate. In the case of share price index, its growth rate does 
not decline after the occurrence of a monetary shock. This implies the weak 
influence of interest rate policy on overall economic activities (i.e. GDP growth). 
Since the share market usually has a forward-looking mentality, within the 
Euro12 area, a monetary shock can be seen as an effective tool for achieving 
stable inflation and leaves GDP with a smaller/minor downturn effect; therefore, 
the share market may not see rising in interest rate will penalise overall 
economic activities, but should be effectively ease inflationary pressure.  
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Figure 4-6 Impulse response of GDP growth to the shocks of housing price and share 
price growth – Euro12 
       Response to housing price shock              Response to share price shock 
  
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
Finally, we have also obtained the impulse responses of real GDP to a unit 
shock of housing and share price respectively. By comparing the results between 
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-6, we can see that the reaction of real GDP to share price 
shock is almost the same as the result of the Euro17 area in terms of both timing 
and magnitude. This implies that the equity channel of the MTM may operate in 
a similar way among original members and new members of the Eurozone. Share 
price has a short-term positive role on the overall economic activities in Euro17 
and Euro12 areas; however, there is no strong evidence to show the shock of 
share price will have a longer-term impact on real GDP growth given that the 
impulse responses are only obtained for the early period over the 15-quarter 
estimation time horizon. In case of housing price shock, although the impulse 
response for Euro12 shows similar patterns to the result for the Euro17 area; 
however, none of the responses at each associated period is statistically 
significant. The household balance sheet channel has no important role if we 
consider the Euro12 as a whole, but the possibility of its existence at the national 
level cannot be denied based on the panel approach.   
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4.5.3 Basic estimation without Italy, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain (IIGSP)  
Some studies (Demeztris et al. 2000, Baimbridge et al. 2005) argue that EMU is 
more motivated by political determination, rather than economic factors. The EU 
designed its own version of currency union criteria – the Maastricht Convergence 
Criteria (MCC); the advocates of the Eurozone believe that the attainment of the 
MCC would indicate the compatibility of EMU members with union-wide 
monetary policy in both favourable and unfavourable economic circumstances 
(Baimbridge et al. 2005). Despite the theoretical criticism of the MCC, when the 
euro was formally established in 1999, only three EMU members had achieved 
adherence to all five MCC criteria. This may weaken the effectiveness of EMU 
single monetary policy, as different countries may require different levels of 
monetary policy, even under union-wide economic shocks.  
 
Table 4-8 Number of MCC achieved by EU member states (1992–2002) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Ave 
Luxembourg 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 
France 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 
Germany 4 3 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 
Ireland 4 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 
Belgium 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Netherlands 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 
Austria 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
Finland 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 4 5 5 3 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 3 3 5 4 3 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 4 5 3 4 2 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 3 3 3 1 
Number of 
member 
states 
meeting all 
MCC 
1 0 2 1 1 2 6 4 4 5 3 2 
Source: figures are adopted from Baimbridge et al. (2005) 
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From Table 4-8, we can see that the average achievement of the MCC across 
the initial 12 members from 1992 to 2002 is only 2. Spain, Portugal, Italy and 
Greece had the worst performance, especially before 1998, which is the year 
prior to the fixing of a national exchange rate. They had accelerated their 
achievements concerning the MCC, which made them just about qualified 
according to EMU criteria, before the official establishment of the euro. Now, 
fourteen years since the first day of EMU, these four countries have attracted 
much attention from the international community again, due to their threats to 
the stability of the Eurozone. Thus, it would be interesting here to estimate the 
overall effectiveness of monetary policy in EMU when Italy, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal are excluded in the panel analysis.    
Figure 4-7 Impulse response for effects of monetary shocks (interest rate) on Euro12 
members without IIGSP 
                             Real GDP Growth                                       Inflation 
 
                                                                Area of Euro12  
                           Real GDP Growth                                         Inflation 
    
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
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    In Figure 4-7, we are presenting the impulse responses of real GDP growth and 
inflation to a one-unit shock in central bank interest rate in both the areas of 
Euro12 and Euro12 without IIGSP. In terms of the dynamic response of real GDP 
in these two areas, the results show that ECB monetary policy has a statistically 
significant impact on the real GDP growth at quarter 4 after the initial monetary 
shock. Despite the impulse response graph also indicating a negative short-term 
relationship between real GDP growth and ECB monetary policy, the results are 
all statistically insignificant. Therefore, we believe that there is no strong 
evidence to prove the existence of a pronounced impact of ECB monetary policy 
on real GDP growth in the area of Euro12 without IIGSP. This difference between 
these two areas may suggest that the slopes of the short-term Phillips curve may 
differ across these two parts of the Eurozone. Hence, it also provides evidence 
for the existence of heterogeneity of the MTM among regions inside EMU.  
Table 4-9 Statistically significant response of inflation to monetary shock – 
Euro12 without IIGSP 
Period 0 1 2 3 4 11 
Response  -0.2867 -0.3827 -0.3570 -0.4319 -0.3770 -0.1800 
Period 12 13         
Response  -0.1857 -0.1556         
Total response between period quarter 0 to 
quarter 4:  
 -2.3566     
Source: produced by the author 
 
In the case of effectiveness of ECB monetary policy in controlling inflation, the 
results show minor differences between these two regions only in the respect of 
magnitudes of response. The timings of statistically significant responses of 
inflation to monetary policy shock are the same across Euro12 and Euro12 
without the IIGSP area (see Figure 4-7). Inflation will drop immediately until 
quarter 4, then statistically significant impacts will appear again during the 
period between quarter 11 to quarter 13. The overall impacts of ECB monetary 
policy on inflation are slightly different across these two areas. From Table 4-9, 
we can see that overall response of inflation in the area of Euro12 without IIGSP 
is -2.3566, which is only 0.0713 smaller than the result of the Euro12 area. This 
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slightly smaller impact of monetary shock on inflation is not surprising to see 
given that IIGSP’s real GDP growth is more sensitive to ECB monetary policy than 
other parts of the Euro12 area. 
 
By comparing the results of Euro12 and Euro12 without the IIGSP area, we may 
see that the IIGSP countries’ economic aggregates are vulnerable to the inflation-
averse type of monetary policy, since the impulse response of real GDP growth 
for the area of Euro12 without IIGSP is statistically insignificant, but for the same 
test on the Euro12 area, the statistically significant relationship between growth 
and monetary policy was recovered. Therefore, in order to maintain a low level 
of inflation inside the euro area, a rise in ECB interest rate will have similar 
effects on the Euro12 and IIGSP areas, but IIGSP’s economic growth will be more 
likely to be dampened than that of the other members. This may explain why the 
fiscal policy had been used more rapidly among those countries and public debt 
levels were much higher than those of other members in EMU since they joined 
the Eurozone. 
 
4.5.4 Estimation of Eurozone with money variable  
Despite the interest rate variables having received more attention than money 
variables during conducting research on monetary policy, empirically money 
variables played an important role in monetary strategies of some major 
economies during the latest 2000s financial crisis. Both the US and the UK had 
conducted quantitative easing (QE), in order to prevent their economies slipping 
into deep recession with deflation, which the Japanese had experienced during 
the last decade of the 20th century. The Eurozone, as the second biggest 
economy in the world, had also lapsed into the recent economic crisis, which was 
the first time the 17 member states had faced a common economic shock since 
the establishment of EMU. Different from the US and the UK, the only monetary 
measure which the ECB had conducted during the recession is the interest rate 
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policy. It is interesting to ask how effective the money variable could be in the 
Eurozone if QE was conducted by the ECB.  
 
Therefore, in this subsection we will extend our basic estimation for EMU by 
including the narrow monetary aggregate (M1) in the PVAR model. Given the 
results of the three IC approaches which are displayed in Table 4-10, we will 
conduct the PVAR model with lag length 2 for the period of Stage Three EMU 
(2000:Q2–2011:Q3) for both Euro12 and Euro12 without the IIGSP area. The 
identification strategy is the same as the previous section. Referring to standard 
monetary theory, we are placing M1 before the short-term interest rate IR. This 
allows a contemporaneous impact on interest rate, growth of housing price and 
share price. Thus, the vector of endogenous variables will be estimated as 
{RGDPG, CPI, M1, IR, HPPC, SI}.  
 
Table 4-10 Three information criteria test for lag length selection 
  Euro12 Euro12 without IIGSP 
Lag AIC BIC HQIC AIC BIC HQIC 
1 -23.932 -23.243 -23.662 -24.186 -23.459* -23.895 
2 -24.330 -23.433
*
 -23.975 -24.397 -23.350 -23.978* 
3 -24.395 -23.2602 -23.950 -24.308 -22.930 -23.756 
4 -24.630 -23.2603 -24.092 -24.521 -22.800 -23.831 
5 -24.748 -23.134 -24.113 -24.777 -22.700 -23.943 
6 -24.908 -23.040 -24.173
*
 -24.809 -22.363 -23.827 
7 -24.906 -22.775 -24.066 -24.784 -21.954 23.647 
8 -24.979 -22.572 -24.030 -24.798 -21.571 23.501 
9 -25.023 -22.330 -23.960 -24.926* -21.284 23.461 
10 -25.309* -22.316 -24.126 -4.5494 -0.4765 -2.9092 
     Source: produced by the author 
 
In Figure 4-8, we have displayed the PVAR results for two sample sets. The first 
is the impulse response of real GDP growth to M1 shocks and interest rate shock 
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in Euro12. The second section of Figure 4-8 shows the results for the Euro12 area 
without IIGSP. Compared with the previous studies, which also consider money 
as the instrument of monetary policy, our result is similar (Peersman and Smets 
2001), which shows monetary aggregates have impacts on real GDP and reach 
their peak value at around quarter 4. However, our results suggest the monetary 
aggregates will have their maximum impact on real GDP growth at about the 
seventh quarter after the initial monetary shock, which may suggest that the 
adjustments to the monetary base will take a longer time to affect the real side 
of the economy than was estimated by previous studies during in the early 2000s. 
 
Figure 4-8 Impulse response of real GDP growth to monetary shocks (M1) 
                             Euro12                          Euro12 without IIGSP
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
By comparing the results of Euro12 and Euro12 without the IIGSP area, we can 
see the possible heterogeneity of the MTM among these two areas again, which 
has been already suggested by our early estimations. Figure 4-8 shows these two 
areas will respond to a monetary aggregate shock differently in terms of timing 
of its effects on real GDP growth. The area of Euro12 without IIGSP responds to a 
monetary aggregate shock one quarter earlier than the Euro12 area, but the 
effects die out more quickly as well. In terms of magnitudes of effects, despite 
the fact that ECB monetary aggregate shock can impact on real GDP growth 
longer in the Euro12 area, the area of Euro12 without IIGSP may respond to the 
monetary aggregate shock more strongly. In Table 4-11, we can see that the 
accumulation of statistically significant responses of real GDP growth to a 1% M1 
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shock is more than twice as big in the non-IIGSP area of Euro12 than the whole 
Euro12 area. This difference between these two areas, again, suggests the 
existence of MTM heterogeneity between different groups of EMU members. 
The ECB’s monetary policy (M1) can be used more effectively in boosting the 
economic aggregates in those countries that have good levels of business 
synchronisation.      
                     
Table 4-11 Statistically significant response of inflation to monetary shock (M1) 
  Euro12   
Period 1 2 5 6 7 8 
Response  -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 
Period 9 10  11 12  13    
Response  0.0006 0.0005 0.0004  0.0003  0.0002    
Total response:  0.0023       
  Euro12 without IIGSP   
Period 4 5 6 7 8  9 
Response  0.0007 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0007 
Total response: 0.0052        
Source: produced by the author 
 
Figure 4-9 Impulse response of inflation to monetary shocks (M1)  
                       Euro12                                                      Euro12 without IIGSP 
 
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
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The monetary aggregates do have effects on the growth of real GDP across the 
Euro12 area, which suggests that extensive QE may be able to help EMU 
members with the current economic recession, as long as extra funds inside the 
banking system can be used for boosting lending activities among 
businesses/firms and financial markets. However, the ECB’s primary objective is 
to maintain its inflation-averse objective rather than stimulate the growth of the 
economy. But if the ECB’s unconcerned attitude about QE is due to their 
concerns of possible inflationary pressure from monetary expansion, our results 
may suggest that such worry about inflationary pressure on EMU’s economy is a 
bit too cautious (see Figure 4-9). The maximum responses of inflation to a 1% 
increase in M1 are only 0.0009 and 0.0013 for Euro12 and the Euro12 area 
without IIGSP respectively. This shows some room for the ECB to operate an 
extensive QE in the early stages of the 2007–8 global financial crisis to ease and 
prevent such deep falls in economic activities across the Eurozone, which are the 
key issues concerning all EMU members.    
 
4.5.5 Estimation of Eurozone with exchange rate  
  In previous sections, we have focused on the overall effect of monetary policy 
in respect of closed models. This setting is based on the special feature of the 
Eurozone trading pattern, which is that the major trading partners of EMU 
members are their fellow EU members. The underlying issue of closed models is 
the ignorance of the exchange rate channel of the MTM. Although intra-EMU 
trade holds a significant share of total Eurozone trading, as exchange rate 
channel may play an important role in economic recovery, it is worth extending 
this analysis into an open economy perspective.   
   
According to the standard textbook example, currency depreciation is usually a 
by-product of a recession. However, a troubled economy can recover from its 
slump through the restoration of international competitiveness, which is due to 
falling export prices. On the other hand, depreciation of domestic currency not 
________Chapter 4 Effectiveness of the ECB single monetary policy in the Eurozone  
 
200 
 
only brings down the price of exports, it can also push up domestic inflation due 
to rising import prices. As imports become more expensive, the adjustment of 
trade balance can be promoted. Domestic expenditure will switch from imports 
to domestically produced goods and services. Hence, economic recovery can be 
further boosted by surges in domestic consumption.    
 
It seems that high exchange rate pass-through to import price should stimulate 
the economy through recovery of both domestic and international markets. 
However, exchange rate depreciation may actually slow down the speed of 
recovery rather than boosting it, if we move our attention away from the price of 
imports to domestic inflation. Suppose the exchange rate pass-through is not 
only on import price, but domestic inflation also responds to it sensitively; that is, 
domestic inflation has a one-to-one reaction to exchange rate changes. The 
combination of currency depreciation and rising inflation can cancel out, or at 
least weaken the improvements in, export competitiveness. Therefore the 
degree of exchange rate pass-through to domestic price has an important role in 
the economic recovery.  
 
Hence, we are extending our analysis by introducing exchange rate variables 
into our PVAR model. Here, we are using an effective exchange rate rather than a 
bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, which was used by many previous 
studies (Campa et al. 2005, Marazzi et al. 2005, Coricelli et al. 2006). Each 
Eurozone member has a high trade dependence on their fellow EMU countries. 
By using the single currency across the whole union, there are no exchange rate 
relations among euro members. Therefore, if the euro depreciates, EMU 
member states cannot gain export competitiveness within the Eurozone or 
experience much inflationary pressures from other members. However, the 
restoration of trading competitiveness and possible high inflationary pressure 
may happen if we consider non-EU trading partners. Hence, we think an effective 
exchange rate is the right concept to use here, as the analysis is trying to 
consider the total effects of exchange rate changes on Eurozone domestic price.  
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The real quarterly effective exchange rates (EER) for Eurozone members are 
collected from the Eurostat database, besides Belgium’s and Luxembourg’s 
which are obtained from the IMF and IBS databases respectively. In this 
subsection, we will place EER before the variable of domestic price. The ordering 
of variables implies the EER will only react to output and monetary shocks 
contemporaneously, and the exchange rate has a contemporaneous effect with 
domestic price. This arrangement is set to capture the information which 
indicates the degree of pass-through between exchange rate and inflation. Thus, 
the model will be estimated as {RGDPG IR EER CPI}.   
 
Table 4-12 Three information criteria test for 
lag length selection 
  Euro17 
Lag AIC BIC HQIC 
1 -11.8332 -11.3165 -11.6330 
2 -12.1806 -11.5507 -11.9376 
3 -12.3040 -11.5597 -12.0165 
4 -12.4826 -11.6195 -12.1488 
5 -12.7681 -11.7816* -12.3862 
6 -12.8473 -11.7324 -12.4152 
7 -12.8941 -11.6453 -12.4095 
8 -12.8975 -11.5093 -12.3582 
9 -13.0168 -11.4829 -12.4201 
10 -13.0844* -11.3983 -12.4277* 
                                 Source: produced by the author                      
Figure 4-10 Impulse response of inflation to exchange rate shock (M1) 
 
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by 
 Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
-0.001 
-0.001 
0.000 
0.001 
0.001 
0 5 10 15 
s 
________Chapter 4 Effectiveness of the ECB single monetary policy in the Eurozone  
 
202 
 
    We will estimate our model for the current Eurozone area – Euro17 at lag 
length 5 (see Table 4-12). The impulse response diagram for inflation is displayed 
in Figure 4-10. In the short term, a unit exchange rate shock (1% increase in real 
effective exchange rate) leads to a minor decrease in domestic inflation by less 
than 0.001 base points. This is far less than the crucial one-to-one relationship, 
which can be used to show an unfavourable correlation between exchange rate 
and economic recovery that is caused by the ‘exchange rate pass-through’ 
phenomenon. The result here implies that domestic inflation in the Euro17 area 
is not sensitive to exchange rate shock, and it is more appropriate to treat the 
Eurozone as a closed economy rather than an open economy given that the 
majority of trade is taking place between EMU members. 
 
The result we obtained in this subsection can be seen as the outcome of the 
introduction of the single currency to the Eurozone, which had eliminated the 
exchange rate uncertainty among EMU members; therefore, the high level of 
EMU intra-trade, which was encouraged by the membership of the euro area, 
may provide some explanation of the above result that is in line with previous 
studies (Campa et al. 2005). Campa et al. (2005) look at the early stage of EMU, 
have funded the transmission from exchange rate to imports price in the euro 
area, is relatively high in the short run, but incomplete. In the long run, the pass-
through is complete and high, although the value is still lower than unity. 
Furthermore, the author also argued that the exchange rate pass-through to 
domestic inflation should become continuously weaker as the result of 
enlargement and convergence of Eurozone economies.  
 
 
4.6 Summary of results and conclusion  
In this chapter, we have examined the effectiveness of ECB monetary policy by 
using the panel vector autoregression method (PVAR). In contrast with previous 
studies, through the PVAR approach we are able to estimate the impact of ECB 
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monetary policy on EMU’s economy in terms of the dynamic responses of 
choosing key macro-variables by considering national-level information, rather 
than focusing purely on Eurozone level aggregates or by using a few key 
economies of EMU to represent the whole single currency area. Moreover, in 
contrast with previous empirical works, through being independent from any 
specific channel of the MTM, we analysed the aggregate-level data to check the 
overall impact of monetary policy on real economic activities in the euro area. 
 
First, we identified the monetary shock as a 1 percent points increase in the 
ECB’s base rate, and thus estimated the impacts of ECB monetary policy on the 
Euro17 area. We found that the ECB monetary policy is effective in altering the 
level of inflation across the current euro area. Inflation will respond to the 
interest rate shock immediately after the occurrence of the shock. However, the 
ECB’s single monetary policy affects real GDP growth to a minor degree relative 
to the response of price level in the Euro17 area. This may confirm that the 
creation of this supranational monetary authority – the ECB – has brought 
significant credibility to the Eurozone’s single monetary policy (Cukierman 1992, 
Goodhart 1994, Svensson 1997). With a clear inflation-averse monetary policy, 
and possible a relatively steep short-run Phillips curve, the ECB’s single monetary 
policy seems to be able to fulfil its role of controlling inflation inside the 
Eurozone as has been assumed by NCM theory.  
 
  However, the weak response of economic aggregates to the monetary shock 
may indicate a potential issue, which actually may have already happened inside 
the Eurozone; that is, ECB monetary policy (interest rate policy) may not be 
adequate, at least not when used alone, to stimulate the growth or recovery of 
EMU’s economies during the time of recession. This may be due to the existence 
of MTM heterogeneity among EMU members. Moreover, it may also reflect the 
different levels of business cycle convergence among different groups of euro 
participants. In contrast to the interest rate policy, EMU’s GDP growth is more 
sensitive to changes in the monetary base. Nevertheless, the shock of monetary 
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aggregates (M1) has a smaller influence on domestic inflation across the 
Eurozone than the inflationary impact of ECB interest rate policy.  
 
This reflects the fact that monetary aggregates do have pronounced influence 
on overall economic activities in the short run, which has been particularly 
recognised by Post-Keynesian theory as they believed that ‘money matters’ to 
macroeconomic performance (Dow and Eral 1982). The monetary policy which is 
implemented through adjusting high-powered money can be useful during the 
economic downturn, especially when interest rate policy is no longer effective in 
stimulating private expenditure. The ECB missed the opportunity to conduct an 
expansionary monetary policy, which includes both conventional and 
unconventional monetary policies, thus trying to prevent the Eurozone’s 
economy sliding into the slump that is still badly affecting some of its members 
at present.  
 
Benefit from the panel approach, we are able to estimate the impacts of ECB 
monetary policy on different regions of the Eurozone rather than previous 
literatures, which were looking at it as whole or on country level (Butzen et al. 
2001, Peersman 2001, Valderrama 2001, Chatelain et al. 2002, Vermuelen 2002, 
Rabanal 2003, van Aarel 2003, Peersman 2004, Rafiq and Mallick 2008, Favero 
and Giavazzi 2008, Martinz-Carrascal and Frenando 2008, Weber et al. 2009, 
Peersman 2011). We have also conducted the same analysis on the areas of 
Euro12 and Euro12 with IIGSP (Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal). In 
terms of controlling the level of inflation, all three areas had slightly different, 
but not significant, responses to the ECB’s interest rate policy. However, IIGSP’s 
levels of economic growth are more sensitive to the fluctuation of ECB base rate 
than those of other members of EMU. This may explain why the debt remained 
high even during the period of the pre-2007–8 global financial crisis among these 
countries, which currently have the worse economic performance and suffer 
from both low/negative growth and sovereign debt problems.  
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These differences reflect the results that we obtained in Chapter 3, which show 
that those countries who achieved better performance in the aspect of 
adherence to the Maastricht Convergence Criteria (MCC) have a high level of 
business cycle convergence. Therefore, these EMU members may find the ECB’s 
interest rate policy is more likely to be appropriate to their own domestic 
economic circumstances. In contrast, for the IIGSP countries, since their cycles 
are poorly synchronised with the Eurozone’s business cycles, the ECB’s monetary 
policy may have inappropriate impacts on their economies. Then the possibilities 
of overuse of national-level fiscal policy increase.  
 
Since our model tried to contain key variables that are related to different key 
channels of the MTM, therefore we have also identified the existence of an 
equity channel and a household balance sheet channel inside the Eurozone. 
Nevertheless, the results also show the possible heterogeneity among different 
regions of EMU. That, in trun, supports the conclusions of previous empirical 
studies, which suggested that the heterogeneity of MTM does, exists inside EMU 
(Mojon 2001, Clausen and Hayo 2006). The equity channel is found to exist in 
both the original area of the Eurozone (Euro12) and the current Eurozone 
(Euro17). ECB monetary policy has a statistically significant impact on the level of 
share index across both regions, and real GDP growth of EMU members is also 
sensitive to the price of the shares. However, the timing and magnitudes are 
slightly different. In contrast to the equity channel, the household balance sheet 
channel is found to be statistically significant in the Euro17 area, but we have not 
found strong evidence to prove the real GDP growth of Euro12 area is, to some 
extent, dependent on the wealth of households in terms of housing price. 
Furthermore, the results also suggested that the housing price boom, which 
occurred before the outbreak of the 2007–8 financial crisis in the Eurozone, is 
hardly to be dampened by interest rate policy given that no statistically 
significant impulse response of housing price to a monetary shock has been 
discovered for either  Euro12 or Euro17 areas. 
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 Finally, we added exchange rate into our model, mainly trying to discover 
whether the critical one-to-one exchange pass-through phenomenon exists in 
the Eurozone. If this one-to-one relationship between exchange rate and 
domestic price does exist among EMU members, then depreciation of exchange 
rate will not only help restore international competitiveness in the form of 
export price; it will also lead to increase in domestic price levels through rising 
prices of imports, thus slowing down the recovery of the economy by raising the 
general costs of production across the whole economy. The finding here suggests 
the degree of exchange rate pass-through within EMU is low, which confirms the 
arguments of early studies of Campa et al. (2005) who argue that the exchange 
rate pass-through to domestic inflation should become continuously weaker as 
the result of enlargement and convergence of Eurozone economies. Moreover, 
this result also shows it is more appropriate to treat EMU as a closed economy 
since the domestic price level is obtuse to exchange rate shocks which are line 
with the trading pattern of the Eurozone. The key/main trading partners are 
their fellow members inside the euro area, and with the adoption of the single 
currency, no exchange rates exist among members, and intra-Eurozone trade has 
been encouraged since the establishment of the euro area. 
 
    Overall, the findings we have obtained in this chapter have generally 
confirmed the previous studies, which tried to estimate the impacts of ECB 
monetary policy and argued it can be effective for controlling inflation for EMU 
given that the ECB’s fiscal independent position automatically enhances the 
credibility of its interest rate policy. However, our results can be seen as more 
comprehensive than those of the earlier literature. We have considered all 
members of EMU together through the panel data approach. This has allowed us 
to see the impacts of the ECB’s monetary policy on the Eurozone economies 
based on the collective analysis of all members’ national data.  
 
The combination of panel data and the VAR approach enabled the dynamics 
among all endogenous variables (e.g. monetary instrument variable and macro-
variables) to be recovered without falling into the issue of low degrees of 
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freedom, which is the problem that would arise from the short history of EMU if 
a time series VAR was applied. Moreover, the richness of the sample size in this 
chapter allows the analysis to be carried out with little worry of the estimation 
bias that can arise when the data set is small, which is a problem the DSGE model 
approach might suffer if the attention of the research specifically draws on the 
post-EMU period.  
 
In terms of the consistency of the economic theory – the NCM model, which 
the ECB adopts for its policy implementation – with the actual economic 
performance of EMU, the credibility of ECB monetary policy appears to be high 
given that interest rate shock can effectively influence the level of the price while 
it has relatively insignificant impacts on the level of economic growth. In other 
words, the price expectations in the euro area are sensitive to the variation of 
ECB base rates. However, this also implies a shortcoming of ECB monetary policy, 
which is that of having weak impacts on real economic activities. This can be a 
pronounced issue for EMU during the time of economic hardship; the interest 
rate is insufficient to stimulate economic recovery. This problem can be due to 
the presence of imbalanced business cycle synchronisation among members, and 
heterogeneity of the MTM. Policy that has been designed based on union-level 
data may not able to fully address ‘local’ problems. For a sovereign country, 
some regions may see national-level monetary policy as less appropriate to them, 
whilst national-level fiscal transfer and other fiscal measures can compensate for 
the loss due to this problem. Unlike a sovereign nation, fiscal policies are 
decentralised in EMU; hence, there is no union-level fiscal measure that can be 
used to move resources around members for correcting the inappropriateness of 
a union-wide single monetary policy.  
 
Fiscal federalism may not guarantee full compensation of the loss of monetary 
sovereignty and possible inappropriateness of ECB monetary policy, but it can be 
a partial solution, at least: a supplementary measure that can be used to stabilise 
economic fluctuations at both union and member level. However, it would 
require much deep political co-ordination and integration, which may require a 
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different definition of the European Union from the one we have at the moment. 
Furthermore, the results we obtained suggest that the monetary aggregates, e.g. 
monetary base, are more influential of real economic activities than interest 
rates. NCM particularly focuses on the use of interest rate as the momentary 
instrument for achieving its policy goal. It might be fine when the economy is not 
under the threat of recession. However, the ‘money matters’ argument of post-
Keynesians can be more relevant to stimulation of economic recovery for EMU.  
 
Overall, the findings in this chapter show the ECB’s interest rate policy is 
effective in respect of maintaining a low level of inflation, but with relatively 
small impact on economic growth, at least, of those countries who have high 
levels of business cycle synchronisation and also had good adherence to the MCC 
before the establishment of EMU. The results suggest that the ECB’s monetary 
policy can be appropriate, or effective, only if membership of the single currency 
area is carefully granted rather than mainly being driven by the political wills of 
participating countries. Moreover, given the economic enlargement and 
integration inside EMU over recent decades, the heterogeneity of the MTM still 
exists among members, which makes conducting a union wide appropriate policy 
even more difficult for the ECB. Since the analysis we conducted in this chapter 
focused on the Euro17, Euro12, and Euro12 with IIGSP areas, and also used 
different variables, the outcomes of these analyses are not only for identifying 
the different reactions of macroeconomic variables to monetary shocks among 
different groups of members in the euro area: it can also be seen as a method for 
testing the robustness of our model, and has confirmed that the model does 
perform robustly as it is capable of analysing the effectiveness of ECB monetary 
policy for different sets of members and variables. 
 
  Finally, our results indicate the existence of a ‘one size fits all’ issue inside EMU, 
which underlines the root of the poor adherence to EMU fiscal rules and 
constant rise in national debts of some EMU members, especially amongst those 
peripheral members. The high level of national debts combined with the 
outbreak of the 2007–8 global credit crunch collectively caused the current 
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economic recession and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Clearly, the poor fiscal 
discipline of EMU members, which can be partially blamed on inappropriate ECB 
monetary policy at national level for some countries, suggests that the fiscal 
policy disciplinary mechanism had failed to enforce members’ fiscal behaviours. 
That, in turn, can be crucial to the sustainability of EMU in terms of achieving 
‘price stability’ and sustainable fiscal policy. This leads us to the next key 
question of this thesis, which focuses on investigating the Euro Fiscal Dividend 
phenomenon.   
 
 
______________________________Chapter 5 Fiscal stance and long-term interest rates 
 
210 
 
Chapter 5  
Fiscal stance and long-term interest rates in EMU 
– investigating the existence of a ‘Eurozone Fiscal 
Dividend’ 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Following the 2007–8 financial crisis, a sovereign debt crisis broke out inside the 
Eurozone among some of its members (e.g. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, 
Cyprus etc.), which has drawn much attention from policymakers in EMU. In fact, 
the key feature of EMU’s infrastructure had already lain down the seed of fiscal 
crisis of the Eurozone before the 2007–8 financial crisis. The centralised 
monetary framework in EMU means that fiscal policy may become the only 
available stabilisation mechanism members can use to counter economic shocks 
at the national level, given that labour mobility and wage flexibility in the 
Eurozone are insufficient to provide adequate automatic adjustments (Feldstein 
2005).  
 
Although, within EMU, there is supposed to be a dual fiscal disciplinary 
mechanism available to monitor and enforce the fiscal activities of its members, 
it seems that there were some failures among these two disciplinary mechanisms 
to prevent reckless use of fiscal policy. First, based upon the reference values 
from the Maastricht Convergence Criteria (MCC), the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) was established to monitor and enforce members’ fiscal behaviour. 
However, poor administration of the SGP had failed to discipline the fiscal 
behaviour of EMU members since the creation of the Eurozone. Hence, the 
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question is whether the financial market, which should perform as an alternative 
fiscal disciplinary device in the Eurozone, also failed after the establishment of 
EMU. 
 
    Fiscal activities can be better disciplined if the financial market is able to 
correctly identify the risks of public debt borrowers in different debt situations 
(Warin and Wolff 2005). However, membership of EMU can cripple the market 
discipline mechanism through providing extra credibility to those national bonds 
which are issued by EMU members. Hence, the long-term interest rates, which 
reflect risk premiums of bonds, may just serve as a weak mechanism for 
discipline fiscal activities among EMU members given that the market may have 
an overly optimistic view on risks of EMU members’ sovereign debts. This fiscal 
benefit of EMU membership is known as the ‘Euro Dividend’, initially proposed 
by Marattin and Salotti (2010). It describes a ‘fiscal shield’ that EMU members 
may have experienced in the past, especially before the 2007–8 financial crisis. 
  
Among previous studies, which focused on the relationship between fiscal 
stance and long-term interest rates, there is more literature on the US than EMU 
given that the sample size of EMU data is small due to its short history. They 
generally found a positive relationship between fiscal stance and the level of 
long-term interest rates over different time periods (e.g. Codogno et al. 2003, 
Bernoth et al. 2004 & 2006, Faini 2006, Ardagna et al. 2007). Compared with 
previous literature (Favero et al. 1997, Reinhart and Sack 2000, Ang and Piazzesi 
2003, Engen and Hubbard 2004, Bernoth et al. 2004, Chinn and Frankel 2007, 
Faini 2006, Ardagna et al. 2007, Marattin and Salotti 2010 etc.), instead of using 
projections of national debt, which usually generate statistically significant 
results, we employed the actual data on debt in our estimation. This specification 
of data enables us to identify the relationship between actual debt level and 
long-term interest rates. If the rise in actual debt cannot lead to increasing or at 
least casing an insignificant response of long-term interest rates on government 
bonds, then we are able to say that the market has an optimistic view on EMU 
members’ debt status regardless of the worsened fiscal stance of these debtors.  
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For the econometric method, we adopted the panel vector autoregression 
(PVAR) method to recover the dynamic response of long-term interest rates to 
the shock of debt developments. The method of PVAR enables us to advance the 
current study by considering the Eurozone as a whole, but without losing 
national-level information. Moreover, given that the PVAR is based on the panel 
data, this can overcome the key shortcoming of time series VAR, which requires 
a large number of observations that are not usually available to those periphery 
members of EMU. The PVAR method had already been employed by Marattin 
and Salotti (2010), who also look at the relationship between debt and long-term 
interest rates in EMU. Compared with this previous study, we employed 
quarterly data rather than annual data. It covers the period 2000:Q1–2012:Q1, 
and has obtained direct and statistically significant evidence of the existence of 
the Euro Fiscal Dividend in EMU. Moreover, since the data set we used here is 
sufficiently large, in contrast to the previous study, we have also investigated 
whether the ‘Euro Fiscal  Dividend’ has changed since the outbreak of the 2007–
8 global financial crisis, which had not been covered by the previous study, 
possibly due to the small sample size of its analysis.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Subsection 5.2 reviews the economic 
theory, which explains the necessity of fiscal rules and their performance in EMU. 
In Subsection 5.3, we explain the possible cause of weak signalling from financial 
markets; then follows the review of existing empirical studies. Subsection 5.5 
discusses the empirical methodology and data of this chapter. In Subsections 5.6 
and 5.7 respectively, the empirical results and concluding remarks of this chapter 
will be presented. 
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5.2 EMU fiscal rules – their necessity and performance  
 
Fiscal policy is downgraded in the NCM model. The attention to it in view of 
NVM theory has been focused on its impacts on the ‘price stability’ goal of 
monetary policy, which has been seen as the crucial and major policy objective 
for policymakers. In this subsection, through reviewing relevant economic theory, 
we will discuss the necessity of the fiscal policy rule, especially in relation to EMU. 
Moreover, the adherence to EMU fiscal rules (EMUFR) among Eurozone 
members since the time of its creation will be discussed here as well.  
 
5.2.1 Time inconsistency issue of monetary and fiscal policy  
 5.2.1.1 Time inconsistent monetary policy and inflation bias  
The common problem usually faced by the policymaker and private economic 
agent is the timing of the policy and reactions to the policy from each side of the 
game. The game played between these two parties can lead to suboptimal 
equilibrium between inflation and unemployment. This issue is known as the 
time inconsistency policy, which has an influential role on the view of economic 
stabilisation policy (Kydland and Prescott 1977, Barro and Gordon 1983a&b). 
Although the original work was initially developed by the new classical 
economists to question the necessity of discretionary monetary policy, it also has 
implications for the fiscal rules of the European Monetary Union. In the following 
subsection, we will explain how the time inconsistency issue of monetary policy 
would have some linkages to the fiscal rules.  
 
In the Kydland and Prescott model (Kydland and Prescott 1977), they 
demonstrate how the time inconsistency problem can significantly affect the 
credibility of announced policy that eventually may lead to a suboptimal 
equilibrium in the economy. The model is essentially based on the new classical 
assumptions of rational expectation behaviours of economic agents and of 
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unemployment being temporarily altered by unexpected inflation shock to 
private agents. So the Kydland and Prescott model can be represented by the 
following:                 
 
)( t
e
tnrt UU       (1) 
  
)( 1 tt
e
t E           (2) 
       
),( tt UWsWs            (3) 
(5-1) 
 
Ut is the current level of unemployment, Unr is the natural rate of unemployment 
of a particular economy; hence part (1) in Equation (5-1) represents how the 
level of actual unemployment can deviate from its natural rate due to inflation 
surprise. The expected inflation at time t: 
e
t is subject to the information 
available at the period t-1; private agents’ expectations are backward-looking. 
Part (3) in Equation (5-1) shows that social welfare is the function of current 
inflation and unemployment rate. Moreover, it satisfies the following:  
                                        0
td
dWs
  and   
0
tdU
dWs  
This implies that social welfare will be improved by the decrease in the level of 
either inflation or unemployment, or a combination of both. The economic policy, 
which aims to maximise the social welfare function, is subject to the given 
Phillips curve in Equation (5-1) (1). 
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Figure 5-1 Time inconsistency and inflation bias 
 
Source: figure drawn by the author 
 
We can graphically see from Figure 5-1 how the game, which is played 
between policymakers and private agents, will lead to time inconsistency 
problems. The four curved lines S1, S2, S3 and S4 represent the indifference curve 
of social welfare function. Since the 0
td
dWs

 and 0
tdU
dWs , the inward 
indifference curve implies a higher value of social welfare where S1> S2 > S3 > S4. 
The downward-sloping lines 
e
t1  and 
e
t 2  are the expectation-augmented Phillips 
curves.  
 
In the dynamic game, each player will try to maximise its own objective 
function upon the perceptions of the strategies of the other participator. Kydland 
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and Prescott (1977) adopt the Stackelberg game and assume that the monetary 
authority (government dependent and able to determine the rate of inflation) is 
the dominator and the private agent is the follower in this game. The optimal 
equilibrium which maximises the social welfare objective locates at O1, 
associated with natural-rate unemployment and zero inflation. Assume the initial 
time consistent equilibrium is at O4 where the Phillips curve 
e
t1   tangent with 
indifference curve S3. Now, the monetary authority has the intention to achieve 
the optimal equilibrium O1, and thus announces a deflationary policy e.g. 
reducing the growth rate of the money supply. If this is a credible announcement, 
private economic agents will revise downwards their price expectation; therefore, 
the Phillips curve 
e
t1  will shift down to
e
t 2 .  
 
Since the monetary authority is not independent, it is likely governments may 
cheat private economic agents by imposing an inflation surprise through 
unannounced monetary policy at O1. From part (1) of Equation (5-1), we can see 
that raising inflation above the current expectation level will impose negative 
impacts on the level of current unemployment rate, thus causing current 
unemployment to deviate below its natural rate. Therefore, government is able 
to move the economy to O2, which is superior to O1 and O4. However, this is not 
a stable position, as unemployment is below the natural rate and inflation is 
higher than the expectation of private agents. Private agents will learn this very 
soon and revise their price expectation upwards, hence we will move back to 
point O4. Even under the assumption of imperfect information, if the monetary 
authority has a history of discretionary behaviour, private agents know the 
objective function of the monetary authority and understand government is 
likely to cheat on their policy (Blackburn 1992). This implies that given time 
inconsistency behaviour and low reputation of monetary policy, the optimal 
point O1 cannot be maintained and O4 will be achieved in this non-cooperative 
game. Moreover, since the natural rate of unemployment can be achieved at 
zero inflation, therefore the suboptimal equilibrium O4 that represents the 
occurrence of inflation bias can only be eliminated if the government intends to 
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pre-commit to a non-contingent monetary rule which is consistent with price 
stability (Taylor 1985).        
 
The solution to the issue of inflation bias is to remove/limit the discretionary 
behaviour of the monetary authority by delegation of monetary policy to a 
‘conservative central bank’ that has an inflation-driven policy preference 
(Svensson 1997). The non-political independent central bank can receive a 
‘credibility bonus’ and is the right form of this ‘conservative central bank’ for its 
disinflationary policy to be accomplished (Cukierman 1992 and Goodhart 1994). 
The Treaty of European Union ensured the independence of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), which has the legal right and politically neutral position to 
fulfil the objective of ‘price stability in the Eurozone’. The ECB has a defined 
power to conduct an inflation-driven monetary policy; however, the credibility 
and outcome of price stability monetary policy can hardly be achieved without 
controlling fiscal behaviour of individual members in the monetary union 
(Woodford 2001, Brück and Zwiener 2006, Chair and Kehoe 2008). Chair and 
Kehoe (2008) argue that union members tend to have a free-rider mentality 
which induces them to purse lax non-monetary policy that benefits themselves 
individually.  
 
Since the interest rate policy of the ECB can be trumped by the fiscal activities 
of individual governments, if there is low coordination and government set its 
policy after the ECB makes its decision on monetary policy (Buti et al. 2001), in 
order to restrict members’ fiscal activities EMU designed and implemented a set 
of fiscal rules which any Eurozone candidates or existing members have to obey, 
at least according to the Maastricht Treaty. The fiscal rules of EMU are set out in 
the Stability and Growth Pact which aims to increase coordination among 
members and the ECB through enforcing a strict boundary of fiscal activities.  
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5.2.1.2 Deficit/debt bias and common pool problem  
Besides the issue of time inconsistency on monetary policy (i.e. inflation bias 
and price stability), development of fiscal activities such as discretionary fiscal 
policy is also relevant (Kydland and Prescott 1977). For instance: the fiscal 
authority (government) may announce a fiscal policy that aims to adjust the 
fiscal imbalance problem; however, ex post, they may discretionarily renege on 
their previous commitment for political reasons. This discretionary use of fiscal 
power is likely to cause the issue of budget/debt bias during the democratic 
process in view of political economics (Alesian and Perotti 1995, Balassone 
Francese 2004, Eslava 2011).  
 
The explanation of this opportunistic behaviour of government, which leads to 
budget/debt bias, is generally twofold. First, the fiscal illusion (see Nordhaus 
1975, Buchanan and Wagner 1977) model assumes that policymakers are 
interested in maximising the numbers of votes rather than social welfare; on the 
other hand, voters can be fooled by ‘fiscal illusion’, given that they value the 
government spending by its expansionary effects or spending hikes and usually 
underestimate the future costs of current expansionary fiscal policy, since they 
have no knowledge of government intertemporal budget constraints. Hence, 
government has the intention of conducting expansionary fiscal policy or 
breaking their promise of adjusting fiscal imbalance. Nevertheless, this model 
has an unrealistic assumption, which is that private agents have no learning 
ability and are consistently fooled by ‘fiscal illusion’ (Alesian and Perotti 1995, 
Drazen 2000).  
 
The second and more recent contribution to political macroeconomic view on 
deficit/bias emphasises the quality of information which may lead to the rational 
private agents having an incorrect view of the fiscal programme, hence, voting 
for the incumbent. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) argue that voters 
only have imperfect information about the competence level of politicians; 
therefore, voters will extract the information of politicians’ competence from 
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their previous fiscal choices. Given the decision of voters is based on their 
knowledge of governments’ previous fiscal choices, it will induce government to 
run an expansionary fiscal programme before the election to attract votes. In 
fact, this type of behaviour has been discovered to have occurred among the 
European countries before the creation of EMU (Hughes et al. 2001, Buti and van 
den Noord 2003).     
 
Under these political intentions, it is not hard to understand the motivation of 
government to renege on any of their previous commitments on fiscal 
programmes, hence the existence of deficit/debt bias. In relation to EMU, the 
outcome of irresponsible and discretionary fiscal policy may not only lead to a 
higher level of bond interest rates of their own, but it causes an increase in other 
members’ bond interest rates too (Schuknecht 2004). This negative spill-over 
effect has strong links with the integration of financial markets where the 
international factor (i.e. other countries’ economic/debt performance) can 
largely explain the development of domestic bond interest, especially in Europe 
(Bernoth et al. 2004, Sgherri and Zoli 2009, Schuknecht et al. 2010, Favero and 
Missale 2010, Bolotn and Jeanne 2011). The recent financial integration was 
stimulated by several rounds of capital account liberalisation, financial 
deregulation and innovation, and the introduction of the euro (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2008). Moreover, sovereign bond markets have become more 
interconnected, whereas in the past only countries with high domestic savings 
and developed financial systems based on bank financing could issue public 
bonds easily (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004). Given the highly integrated 
financial market in EMU, where it is unusual to see banks holding large quantities 
of other fellow members’ sovereign debts, there could be an increase in the 
possibility of lender countries being forced to bail out borrowers.    
 
Generally speaking, economists have found that it is not easy to design fiscal 
rules which can perfectly solve the time inconsistency issue and deficit/debt bias 
problem by constraining government behaviour, since the rules can hardly be 
contingent, which makes it very costly to be compliant in difficult situations (i.e. 
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recession) (Buchanan 1985, Wyplosz2012). However, with good implementation 
of the rules, it is still considered as a means to at least lessen these problems 
(Wyplosz 2012).  
 
5.2.2 The implementation of EMU fiscal rules 
Here we will review the implementation according to the timeline of the 
establishment of EMU and changes in the content of the SGP. Therefore, the first 
period runs from 1992 up to 1997 when the reference values of 3% budget 
deficit and 60% gross debt were put into force by the Maastricht treaty. The 
second period is from 1999 until 2005 when the SGP was relaxed. The final 
period looked at is the one since 2005.    
 
1992–1997 
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, setting out the ceiling of 
EMU candidates’ fiscal activities in terms of their budget deficit and government 
debt level. According to the Maastricht Convergence Criteria (MCC), the EU 
version of single currency criteria for entry to EMU, the fiscal rules are qualified 
by the provision that a 3% deficit limit and 60% government debt ceiling or 
otherwise sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace (art. 104 of the EU Treaty). The ‘Maastricht effect’, which refers 
to fiscal consolidations in the Eurozone, was discovered among EMU candidates 
during the run-up period of EMU, from 1992 to 199728. The previous empirical 
studies (Buti and Giudice 2002, Hughes, Hallet and Lewis 2008) have found that 
since the imposition of the fiscal rules in the MCC fiscal consolidation happened 
during the run-up period among all EMU candidates.  
 
 
                                                          
28
 The year 1997 and not 1998 is taken as the last year of the ‘Maastricht period’, given that the 
decision on entry into EMU was taken in 1998 on the basis of data from 1997. Hence, as from 
1998, fiscal outcomes were no longer influenced by the incentive to comply with the Maastricht 
criteria. 
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1999–2005 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was introduced to the members of EMU 
after those candidates obtained their formal membership of the Eurozone. Since 
the SGP came into force, the fiscal performance of members did not show 
evidence of obeisance to the official fiscal rules which were designed by its 
creators. Fiscal stances of EMU members deteriorated since the first years of 
EMU. The structural primary balance of the Euro area (i.e. the budget balance 
corrected for interest payments and the effects of the economic cycle) decreased 
from a surplus of 2.7% GDP in 1997 to 0.6% GDP in 2003. During 2001–2004 six 
countries – France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal 
became formally subject to the excessive deficit procedures for breaking the 3% 
GDP limit. Instead of  the rules and being enforced and sanctions applied to 
those members, a dramatic event took place inside EMU.   
 
In November 2003, tensions with respect to the rules reached a climax when 
the ECOFIN refused to take a decision on the basis of a recommendation by the 
European Commission to move to the next step in the sanction procedure for 
Germany and France. After the European Commission had brought the case to 
the Court of Justice, the court ruled that the Council had not been allowed to 
take its own decisions outside the scope of the EU Treaty (European Court of 
Justice, 2004). At the same time it also confirmed the discretion of the Council on 
whether or not to move forward in the sanction procedures. This dramatic event 
implies there were no intentions of strictly applying the SGP among EMU and its 
members.  
 
There was no – or maybe just a little – peer pressure among EMU government 
and council members to enforce the SGP, especially when Germany and France 
were involved in this event. The study of de Hann et al. (2004) argues that there 
is no credible enforcement mechanism available inside EMU to control the fiscal 
discipline of its members. Moreover, the authors also refer back to the previous 
study by Inman (1996) which had already raised strong doubts as to the ability of 
EMU fiscal rules to effectively correct the deficit bias given the lack of 
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independent monitoring and enforcement of Eurozone national-level fiscal 
activities. 
 
2005–present        
 Following the dispute of the SGP among members and EMU itself, the SGP was 
reformed in March 2005 in order to meet the requirements of more flexibility 
and the need of national ownership of the rules (EC 2004). The ‘new’ SGP did not 
change the reference value of the original SGP since the 3% and 60% ceiling is 
bound with the Treaty of European Union. However, the discretionary power of 
the ECOFIN was formally extended after the European Court of Justice 
acquiesced to it during the 2003 conflict. Moreover, the reform also loosened 
the escape clauses, lengthened deadlines for taking action and reclassified the 
circumstances for permitting a longer adjustment period under ‘exceptional and 
temporary’ situations. 
 
The reform of the SGP in 2005 improved flexibility, which was the main issue of 
EMU fiscal rules when they were created in June 199729. However, the issue of 
enforcement was left unresolved (Beetsma and Debrun 2006, Morris et al. 2006). 
These authors argued that the extended discretion power of the ECOFIN in the 
application of the rules has created room for unsound economic judgement on 
excessive deficits; and, moreover, the proliferation of escape clauses bears the 
risk of more lenient enforcement decisions. With the more flexible SGP and no 
improvements in enforcement mechanisms in EMU fiscal rules, it is not 
surprising to see that the Eurozone went into the current sovereign debt crisis, 
given that the increased unemployment benefits and decline in tax revenues 
after the late-2000s financial crisis had a significant impact on the already 
worsened fiscal stance.  
 
Given that except Luxembourg and Finland is not under excessive deficit 
procedure and in order to prevent a future fiscal crisis, the EU brought a 
                                                          
29
 For detailed discussion of the SGP see Allsopp (2002), Brunila et al. (2002), Pisani-Ferry (2002), 
Uhlig (2002) and Brück and Stephan (2006). 
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legislative package of six legal acts (known as the ‘Six Pack’) into force in 
December 201130, which aims to reinforce the current SGP. The ‘Six Pack’ focuses 
on two major areas: 
 
 Macroeconomic imbalances:  
•Prevention and correction of macroeconomic  imbalances 
•Enforcement action to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in 
the euro area  
 
Fiscal policy: 
•Strengthening of budgetary surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies  
•Speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit  
•Effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area  
•Requirements for the fiscal framework of the member states  
 
 
  In fact, this new EU legislation, which aimed to provide stronger economic and 
budgetary coordination for the Eurozone in particular, was proposed in 
September 2010 and initially scheduled to be approved by June 2011. However, 
due to the disagreements among members over the decision procedures of 
sanctions, the ‘Six Pack’ was eventually adopted five months later in November 
2011. The opposing views amongst countries delaying the approval of new 
budgetary rules under the ‘Six Pack’ throughout 2011 have further undermined 
the SGP’s credibility (Ferré 2012).    
 
  In concluding this subsection, we have shown that the independent central 
bank is the solution to the issue of inflation bias. Hence, the establishment of the 
ECB has reflected this theoretical/practical problem by adopting strict price-
stability-driven monetary policy. The ECB should gain an extra ‘credibility bonus’ 
                                                          
30
 ‘EU Economic governance "Six-Pack" enters into force’, EU Press Releases, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/898. 
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given that it is a monetary authority which has non-discretionary behaviour and 
is fully politically independent; meanwhile, the credibility and outcomes of ECB 
monetary policy can be affected by discretionary and reckless fiscal policy. This is 
the reason why the fiscal rules were introduced in the early stages of EMU to 
enforce member states’ fiscal activities. However, the instruments of economic 
governance were too weak to force governments of EMU members to commit to 
the SGP after the memberships were granted to them (Eichengreen 2005, Larch 
et al. 2010). Moreover, the reform of the SGP in 2005 was unanimously 
perceived as evidence that the most EMU members had no intention of 
complying with the original SGP and required more flexibility (Bonatti and Cristini, 
2008). The current Eurozone debt crisis can be, at least partially, blamed on the 
poor implementation of the SGP which failed to curb the deficits and 
accumulations of debts among EMU member states. However, poor 
performance of the SGP, which has led to the reckless fiscal behaviours among 
member states, may not be the only issue the Eurozone had during the pre-crisis 
period, The financial market, where governments finance their budget, may also 
fail to prevent the current debt crisis inside the Eurozone.     
 
 
5.3 Determinacies of relationship between fiscal stance and 
long-term interest rates in EMU 
 
In the above section, we have reviewed the necessity of fiscal policy rule and 
discipline in EMU. Despite the SGP having been established to monitor and 
enforce the fiscal behaviour of members’ fiscal policy implementation, 
adherence to the SGP among EMU members had been poor, which shows EMU 
fiscal rules (EMUFR) had failed to achieve their purpose. Alongside EMUFR, the 
centralised monetary regime also constrains the development of national fiscal 
stance. Individual members are no longer able to finance their debt by creating 
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more money, due to the centralised monetary system. For example, government 
can sell its bonds to the central bank, therefore, to use the newly printed money 
to finance its fiscal programme. As the result of this, national debts and budget 
deficits have to be financed through issuing government bonds in financial 
markets. This implies that the market may have a crucial role in public 
borrowings31. There will be fewer risks of free-rider issues if the financial market 
is able to identify the risk premiums of public debt borrowers in different debt 
situations (Warin and Wolff 2005).  
 
As the interest rates offered on government bonds can be treated as signals to 
both the lender and borrowers in the financial markets, if the national fiscal 
stance is approaching an unsustainable path, the ‘signal’ should provide an extra 
safety net to Eurozone fiscal sustainability32. However, the establishment of EMU 
and the ECB may possibly cripple the signalling ability of the financial market. In 
this subsection, we will review the economic theories/hypotheses that provides 
explanations of the relationship between fiscal stance and the long-term interest 
rate, which are particularly relevant to EMU, and therefore to understand the 
possible theoretical reasons for the existence of the Euro Fiscal Dividend 
phenomenon.  
 
 
                                                          
31
 For instance, high-risk government will be charged much higher risk premiums in order to 
finance the budget deficit and debt payment. This means that the high-risk country may find it 
difficult to attract investors to hold their bonds in the market than low-risk countries. Therefore, 
the risk premium of national debt is possibly reflected by the long-term interest rates on 
government bonds, as the unsustainable fiscal stance may cause rising of bond yields in these 
countries. If this is the case, the relationship between fiscal stance and interest rates of 
government bonds may have an important role in disciplining the fiscal behaviour of high-debt 
countries (Bayoumi et al. 1995, Mosley 2003). This would be especially relevant to the Eurozone 
as each member can issue their own debt, but does not have the opportunity to monetise and 
inflate away excessive debts (Warin and Wolff 2005).  
 
32
 For instance, the high interest rates on national debt would make it difficult for this country to 
finance its debts and budget, unless satisfactory progress can be made to ease the debt problem 
of the government (Bayoumi et al. 1995).  
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5.3.1 Fiscal dominance and monetary dominance – inflation  
Expansionary fiscal policy or monetary measures may stimulate domestic 
expenditure in the short term; however, their long-term implication, especially in 
view of monetary and classical economists, is high future levels of inflation. 
Therefore, the potential impact of monetisation of debt is to raise inflation 
expectations among private economic agents. Such high expectations of future 
inflation may cause worries of macroeconomic uncertainty and aggravation of 
fiscal solvency, which can consequently drive up the risk premium of sovereignty 
debt (Baldacci et al. 2011). 
 
The view of fiscal dominance is that high government debt could well constrain 
the ability and willingness of the central bank to maintain the target inflation by 
controlling the central bank base rates (Turner 2011). By allowing the upward 
movements of inflation, which is due to pressure from the heavily indebted 
central government, the real value of their debt is eventually reduced. Such a 
devaluing process of national debt is more likely to be seen in those countries 
where the central bank is not independent (Beetsma and Bovenberg 1997). For 
example, during the late 1960s and 1970s, the sharp rise in inflation in the UK 
reduced the debt/GDP ratio significantly, which can be, at least partially, 
explained by the less active reactions of the Bank of England before and during 
the early stage of the 1970s economic crisis (Turner 2011).  
 
In contrast, if a country that has an independent central bank is experiencing 
high inflation pressure, the central bank should raise the real interest rate to 
eliminate the inflationary effects of an unsustainable fiscal policy. This behaviour 
of central banks, which is opposite to fiscal dominance, is known as monetary 
dominance (Sargent and Wallace 1981, Jeanne 2012). The implication of 
monetary dominance is not only about achieving price stability; moreover, it also 
indicates that as the rise in real interest rate, which is due to downward 
movement of inflation, the cost of government debt will remain high (Turner 
2011). The author refers his argument to the study by King (1995) which states 
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that a successful deflationary monetary policy may not immediately bring down 
the nominal long-term interest rates on government bonds, given that the 
adjustment of expected inflation is slower than the movement of actual inflation. 
Since the prospect of rising in services costs of government debt under the 
regime of monetary dominance, governments need to reduce their primary 
deficits; hence, fiscal behaviour can be disciplined (Buiter 2010). Moreover, due 
to tight monetary policy, expectation of inflation may eventually adjust down, 
which can reduce the level of long-term interest rates on government bonds. 
However, a tighter monetary regime may take many years to earn the credibility 
for the market to start responding to its monetary signal.  
 
In the real world, the fiscal authority may have political influence over the 
monetary authority. This would force the central bank to compromise their 
primary objective of price stability; instead, they may facilitate the needs of fiscal 
policy (Buiter 2010). In the case of EMU, the institutional structure of the ECB 
may help it face less direct pressure from fiscal authorities in the Eurozone. The 
ECB is formally independent from any members’ treasury departments; no 
individual government can have direct influence on the ECB’s policy rate settings. 
Moreover, national fiscal interests are hardly aligned among all member states. 
This leads to a weak ability of divided EMU members to bring sufficient and 
effective pressure to bear on the ECB. Fiscal dominance may become weaker 
relative to the situation of a non-EMU country. Furthermore, the fiscal neutrality 
of the ECB can create an immediate credibility to the monetary authority, which 
implies that the market may expect and believe in a sufficient level of monetary 
dominance in EMU; accompanied by the recent decline of the fiscal dominance 
regime (Moreno 2003, Buiter 2010), confidence in price stability in the Eurozone 
should be improved. This would weaken the inflationary expectation; therefore, 
the market would charge less inflation premium on the national debt (Gürkaynak 
et al. 2006, Baldacci et al. 2011).  
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5.3.2 Fiscal regime  
One dimension of economic analysis takes a distinct perspective on the 
implications of large government debt for the long-term interest rate; that is, the 
Ricardian versus the non-Ricardian view of the private sector response. Aiyagari 
and Gertle (1985) distinguish these two regimes as follows: Ricardian 
equivalence means households are forward-looking and treat present 
government debt as future taxation; for governments, the future fiscal revenues 
are expected to be used as the source of repayment of current government 
liabilities. Furthermore, the economy having Ricardian equivalence suggests that 
the fiscal policy may have little or even zero impact on the real side of the 
economy. In a non-Ricardian regime, since at least some future repayment of 
current debt can be financed through issuing new money, policymakers may not 
use future tax completely to match government debt. 
 
  The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis argues that ‘Ricardian’ consumers who 
are forward-looking and aware of government intertemporal budget constraints 
will react to government fiscal policy rationally, which may eventually cancel out 
its impacts (Buchanan 1976, Dimand 2002). For instance, in order to finance 
government expenditure, the government needs to either raise current tax or 
issue bonds. In the case of tax-financed fiscal policy, consumers will save today’s 
private spending to compensate current higher taxes. In the other case, 
consumers will react to the fiscal activities in the same way. Since the consumer 
takes future tax liabilities fully into account in today’s consumption/saving 
decisions, government bonds will not be treated as net wealth. The future tax 
payments will be discounted and the present value of them will be perceived 
exactly to offset the value of bonds. Private savings will increase as a result of 
cutting down present private spending to finance increase in taxation of 
consumers in the future. If this were the case, the decrease in private spending 
could offset the impacts of fiscal policy on aggregate demand; therefore, the 
‘Ricardian’ behaviour of consumers indicates that government expenditure is an 
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ineffective policy tool to alter the level of output by affecting the level of 
aggregate demand (Barro 1974).    
 
Ricardian equivalence supports the main argument of the classical economists 
regarding the ineffectiveness of fiscal stimulation, which is represented by 
downgrade of fiscal policy and upgrade of monetary policy in the new consensus 
macroeconomics (NCM) model (Fontana 2009). However, the Riccardian 
equivalence model has been heavily criticised by other economists (e.g. 
Keynesians) as an unrealistic theoretical model which relies on assumptions of 
long-time/infinite horizons, absence of liquidity constraints of private economic 
agents (Blinder 2006, Arestis and Sawyer 2003) and lack of empirical support 
(Hemming et al. 2002).  
 
  The first issue of the Ricardian equivalence  model is the assumption of the 
infinite time horizon (Tobin 1980, Feldstein 1982, Snowdon and Vane 2005). The 
lifetime of the economic agent is finite rather than infinite; this means that if the 
future tax liabilities fall on a future generation, then the current generation may 
feel wealthier, hence their current spending may not be affected. Barro (1989) 
defines the RE model through intergenerational altruism theory, which argues 
that current generations are usually far-sighted and care about their future heirs; 
therefore, current generations will raise savings by reducing present 
consumption to increase their bequests to their next generation in order to pay 
for the future tax liabilities.  
 
Although the intergenerational altruism theory was raised to validate the RE 
model, this defence is also questioned by others (e.g. Blinder 2006) who argue 
that most bonds issued to cover deficits will usually mature in no more than 10 
years, which is a time frame when most of the current generation will still be 
around and tax liable, and therefore, intergenerational altruism is not relevant. 
The author also questioned if current consumption is, or mostly, dependent on 
the present-value budget constraints. Blinder (2006) argues that current income 
will matter more than future income because it loosens current liquidity 
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constraints. In that case, a debt-financed tax cut will raise spending since the 
liquidity constraints are binding. Even if only a portion of the population is 
liquidity constrained, Ricardian equivalence will fail.  
 
  In relation to fiscal activities, the Ricardian regime has usually been used to 
describe a well-behaved government that keeps the present value of tax 
liabilities constant by using spending cuts or increasing tax to match present 
government borrowing (to finance tax cuts today) (Elmendorf and Mankiw 1998). 
Moreover, in the context of assessing the sustainability of public finance, being in 
a Ricardian fiscal regime and satisfying the intertemporal budget constraint is a 
necessary condition of fiscal sustainability (Hemming et al. 2002, Afonso 2008). 
In its aspect of the long-term interest rates, having full Ricardian equivalence, the 
desired bond holdings rise by the exact increase in government debt issuance; 
private consumption declines to offset the increase in public expenditure which 
leaves GDP unchanged, and therefore the long-term interest rate remains 
constant (Turner 2011).  
 
  According to the terminology used by Sargent and Wallace (1981), the Ricardian 
regime represents a situation of monetary dominance where the monetary 
authority has some independence from government and actively conducts price 
stability policy. The fiscal authority has to attain a primary budget at some point, 
in order to maintain the consistency of budget constraints with repayment of the 
initial stock of debt, or at least have some tendency to use primary budget 
surplus to ease debt level (i.e. debt-GDP ratio) (Afonso 2008). The Ricardian 
regime was empirically confirmed for Europe throughout the pre-EMU period 
and also the early stage of the post-EMU period (Favero 2002, Galí and Perotti 
2003, EC 2004, Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay 2005, Afonso 2008). These 
studies generally confirmed that the negative relation between budget surplus 
and debt level, which is the synonym of the Ricardian regime, exists among most 
EMU members. Since the Ricardian regime exists inside EMU, at least during the 
run-up to and early stage of EMU, the impact of large government debt on long-
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term interest rates could be limited given that government has the intention to 
curb the debt level by controlling their budget deficit (Woodford 2001).   
    
5.3.3 Financial integration and fiscal discipline   
Fiscal discipline in EMU can be monitored and enforced by fiscal rules e.g. 
EMUFR and the SGP. However, the effectiveness of such rules heavily depends 
on the level of obedience among member states and the degree of policy 
administration at EMU level. Besides EMU fiscal rules, the sovereign bond 
market may also provide an alternative mechanism that should bring pressure on 
national fiscal discipline (Schuknecht et al. 2008). This market discipline 
mechanism can be defined as the financial market participants pricing different 
risk premiums on EMU members’ risks of default (Bernoth et al. 2004, Warin and 
Wolff 2005, Manganelli and Wolswijk 2007, Schuknecht et al. 2008,). A country 
with unsound fiscal policies will be penalised for their lack of fiscal discipline in 
the bonds market by being charged with high-risk premiums on their sovereign 
debt. This signal not only helps the risk-averse investor discriminate the quality 
of different national bonds, it also puts pressure on high-risk countries. 
Therefore, governments have to take into account the high level of financing 
costs when they plan their fiscal policies. As unsound fiscal policies are penalised 
by the market force, the fiscal discipline need to be improved to reduce the costs 
of debt financing (Favero et al. 1997, Ardagna et al. 2007, Manganelli and 
Wolswijk 2007).  
 
This kind of market mechanism is more relevant to a region or country such as 
EMU and the USA where the governments of member states can issue their own 
bonds, but are restricted in their ability to respond to financial shocks since they 
have no control of monetary policy (Restoy 1996). As the monetary policy is 
centralised at the union level, inflation surprise or monetisation is no longer 
available to member states; in times of fiscal crisis, such governments are likely 
to require bail-outs from fellow members and the union central bank. Such 
incidents will cause the spread of the costs (i.e. risk premiums of other members’ 
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government debt may rise) of their profligate fiscal policies to the rest of the 
monetary union (Detken, Gaspar and Winkler, 2004).  
 
If the market discipline mechanism does exist and work effectively, it should 
lead to more prudent national fiscal policies, thus protecting the union from 
fiscal crisis (Manganelli and Wolswijk 2007, Bauer and Zenker 2012). The market 
mechanism is more effective in situations where government has access to the 
capital markets on the same terms as other private borrowers, and the full 
financial consequences of a possible default have to be taken by the 
governments (Bishop 1989, Lane 1993, Manganelli and Wolswijk 2007). In 
contrast, the disciplinary function of the financial market can be impaired if 
pricing distortions exist due to direct or indirect pressure to favour government 
debt securities in the market (Schuknecht 2008).  
 
Lane (1993) points out that the borrower must not face a captive market in 
which lenders cannot deny it funds. In case of borrowing by a sovereign 
government, if under effective capital controls, government might able to 
increase its debt without driving up interest rates by limiting domestic residents' 
ability to seek alternative assets abroad. Therefore, free and open financial 
markets are required so that interest rates can respond to the level and nature of 
borrowing. In Europe, the Treaty of Rome provided for the free movement of 
capital for the first time in Europe, but the abolition of capital restrictions 
between member states was to be ‘to the extent necessary to ensure the proper 
functioning of the common market’. As part of the drive towards Economic and 
Monetary Union, the freedom of capital movements gained the same status as 
the other internal market freedoms with the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty.  
 
From 1st  January 1994, not only were all restrictions on capital movements and 
payments between EU member states prohibited, but so were restrictions 
between EU member states and third countries (Articles 63 to 66 of the TFEU). 
The barriers to trade and capital movements were eliminated by the TFEU, which 
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implies a wider and fairer European financial market where financial integration 
among members increases the efficiency of financial markets. The more efficient 
the market is, the more accurate risk assessments of national bonds can be 
(Warin and Wolff 2005). Therefore, financial integration, which is the product of 
the European single market, reinforced the market mechanism as the device of 
fiscal discipline.  
 
However, the creation of EMU may also impair the function of the market 
discipline mechanism which is implied by the convergence of government bond 
spreads among EMU members, especially between Germany and other high-
debt countries (Pagano 2004). Germany is usually recognised as the leading and 
stable economy in the Eurozone: bond interest rates have been kept low for 
decades, and it is commonly used as the benchmark bond for measuring bond 
yield spreads. The other high-debt EMU members had sizeable spreads compare 
with Germany before the creation of EMU, which implies a high-risk premium of 
their sovereign debt securities (Condogno et al. 2003). Despite the high debt 
level and deterioration of the fiscal stance of high-debt EMU member states, the 
convergence of government bond spreads happened during the run-up period of 
the Eurozone and the first few years of the post-EMU period (Barrios et al. 2009). 
Such a phenomenon, especially the convergence of bond spreads after the 
creation of EMU, may indicate the single currency and EMU had caused the 
market discipline mechanism to deteriorate. The elimination of future 
uncertainty about economic circumstances (e.g. exchange rate movements and 
price stability), which are used by the financial market to determine the risk 
premiums, can be treated as the possible reason why markets fail to discriminate 
EMU members’ debt risks (Manganelli et al. 2007). 
 
5.3.3 Market mechanism and fiscal rules 
  The EMU is designed to be a fiscal crisis safe zone, if both fiscal rules and the 
market mechanism can work efficiently and simultaneously. There are a few 
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conditions the financial market must meet, in order to allow the market 
discipline to work (Bishop 1989, Lane 1993). Generally, the required conditions 
which allow markets to enforce fiscal discipline generally fall into the following. 
First, the free movement of capital markets is required, which ensures 
governments will face similar conditions to other borrowers when they enter the 
financial market. Second, timely and standardised fiscal information of 
borrowers has to be available on a regular basis for investors to assess risk 
premiums of sovereign debts. Third, the monetary authority needs to be 
independent from the fiscal authority, which prohibits the government from 
solving debt issues in monetary ways. Finally, no bail-out clause is allowed, which 
would prevent the investors underestimating the risks of default.  
 
  Meeting these conditions allows the market to perform as a fiscal discipline 
device; however, even assuming no other factors affect the capability of the 
market mechanism, fiscal discipline cannot be guaranteed by market forces 
alone given that the reactions of the market to changes in the fiscal and 
macroeconomic conditions are unstable (Delors 1989). In contrast, Bayoumi et al. 
(1995) studied the US state-level bond interest rates and conclude that, even 
when the market cannot sufficiently identify the risk premium of government 
debt, the level of interest rates on government bonds  it is still useful to provide 
a signal to market participants about the probability of default. However, the low 
level of long-term interest rates with poor obedience to EMU fiscal rules among 
some Eurozone member states before the late 2000s financial crises and EMU 
fiscal crises afterwards seems to suggest the failure of both safety devices in 
EMU.  
 
The SGP does not necessarily guarantee existing members will obey the rules. 
In fact, it heavily depends on competition and coordination in EMU and the 
political will of its member states (Eichengreen 2005, Larch et al. 2010, Bonatti 
and Cristini 2008). The poor performance can be blamed on the weak 
administration of EMUFR inside EMU by the EU Committee. In the case of the 
market mechanism, the fiscal rules and market mechanism are not isolated from 
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each other. In fact, the fiscal rules and market mechanism can work together. For 
instance, Bayoumi et al. (1995) proposed increasing the role of market forces in 
fiscal rules, for instance by using interest rates rather than budgetary data for 
triggering non-compliance procedures or for determining the size of sanctions. In 
the other direction, fiscal rules provide general guidance about the borrower’s 
fiscal stance which can be used by lenders to evaluate the changes in risks of 
sovereign debt stances (Mosley 2003). For example, a member who has 
breached EMUFR and continues in non-compliance with Council 
recommendations could be seen as raising the risks of exiting EMU, and thus 
promote concerns of possible default in the future. 
 
However, Manganelli et al. (2007) raise doubts about the reinforced relation 
between fiscal rules and market discipline by arguing that the deterrent and 
correcting effect of the Pact might reduce monitoring by financial markets of 
fiscal activities given that lenders may have some confidence in the peer 
pressure and sanctions which will lead governments to reduce budgetary 
positions to below the deficit and debt reference values. Poterba and Rueben 
(2001) also argue that the tight fiscal rules will weaken the relationship between 
the interest rate and the development of undue fiscal stance, and find that US 
states with tight fiscal rules have smaller interest rate changes in response to the 
rise in deficits than in other states that have no tight fiscal control. In the case of 
EMU, EMUFR, which are recognised as a very tight set of fiscal rules that do not 
provide enough flexibility to member states (de Grauwe 2009), may had provide 
the extra confidence to investors during the early stages of EMU. Lenders in the 
bonds market may believe that peer pressure and sanctions from EMU can 
sufficiently improve the fiscal stance of high-debt members. Therefore, the 
breaching of the fiscal ceiling of EMUFR can be treated as a temporary issue that 
may not necessarily pose a long-term permanent impact on the members’ fiscal 
path (Manganelli et al. 2007).  
 
 In conclusion to this subsection, the possibility of a country using sudden 
depreciation of domestic currency or inflation to reduce the real value of debt 
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payments can be, at least, mostly eliminated by membership of EMU given that 
the TEU assured the full independence of the ECB. Since inflation uncertainty is, 
to some extent, being removed inside EMU (Caporale and Kontonikas 2009), the 
risk premiums of national debts of EMU members may be revised downwards by 
the lenders. In addition to this, the Ricardian fiscal regime of EMU countries 
should also have a negative effect on the sensitivity of financial markets to the 
fiscal behaviours of euro member states. Finally, the SGP, which forms the fiscal 
rules formal EMU members have to obey once they join the Eurozone, may also 
have some contribution here. However, later evidence proved that the SGP failed 
to enforce the fiscal developments of EMU member states after their 
membership was granted. Therefore, the impacts of the SGP on the relation 
between bond interest rates and fiscal stance remain questionable.   
 
 
 
5.4 Previous literature – investigating the relationship between 
fiscal stance and long-term interest rates  
 
 A substantial amount of previous literature was conducted to investigate the 
effects of fiscal policy on interest rates in terms of sign and magnitude. Gale and 
Orszag (2003) provide a comprehensive survey of previous studies conducted 
during the early 2000s. They reviewed 59 papers and suggested that, despite the 
large production of studies in this field, the results are still rather mixed. Among 
them, 29 papers have found a significant positive effect between government 
debt and interest rate; 19 papers have found a predominantly insignificant effect; 
and 11 papers produced mixed results. Although any answer to the relation 
between debt level and long-term interest rates remains controversial, there is 
one consensus among most literature, which involves using projections of 
budget deficit and government debt rather than their actual value.  
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The reason for using the projection rather than actual data is twofold. First, by 
using the projection value, the estimation includes the information regarding 
forward-looking behaviour of the financial market; second, by using the 
projected data from independent economic institutions, e.g. OECD and IMF, 
researchers can avoid the optimistic bias from the actual government figures 
(Dell’Erba and Sola 2011). Beetsam and Giuliodori (2010) and Cimadomo (2008) 
argue that the budget plans announced by government are usually more 
optimistic in terms of the expected fiscal outcome than forecasts from 
independent authorities/organisations. Moreover, studies like those of 
Canzoneri et al. (2002), Gale and Orszag (2003), Laubach (2009) and Afonso 
(2010) find that the results of estimation will become more statistically 
significant when using projected values of fiscal stance than the actual data. 
However, our argument on using projection data is that this methods only looks 
at the reaction of long-term interest rates to the changes in the level of future 
expected fiscal outcomes, therefore the relation between current existing debt 
stance and long-term interest rates is omitted, whereas it should also play a role 
in setting long-term interest rates on bonds.  
 
  In the past, more studies focused on the US than other economies which is 
probably due to the better availability of US data in terms of time horizon. 
However, the number of studies conducted for other economies, e.g. OECD 
countries and Europe, have increased, as a result of improvements in those 
countries’ data availability. By using annual fiscal projections from the OECD, 
Reinhart and Sack (2000) estimate the effects of fiscal policy in a panel of 19 
OECD countries. They find that a one percentage increase in the budget deficit to 
GDP ratio increases interest rates by 9 basis points in the OECD; moreover, the 
effects would be bigger if they only included G7 countries (i.e. France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) in their model: a one 
percentage increase in deficit/GDP can lead to interest rates rising by 12 basis 
points. Chinn and Frankel (2007) also use projections (i.e. expected debt/GDP 
ratio was selected for the measurement of the fiscal policy) from the OECD, and 
find mixed evidence about the effects of expected debt for the UK, France, 
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Germany, the US, Italy, Spain and Japan. However, by including the US interest 
rate as a proxy for the ‘world’ interest rate in the model, the results seem to be 
significant. Ardagna et al. (2007) use a dynamic GLS model to estimate the 
effects of fiscal policy in a panel of 16 OECD countries with actual annual data, 
which cover the period 1960 to 2002. They find that a one percentage increase in 
the primary fiscal deficit to GDP increases long-term interest rates by 10 basis 
points, a result which is similar to that of Reinhart and Sack (2000).  
 
Faini (2006) focuses on nine EMU countries with data for the period 1979–2002, 
and adopts the three-stage least squares method, finding that an expansionary 
fiscal policy in one EMU member has effects on both its spread and on the 
overall level of interest rate for the currency union. Furthermore, the author also 
confirms the evidence of more significant spill-over effects for high-debt 
countries. Bernoth et al. (2004) use a panel data analysis, with data covering the 
period 1991 to 2002, on 13 EMU member countries to investigate the effects of 
fiscal imbalances on bond spreads with the German bond interest being treated 
as the benchmark value. They find that an increase of oneper cent in the 
deficit/GDP differential with Germany increases spread by 3.39 basis points. 
However, the relation between deficit/GDP differential and spread has a non-
linear character. For example, a 25 per cent differential in debt/GDP ratios leads 
to increase in spread by 30 basis points, whereas 50per cent corresponds to 47.5 
basis points. They also find that EMU membership has a negative effect on the 
spreads. 
 
Overall, those studies mentioned above generally find a positive relationship 
between expected/actual fiscal outcomes and long-term interest rates in the 
industrial countries (i.e. European countries, OECD members and the USA). 
However, the question of how the creation of EMU affected the reaction of long-
term interest rates to fiscal developments was barely answered in the early 
stages of EMU.  
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Broadly, in terms of the methodology of estimation, previous literature could 
be divided into VAR (e.g. Favero et al. 1997, Ang and Piazzesi 2003, Engen and 
Hubbard 2004) and non-VAR literature (e.g. Reinhart and Sack 2000, Bernoth et 
al. 2004, Chinn and Frankel 2005, Faini 2006, Ardagna et al. 2007). Compared 
with the non-VAR-method literature on the effects of fiscal policy on government 
bonds yields, there are only a few VAR-method papers, most of which are 
focused on the US. The VAR method can consume a substantial number of 
degrees of freedom; therefore, it requires a large data set to run the estimation. 
This could be the reason why the majority of VAR-method literature focuses on 
the US, rather than other economies.  
 
Among these VAR studies, Engen and Hubbard (2004) use conventional 
reduced form specifications with projected debt variables. They find that a one 
unit increase in projected US federal debt increases the expected and the current 
five-year Treasury bonds interest rates by 1.5 and 2.5 basis points respectively. 
Evans and Marshall (2007), using a monthly data set which covers the US 
economy from 1959 to 2000, find no evidence to confirm the effects of fiscal 
shock on interest rates. Ang and Piazzesi (2003) investigate the role of 
macroeconomic factors in explaining bond interest rates, over the same time 
span and frequency as Evans and Marshall (2007). The authors use a traditional 
VAR analysis, imposing an identification restriction, which assumes a no-
arbitrage condition, and confirm that macroeconomic factors can explain up to 
85 per cent of the forecast variance for long forecast horizons at short and 
medium maturities of the yield curve. From these previous studies, the VAR 
method has been approved as a workable model which can be used to study the 
reaction of long-term interest rates to the developments of fiscal stances. 
However, the main drawback of the VAR approach (i.e. needing a large data set 
for estimation) may still limit its application in this type of study.  
 
There are a few VAR-method studies focusing on EMU. For example, Favero et 
al. (1997), who assess the functioning of the exchange rate mechanism during 
the turbulent period from 1993 to 1995 – in particular, the high-frequency 
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fluctuations of three high-yielders in Italy, Spain and Sweden – find that the 
existence of a common long-run stochastic trend between Italian and Spanish 
interest rate spreads was driven by international factors and was independent of 
country-specific shocks. In contrast, in the previous literature focusing on EMU or 
EU countries, studies mainly use standard panel data methods for estimation 
(Reinhart and Sack 2000, Bernoth et al. 2004, Chinn and Frankel 2005, Faini 
2006). Hence, the VAR method has not been treated as a mainstream method for 
estimating the effects of fiscal policy/stance on the interest rates for EMU/EU 
cases. This low popularity is mainly due to the relatively poor past performance 
of VAR estimation, which usually produces less significant results than the non-
VAR methods (Miller and Russek 1996). Especially in the case of EMU, where the 
time horizon data is much shorter than data sets for the US, the time series VAR 
could be the least favourite method as it requires a large data set than other 
time series methods. However, the availability of the Eurozone data has 
improved since the increase in the time span of EMU. In addition to this, the new 
VAR approach of panel vector autoregression (PVAR) can dramatically improve 
the ‘size’ of EMU data set which is seen as a common weakness of VAR methods. 
The contribution of this chapter is to fill the current gap in the literature – few 
VAR-method studies focus on the Eurozone, and using the PVAR method will 
allow the study to benefit from the rich data set feature of the panel method, to 
overcome the problem of the small EMU data set.    
 
To the best of my knowledge, in terms of the methodology that we are 
proposing to use for this chapter, there is one previous study by Marattin and 
Salotti (2010) that also employs the PVAR method to investigate whether a weak 
relation exists between fiscal stance and long-term bond interest rates in the 
Eurozone. The authors conducted the study for 11 Eurozone countries by using 
the annual economic projections between 1970 and 2008. This study attempted 
to estimate the existence of the ‘Euro Fiscal  Dividend’ for the entire Euro11 area; 
however, statistically significant results were only obtained for the period 1970–
1996. The author also split the sample into high- and low-debt country groups, 
but the results are similar as the whole sample estimation. Statistically significant 
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results are only recovered during the period 1970–1996. Furthermore, since the 
authors were using annual data for the research, the insufficient sample size 
implies the reason of why this paper did not conduct a separate estimation for 
EMU period alone.  
 
In contrast  to previous studies, this chapter will investigate the response of 
long-term government bond interest rates to the level of government debts in 
the Eurozone by using the actual data on debt. The reason for using the actual 
debt data is that, first, we are trying to fill the gap in the existing research where 
projections were usually used to obtain the statistically significant results; and 
second, by using the actual data, we would be able to evaluate the impact of 
actual government debt level on the long-term interest rates. Another 
contribution of this chapter is that we will use the PVAR method instead of the 
conventional time series VAR approach, which is rarely used in this field due to 
the lack of sufficient sample size, to recover the dynamics between debt levels 
and long-term interest rates. Since the PVAR approach will be employed with 
quarterly data for this research, we can also focus on the post-EMU period that 
was missing from previous PVAR-approach research.  
 
 
5.5 Methodology and data 
 
The lack of a sufficient sample size can be seen as the main difficulty the VAR 
approach can face when adopted for investigating the dynamics between fiscal 
stance and long-term government bonds rate for a country where the number of 
observations is low. Moreover, for the case of EMU, besides the problem of its 
relatively small sample size, the unique feature of this economic and monetary 
union (i.e. made up by sovereign countries) requires the research to pay 
attention to national-level information rather than treating EMU as a single 
entity (e.g. a sovereign country). In this chapter, we will present the econometric 
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method which we adopt to fulfil the needs of this research, which are: 1) recover 
the dynamic relation between fiscal stance and long-term bond rates by using a 
large volume of data; 2) consider EMU as whole, but without losing national-level 
information. 
  
5.5.1 Methodology – PVAR approach  
Since the VAR method requires a large sample size to provide sufficient 
degrees of freedom for conducting the estimation, thus the conventional time 
series VAR approach may not be a convenient model to use for the research, 
which may include some countries that have a problem of poor data availability. 
Moreover, the objective of this research focuses on the Eurozone as a whole by 
using national-level information rather than union-level aggregates. Therefore, 
the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) approach can be an appropriate model 
for this research. It would enable us to consider all selected countries as a whole 
without losing national-level information. Moreover, by pooling the time series 
data for each country together, we will have a sufficiently large sample size to 
overcome the common issue which previous studies usually faced if the time 
series VAR approach were employed.   
 
We will continual to use the PVAR model, which was defined in Chapter 4. Thus, 
the standard form of our PVAR model can be written as:  
 
where Y’i,t is k × 1 column vector of endogenous variables of each N entity, i = 
1,2,…N. B1 is i × 1 vector of common intercept. B2(p) is the kp × i matrix of slope 
coefficients of K endogenous variables of the N entities; p is the lag order. Fi is 
country-specific fixed effects. δ’i,t is the i × 1 column vector of white noise error 
term.  
  (5-2) 
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The standard way to estimate a VAR system like Equation (5-2) is to employ OLS 
methods, which is severely dependent on the numbers of observations. This is 
known as a Hurwicz-type bias that is inherent in dynamic modelling. As the 
Hurwicz-type bias approaches zero if numbers of observations go to infinity, it 
may not always receive much attention in time series analysis because VAR 
studies usually contain sufficiently large numbers of observations. However, it 
could be a common issue to the panel data approach, as the Hurwicz-type bias 
does not depend on the size of cross sections (Nickell 1981). Even when cross 
sections goes to infinity, the size of the bias still negatively depends on the 
numbers of time series dimensions in panel dynamic models with fixed effects.  
 
In order to overcome this weakness of panel dynamic estimation, an 
alternative estimator – GMM – has been proposed to replace the standard OLS 
estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991, Arellano and Bover 1995). Since the fixed 
effects may cause bias due to the correlation between our country-specific 
effects Fi and lags of depended variables, we can apply the Helmert procedure 
(Arellano and Bover 1995) to eliminate this bias, which is also referred to as 
forward mean differencing, i.e. the contemporaneous correlation can be 
removed by applying forward mean differencing after time-demeaning our 
variables instead of normal mean differencing (Bos and Stam 2011). Since the 
Helmert transformation preserves the transformed variables and lagged 
regressors are orthogonal, coefficients can be estimated under the GMM system 
by using lagged regressors as instruments.  
 
5.5.2 Data  
For the objective countries in this chapter, we have selected 12 Eurozone 
members which are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The countries besides 
Greece are the original 11 members of the Eurozone. Given that Greece joined 
EMU only two years later than the original 11 members, this would mean there 
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would be sufficient post-EMU data available for Greece. Furthermore, since 
Greece has the worst sovereign debt crisis of all the members, which has 
imposed a severe threat on the stability of the Eurozone, it is necessary to 
include Greece in our selected country group of EMU. Our sample does not 
include Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia or Estonia for two reasons. First, these 
five countries only joined the Eurozone recently, therefore there is only a 
relatively short period of post-EMU data for these five new members. Second, 
compared with the other 12 members of the Eurozone these five new members 
only hold a very small proportion of Eurozone’s overall economic activities, 
which may suggest a very limited impact of these countries’ economic 
performance on the entire Eurozone.  
 
The quarterly data will be employed here, covering the period 1994:Q1–
2012:Q1. The levels of sovereign debt level are measured as a percentage of 
each country’s GDP. The quarterly general government debt GDP ratio is 
collected from the Eurostat database; however, it only covers the period 2000 to 
2012. Only the annual debt data is available for these countries in the database 
of IMF and OECD, and the Eurostat database does not  provide data which is for 
the pre-EMU period. Therefore, the quarterly debt/GDP ratios for the period 
1994:Q1–1999:Q4 are measured indirectly. We collect the debt securities issued 
by Euro12 governments in both domestic and international markets from the 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) database. Then we convert the monetary 
value of these governments’ debt securities into debt securities to GDP ratio. 
Hence, we can use this quarterly government debt securities to GDP ratio as the 
approximation to the general government debt to GDP ratio. Since the Eurostat 
database does not provide (or provides only some) GDP data on the pre-EMU 
period for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, thus real GDP growth rates are 
collected from the OECD main economic indicators database. For the same 
reason as the GDP data, long-term interest rates, which are measured by the 
bond yields of 10 years’ government bonds, are also collected from the OECD 
main economic indicators database. Data for these three variables is seasonally 
adjusted.     
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5.5.3 Ordering of variables  
The focus of this chapter is to produce impulse response functions that help us 
to estimate the response of one variable in the system to the shocks of another 
in the PVAR system while others are holding constant. A particular order has to 
be set up due to the assumption of identification, which is that the variable that 
comes earlier in the order affects the following ones contemporaneously as well 
as with a lag. The variable coming later only affects the previous one with a lag. 
This is a usual convention of the VAR system: since the variance–covariance 
matrix of errors is unlikely to be diagonal, to isolate shocks to one of the VAR 
errors it is necessary to decompose the residuals in a way that they become 
orthogonal (Durlauf and Blume et al. 2010). 
 
In our estimation the orthogonalised shocks will be recovered by adopting the 
Cholesky decomposition with the following order of variables: 
 
 LIRRGDPG    DEBTY   
 
where DEBT represents the debt/GDP ratio, RGDPG is real GDP growth, and LIR is 
the nominal long-term interest. In setting this order of variables, we are 
assuming that the lagged real GDP growth will affect current level of debt stocks, 
and the lagged value of LIR will also affect today’s debt stock through interest 
payments on the sovereign data. Also, the current debt level will affect overall 
economic activities and long-term interest rates contemporaneously as well as 
with a lag. This ordering of data is the same as the setting in the previous 
literature (Marattin and Salotti, 2010) that also employed the PVAR approach. 
We have tried different types of ordering for our analysis, e.g. moving the 
RGDPG to the first variable in our model, and the results do not change 
significantly.  
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5.6 Empirical results – does the ‘Euro Fiscal  Dividend’ exist in 
the Eurozone?   
 
In this section, we will present our empirical analysis of the investigation of the 
existence of the Euro Fiscal Dividend. This is to see whether the creation of the 
Eurozone has affected the ability of financial markets to provide signalling to 
fiscal stances of sovereign countries and risk levels of their sovereign debt. We 
begin with the estimation of the whole sample period (i.e. since 1994, which is 
the year the project of EMU started, to the current period and post-EMU period). 
Then we re-estimate the model without Germany and France, to see how the 
rest of EMU members’ national debt developments influence the long-term 
interest rates, which enables us to see if the possible existence of the Euro Fiscal 
Dividend is only the case of those key economies of Eurozone. Moreover, to 
benefit from the richness of the panel data, which is based on quarterly national-
level data, we also performed an analysis on the period of the post-2007–8 
financial crisis to see if this fiscal shield has become weaker.    
 
5.6.1 Unit-root test 
Panel regression estimation is also likely to be affected by the presence of unit 
roots, which are also a common issue in time series analysis. Hence, in order to 
perform a PVAR analysis on the chosen variables above, it is necessary to carry 
out a unit-root test as a standard procedure. In this chapter, as mentioned in the 
Chapter 4, we are continually employing Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS), which is 
based on the well-known Dickey-Fuller procedure. The advantage of IPS is that it 
suggests a more flexible and computationally simple unit-root test for panel data, 
which allows error variance and heterogeneity of the dynamics across entities 
(Barbreri 2006). It also requires fewer time observations, but still maintains the 
power of the test. Moreover, unbalanced panel data is allowed for IPS test, and 
its t-bar test has a better performance when N and T are small (Im et al. 1997 & 
2003). 
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Table 5-1 IPS panel unit-root test  (1994:Q2 to 2012:Q1) 
 DEBT  -0.7904  
   (0.9987)  
 RGDPG  -1.9424
**
  
   (0.0428)  
 LIR  -1.1609  
      (0.9266)   
                    Note: ** represents rejection of H0: all panels contain Unit roots  
                                 at the 5% significance level. Values in brackets are p-values 
 
 
 In Table 5-1, we present the results of the IPS unit-root test for debt/GDP ratio 
(GDEBT), real GDP growth rate (RGDPG) and long-term interest rates (LIR). The 
test is carried out at levels for these three variables. The null hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 5% significant level. Although the estimation results for GDEBT 
and LIR are negative, since the p-values for both variables are extremely high, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of all panels containing unit roots. In order to 
render our data stationary, we will take log difference transformation to GDEBT 
and LIR. Due to this data transformation, instead of looking at the volume of debt 
and long-term interest rates, we are focusing on the growth rate of DEBT and LIR. 
The variables we are using in this research now are: [LDGDEBT RGDPG LDLIR]. 
 
5.6.2 Lag length selection  
Before we start conducting the analysis through the PVAR model, it is essential 
to select an appropriate lag length, just as in running a conventional regression 
of time series VAR. We will carry on using the information criterion approaches 
that were employed in Chapter 4, which are:  
 
*
22ˆln
N
pM
VAIC

  
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It is not unusual to find that the results of the above three IC methods are 
different. Hence, the subjective selection of lag length may not be fully avoided. 
In this case, we may follow Lϋtkepohl (2004), who suggested that the BIC and 
HQIC may be more preferable to the AIC. This is because when the sample tends 
towards infinity, the AIC is usually a more conservative method that usually gives 
a relatively big lag length. In contrast, BIC and HQIC will tend to choose a smaller 
lag length. The bigger lag length can significantly consume degrees of freedom; 
hence, BIC and HOIC are more relevant to the relatively small sample.  
 
Table 5-2 Lag selection – information criterion approach (1994:Q2–2012:Q1 and 
2000:Q1–2012:Q1) 
  1994:Q2–2012:Q1 2000:Q1–2012:Q1   
Lag AIC BIC HQIC AIC BIC HQIC  
1 -5.39543 -5.14185 -5.29824 -5.19374
* 
-4.84786
*
 -5.05872
*
  
2 -5.38463 -5.07685 -5.26660 -5.09878 -4.66963 -4.93049  
3 -5.42109 -5.05788 -5.28169 -5.10790 -4.59851 -4.90848  
4 -5.57039 -5.15042 -5.40909 -5.07844 -4.48569 -4.84629  
5 -5.64357 -5.16549
*
 -5.45982
*
 -5.08099 -4.40236 -4.81478  
6 -5.61968 -5.08206 -5.41290 -5.08087 -4.31285 -4.77929  
7 -5.62369 -5.02507 -5.39328 -4.89869 -4.03785 -4.56023  
8 -5.63385 -4.97270 -5.37919 -4.88361 -3.92627 -4.50690  
9 -5.67036
*
 -4.94508 -5.39079 -4.90840 -3.85066 -4.49170  
10 -5.64096 -4.84988 -5.33579 -4.81467 -3.65243 -4.35630   
 Source: produced by the author 
 
We employed AIC, BIC and HQIC for the estimation of lag length selection; the 
results are presented in Table 5-2. We performed these three IC with 10 lags; the 
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lag length with the highest value represents the optimal lag length suggested by 
each IC. For the whole sample period, BIC and HQIC both suggest lag length 5 is 
the appropriate selection for our analysis, and AIC suggests lag length 9. Since 
AIC tends to suggest a big lag length, which may consume more degrees of 
freedom, and, moreover, since our sample size is just 804 observations which is 
still relatively small comparing with large-scale models, e.g. micro level and 
industrial level data, therefore we will select a lag length of 5 for the whole 
sample period analysis. In the case of the sub-sample set, which covers Euro12 
countries for the post-EMU period, all three IC methods suggest a lag of 1 should 
be the optimal lag length for the PVAR model.    
 
5.6.3 Estimation of the ‘Euro Fiscal Dividend’ – whole sample period vs. post-
EMU period    
 
Following the unit-root and lag length selection tests, in this section we will 
present the empirical results for detecting the existence of the Euro Fiscal 
Dividend. First, we estimated the PVAR model with the full sample set33 and 
calculated the orthogonalised impulse response to capture the dynamic relation 
between fiscal stance and long-term interests for the Euro12 area as whole. In 
order to see whether the establishment of the Eurozone had created a fiscal safe 
haven for its participating members, PVAR will be applied to the post-EMU 
period sample as well.  
 
By comparing the results of impulse response from both sample sets, we are 
able to see the possible changes to the dynamics between DEBT and LIR after the 
creation of EMU. The sample for the post-EMU period starts from 2000:Q1–
2012:Q1; this will provide us with 588 observations. We did not choose a start 
                                                          
33
 Ideally, we should also run an analysis on the pre-EMU period independently. However, the 
data for quarterly debt is not available for most Eurozone countries, and BIS debt securities data 
only starts from 1993:Q3, and thus the available pre-EMU data for Euro12 countries is limited. 
We tried the PVAR model with a sub-data set which covers the second stage of EMU (1994 to 
1999). The results are statistically insignificant for this period of time. This could be due to the 
issue of small sample size.    
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year of 1999 because Greece was not a member at that time. However, in June 
2000 EMU formally announced that membership of the Eurozone would be 
granted to Greece by 1st January 2001. This suggests that, for Greece and the 
financial market, membership of EMU was guaranteed at that time. So, we could 
assume that it was possible for Greece to start to benefit from the Euro Fiscal 
Dividend if it did exist. We have also estimated the PVAR with data that starts 
from 2001:Q1; however, no significantly different results were obtained.      
 
Figure 5-2 Impact of sovereign debt shock on growth rate of long-term interest rates 
and real GDP growth in the Euro12 area (1994:Q2–2012:Q1) 
Response of long-term interest rate 
 
Response of real GDP growth
 
 Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
 The results of the PVAR model for Euro12 are displayed in Figure 5-2. It shows 
the 15-quarter impulse responses of real GDP growth, percentage change of LIR 
to one standard deviation of growth rate of debt/GDP ratio implied by the panel 
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regression, together with two standard error bands (i.e., 5% and 95%), obtained 
by Monte-Carlo simulation 1000 repetitions. The impulse responses are typically 
significantly different from zero at the 95% level, because of the large amount of 
information that comes from using the panel approach. The first graph in Figure 
5-2 displays the dynamic responses of long-term interest rates in Euro12 to the 
one-unit shock in the growth rate of debt/GDP ratio in Euro12 countries. With a 
one-unit shock in growth rate of debt/GDP ratio (one per cent point increase in 
the growth rate of debt/GDP ratio), the dynamic response of long-term interest 
rates remains positive within our estimation period.  
 
This result is similar to the previous paper (Marattin and Salotti 2010) that also 
employed PVAR to investigate the relation between Eurozone debts and long-
term interest rates. Although the authors have also captured the positive 
dynamic relation between national debt and long-term interest rates, the results 
of impulse response analysis for entire estimation periods (6 quarters) are 
statistically insignificant. According to our results, except periods 2, 3, 10 and 11, 
the responses of changes in long-term interest rates are statistically significant. 
From Figure 5-2, soon after the shock of growth rate of debt/GDP ratio, the 
growth rate of long-term interest rate will increase by 0.16 percentage points. At 
quarter 5, the magnitude of response reaches its peak value at 0.33 per cent 
points; afterwards, the impact of debt on long-term interest rate still remains 
positive but with a diminishing rate. 
 
  In Table 5-3, we present the statistically significant response of long-term 
interest rates to the shock of debt GDP ratio. The accumulation value of 
response within 15 quarters is 0.015. It indicates that, with one per cent point 
increase in the growth rate of debt/GDP ratio, the growth rate of long-term 
interest rate will increased by 1.5 percentage points in the Euro12 area within 15 
quarters. Since the VAR model only allows an individual shock to happen at one 
time, therefore the accuracy of impulse response analysis will decline with the 
increase in the length of the estimation period. However, if we only consider the 
first 5 quarters in our impulse response analysis, the accumulation of the 
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response is 0.0073. This still suggests that the long-term interest rates do have a 
pronounced relation with national debt levels in the Euro12 area. With a one-
unit shock in the growth rate of debt/GDP ratio, the growth rate of long-term 
interest rates will increase by 0.73 percentage points in the short term.    
 
Table 5-3 Statistically significant response of long-term interest rates 
(1994:Q2–2012:Q1) 
Period  1 4 5 6 7 8 
Response  0.0016 0.0024 0.0033 0.0014 0.0009 0.0014 
Period  9 12 13 14 15  
Response  0.0012 0.0009 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006   
Total response within 15 periods  0.015     
   Source: produced by the author 
 
In Figure 5-2, we also present the impulse response graph for the impacts of 
debt/GDP ratio to the growth of real GDP in the Euro12 for the period 1994–
2012. Interestingly, with a one-unit shock in the growth rate of debt/GDP ratio, 
the responses of the rate of real GDP growth are negative over the entire 15 
estimation periods. Moreover, as the zero line is not within the area between the 
two 5% error bonds, it suggests that the estimation results for each period are 
statistically significant. The negative response will reach its peak at quarter 2, 
which is -0.0039; however, the negative response will decline over time (see 
Figure 5-2 and Table 5-4). Within the first four quarters since the initial one-unit 
shock in the growth rate of debt/GDP ratio, the accumulated response of real 
GDP growth is -0.013. This means with one per cent point increase in the growth 
rate in debt/GDP ratio, within a year the real GDP growth can decline by 0.013 
percentage points. For the Euro12 area as a whole, the building up of 
government debts that reflect aggressive national fiscal policies seems have no 
real positive impact on the growth of output. Instead, There will be a minor 
decline of the level of real GDP growth in the Euro12 area. This result confirms 
those of other studies which focus on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy 
in EMU and suggests that fiscal policy shock has uneven or very minor impacts on 
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the output and its main components for Eurozone countries (Voso 2002, Afonso 
and St. Aubyn 2008, Afonso and M. Sousa 2009, Forni 2009).  
 
Table 5-4 Statistically significant response of real GDP growth (1994:Q2–2012:Q1)  
Period  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Response -0.0034 -0.0039 -0.0027 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0025 
Period  9 10 11 12 13 14 15   
Response -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.002 -0.0018 -0.0018   
Total response after 15 periods  -0.04       
  Source: produced by the author 
 
In order to investigate whether the response of the long-term interest rates to 
government debts  have changed since the creation of the Eurozone, which will 
help to indicate the existence of the fiscal shield that is created by the single 
currency area, we conducted the PVAR analysis with the same variables for the 
post-EMU period from 2000:Q1. Lag length for this sub-sample analysis is 1, 
which is suggested by all three IC methods that were employed in this chapter 
(see Table 5-2).  
 
In Figure 5-3, we have shown the impulse response diagrams of long-term 
interest rate growth and real GDP growth. By looking at the fluctuation of the 
response curve of long-term interest rates, the difference between full sample 
and sub-sample analysis is strikingly clear. With a one-unit shock in the growth 
rate of debt/GDP ratio, in the full sample analysis, the dynamic response of long-
term interest rate growth is positive over the 15-quarter estimation period, and 
most of the responses are statistically significant, which eventually leads to 
increase in the growth rate of long-term interest rates. Compared to the results 
of the full sample analysis, the dynamic response of long-term interest rates 
changes became completely different after the creation of the euro. During the 
period 2000:Q1–2012:Q1, with a one-unit shock of the growth rate of debt GDP 
ratio, the growth rate of long-term interest rates will only increase during the 
______________________________Chapter 5 Fiscal stance and long-term interest rates 
 
254 
 
first quarter. From quarter 2, the response of long-term interest rate growth in 
the Euro12 becomes negative. Although the negative response of long-term 
interest rates is minor relative to the positive response at quarter 1 and quarter 
2, the negative impacts on the growth rate of long-term interest rates have 
longer effects. The estimation is statistically significant from quarter 4 to quarter 
14. 
 
Figure 5-3 Impact of debt shock on growth rate of long-term interest rates and real 
GDP growth in the Euro12 area (2000:Q1–2012:Q1) 
Response of long–term interest rate 
 
Response of real GDP growth 
 
         Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
In Table 5-5, we can see the magnitude of each statistically significant response. 
Over 15 estimation periods, the accumulated response of long-term interest rate 
-0.001 
0.000 
0.001 
0.002 
0.003 
0.004 
0 5 10 15 
s 
-0.006 
-0.004 
-0.002 
0.000 
0 5 10 15 
s 
______________________________Chapter 5 Fiscal stance and long-term interest rates 
 
255 
 
growth is -0.0011. This implies that with one per cent point change in the growth 
rate debt/GDP ratio, the growth rate of long-term interest rates on government 
bonds will actually decline by 0.11 percentage points over the full estimation 
period. Within a year, the impacts of debt/GDP ratio shock will only lead to 0.2 
per cent points increase in long-term interest rates growth in the Euro12 area. 
This is only half of the size of the impacts that were estimated using the full 
sample set. The results here do suggest a significant change in the relationship 
between government debt and long-term interest rates happened after the 
creation of the Eurozone for Euro12 members. In the short run, the aggressive 
use of fiscal policy, which can lead to a substantial increase in debt stocks in 
Euro12 countries, may not receive sufficient attention from financial markets. 
This is represented by the weak signalling phenomena in the market, hence 
members of EMU could find themselves more able to access and serve funds due 
to the fiscal shield that is created by the Euro Fiscal Dividend.  
 
Table 5-5 Statistically significant response of long-term interest rate (2000:Q1–
2012:Q1) 
Period 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Response  0.0024 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 
Period 10 11 12 13 14   
Response  -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002   
Total responses after 15 quarters:  -0.0011         
  Source: produced by the author 
 
  Besides presenting the impulse responses of long-term interest rates change, 
we also report the dynamics of real GDP growth due to the shock of the growth 
rate of debt/GDP ratio in Figure 5-3. Compared to the case of long-term interest 
rates, there is no significant difference between the estimation results of full and 
sub-sample sets. As with the result of the full sample set analysis, the response 
of real GDP growth to the shock of debt/GDP ratio changes is also negative and 
statistically significant over the 15-quarter estimation period. In Table 5-6, we 
can see that over the 15-quarter estimation period, the accumulated response of 
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real GDP growth is -0.0344, which means, with a unit debt/GDP ratio shock , real 
GDP growth will decline by 0.0344 percentage points over 15 quarters.  
 
Table 5-6 Statistically significant response of real GDP growth (2000:Q1–2012:Q1) 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Response -0.005 -0.004 -0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.002 
Period 9 10 11 12 13 14 15   
Response -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.001 -0.0009   
Total responses after 15 quarters: -0.0344           
Source: produced by the author 
 
However, as we said before, the accuracy of impulse response analysis will 
decline with the increase in the length of estimation. Therefore, we may be more 
interested in the short-term effects rather than long-term impacts. The peak of 
response occurs at period 3, which has a value of -0.0036. This is only 0.0003 
points smaller than the peak value that was estimated by using the full sample 
set (see Table 5-4). Moreover, the total response of the first four quarters 
is -0.0158, which is also very close to the result of the full sample analysis. As a 
result of this estimation, we can see that the fiscal policy remains ineffective on 
real output growth in the Eurozone.     
 
5.6.4 Estimation of the ‘Euro Fiscal Dividend’ – the case of excluding Germany 
and France  
 
In the previous subsection, we conducted the investigation of the existence of 
the Euro Fiscal Dividend by using the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) method. 
By pooling the time series data of each country to create a panel data set, we are 
able to recover the dynamic relationship among variables of debt, output and 
long-term interest rates. The advantage of this method is to enable the 
estimation to be conducted by considering national-level information in the 
Eurozone, rather than relying on union-wide aggregates.  
______________________________Chapter 5 Fiscal stance and long-term interest rates 
 
257 
 
 
Since the panel data is created by pooling national time series data together, 
we can take some countries off our sample set to run the analysis on the 
remaining sub-group. Therefore, to investigate whether the results of the 
previous section are heavily influenced by a few key economies of the Eurozone; 
or the Eurozone has been treated as a whole in view of the financial market, 
helps us to understand if those relatively small/poorly performing economies 
have also benefited from the Euro Fiscal Dividend. In order to perform this 
analysis, we will take Germany and France off our panel data. The reason for 
choosing these two countries is that: first, the debt/GDP ratio and long-term 
interest rates for these two countries are relatively low, especially in the case of 
Germany; second, compared with other low-debt countries, given the size of 
their economy, we could assume a significant influence by these two counties on 
the Eurozone. In Table 5-7, we present the results of the AIC, BIC and HQIC 
estimations. All three IC methods have a common suggestion of the lag length 
for the sub-sample (Euro10 area): that is, lag = 1. Therefore, we will implement 
the PVAR model with lag order 1.  
              
Table 5-7 Lag selection – information criterion approach – sub-
sample (2000:Q1–2012:Q1) 
Lag AIC BIC HQIC 
1 -4.94581
* 
-4.60122
*
 -4.81024
*
 
2 -4.86946 -4.43838 -4.69971 
3 -4.85803 -4.33753 -4.65288 
4 -4.87267 -4.25965 -4.63083 
5 -4.86727 -4.15847 -4.58738 
6 -4.88501 -4.07696 -4.56563 
7 -4.70649 -3.79551 -4.34608 
8 -4.69539 -3.67756 -4.29232 
9 -4.77047 -3.64191 -4.32327 
10 -4.63342 -3.38916 -4.13696 
          Source: produced by the author 
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Figure 5-4 Impact of sovereign debt shock on growth rate of long-term interest rates 
and real GDP growth in the Euro10 area (2000:Q1–2012:Q1)  
Response of long-term interest rate 
 
Response of real GDP growth 
 
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
    In Figure 5-4, we present the diagrams of impulse responses of growth of long-
term interest rates and real GDP to the one-unit shock of growth of debt/GDP 
ratio for the Euro10 area. The dynamics of growth rate of long-term interest 
rates have a similar shape as the results for the Euro12 area (see Figure 5-2). The 
growth rate of long-term interest rates will increase during the first quarter, and 
then it will become negative through the remaining 14 quarters. However, from 
quarter 2, the zero line stays between the upper and lower error bonds, which 
suggests that the results are only statistically significant for quarter 1. Therefore, 
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the only statistically significant response of long-term interest rates has the value 
of 0.0030 (see Table 5-8). This is 0.0006 higher than the peak value of Euro12 
that also occurs in quarter 1. With  one per cent point increase in the growth rate 
of debt/GDP ratio, the maximum response of growth rate of long-term interest 
rates for Euro10 area is only 0.06 percentage points higher than the case of the 
Euro12 area. Given the minor difference between the response of long-term 
interest rates among the Euro10 and Euro12 areas, it seems financial markets 
treat those members as a whole. There is no pronounced discrimination 
between low-debt key economies and high-debt/small economies. Instead, 
Euro12 members had been treated as part of a large union only.    
 
Table 5-8 Statistically significant response of long-
term interest rate (2000:Q1–2012:Q1) 
Period 1 
Response 0.0030 
                                 Source: produced by the author 
 
    We have also presented the impulse response of real GDP growth to the shock 
of debt/GDP ratio growth in Figure 5-4. Compared to the results for the Euro12 
area, there is no significant difference in results for the Euro10 area. The 
dynamics of real GDP growth remain negative over the 15-quarter estimation 
period. The accumulated response of real GDP growth over 15 quarters is -0.036 
(see Table 5-9), which is only -0.002 points higher than the total response for the 
case of the Euro12 area.  
 
Table 5-9 Statistically significant response of real GDP growth in the Euro10 area 
(2000:Q1–2012:Q1) 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Response  -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
Period 9 10 11 12 13 14 15   
Response  -0.002 -0.002 -0.0014 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001   
Total response after 15 quarters:    -0.036           
Source: produced by the author 
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5.6.5 Estimation of the ‘Euro Fiscal Dividend’ – has it changed since the recent 
financial crisis? 
 
During the recent late-2000s global financial crisis, expansionary fiscal policy 
has been widely and rapidly used by the members of the Eurozone. Given the 
imbalance of business cycle synchronisation among EMU members, it is more 
difficult for the ECB to design a union wide appropriate monetary policy. Hence, 
the rapid growth of national debt should not be seen as a surprising 
consequence of loose monetary sovereignty, especially for those countries that 
have a long history of high levels of government debt. This rapid use of fiscal 
policy has led to another economic crisis which is particularly relevant to the 
Eurozone – the sovereign debt crisis. In this subsection, we will look at the period 
between 2007 and the present, to investigate whether the Euro Fiscal Dividend 
has become weaker which allows the financial market to act as a signalling 
device again to the market participants.  
 
 5.6.5.1 Focus on the union as a whole  
Given the results of the three IC approaches that are displayed in Table 5-10, 
we will apply the PVAR model with lag length 1 for the post-crisis period 
(2007:Q1–2012:Q1). The IC results for the pre-crisis period (2000:Q1–2006:Q4) 
differ between these three IC approaches. BIC suggests lag length 1, but AIC and 
HQIC suggest lag length 9. Since there are only 28 observations for each country 
in the sub-panel data set for the pre-crisis period, lag length 9 will seriously 
consume the degrees of freedom. Moreover, for the HQIC approach, the result 
of lag length 9 is only 0.07675 higher than the value of lag length 1 in absolute 
terms. Therefore, we will also choose lag length 1 for the analysis of the pre-
crisis period. 
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Table 5-10 Lag selection – information criterion approach for Euro12 Area 
          (2000:Q1–2006:Q4 and 2007:Q1–2012:Q1) 
  2000:Q1–2006:Q4 2007:Q1–2012:Q1   
Lag AIC BIC HQIC AIC BIC HQIC  
1 -7.02272 -6.48286
*
 -6.80696 -3.69289
* 
-3.01604
*
 -3.41980
*
  
2 -6.84239 -6.17517 -6.57558 -3.47861 -2.63479 -3.13771  
3 -6.81726 -6.01598 -6.49615 -2.84415 -1.81943 -2.42963  
4 -6.23075 -5.28630 -5.85176 -0.85829 0.36327 -0.36355  
5 -6.38438 -5.28721 -5.94351 -1.37228 0.06455 -0.78971  
6 -6.51200 -5.25149 -6.00481 -3.17167 -1.49812 -2.49246  
7 -6.74911 -5.31355 -6.17060 -3.18920 -1.25327 -2.40309  
8 -7.46434 -5.83991 -6.80893 -3.35463 -1.12727 -2.44955  
9 -7.62234
*
 -5.79407 -6.88371
*
 -2.23299 0.32223 -1.19467  
10 -7.49137 -5.44195 -6.66234 -2.96960 -0.04273 -1.78099   
Source: produced by the author 
 
Figure 5-5 shows the graphs of impulse response of long-term interest rate 
growth to the one-unit shock of debt/GDP ratio growth rate for both pre- and 
post-crisis periods. The difference between these two results is that the 
reactions of long-term interest rates to the debt shock are completely different, 
which indicates a structure break may exist around the year 2007. During the 
pre-crisis period, with a unit debt/GDP shock, the growth rate of long-term 
interest rates will decline rather than increase, and this negative response will 
die out around the sixth quarter. However, only the response at quarter 2 is 
statistically significant, since the values of both 95% error bonds are different 
from zero. With an increase in the level of debt stocks, the financial markets 
should adjust upwards the risk premium of these countries’ government debts 
by charging higher interest rates on long-term government bonds. However, the 
result here suggest that during the pre-crisis period the financial market failed to 
act as a signalling device to prevent the Euro12 area from irresponsible and 
excessive usage of fiscal policy at national level.  
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Figure 5-5 Impact of debt shock on growth rate of long-term interest rates in the 
Euro12 area (2000:Q1–2006:Q4 and 2007:Q1–2012:Q1) 
Pre-crisis period 
 
     Post-crisis period  
 
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
 In the results of the post-crisis period, the behaviour of long-term interest rates 
is back to the normal truck. With a shock of one per cent point increase in the 
growth rate of debt/GDP ratio, the growth rate of long-term interest rates will 
increase from the first quarter. The total reaction of long-term interest rates is 
positive but with a diminishing rate. Similar to the result of the pre-crisis period, 
the debt/GDP ratio only has a short-term effect on the growth rate of long-term 
interest rates. The statistically significant impulse response occurs in the first 
quarter after the initial debt shock. With a one-unit shock of debt/GDP growth 
ratio, the growth rate of long-term interest rates on government bonds will 
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increase by 0.48 percentage points (see Table 5-11). This is twice as high as the 
value of response for the full post-EMU period analysis (see Table 5-5). 
 
Table 5-11 Statistically significant response of long-
term interest rate (pre-crisis and post-
crisis) 
  Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Period 1 2 
Response -0.001 0.0048 
                Source: produced by the author 
 
  In Table 5-11, we present the results of statistically significant impulse 
responses of long-term interest rates. During the pre-crisis period, with a 
debt/GDP ratio shock, the growth rate of long-term interest rates will have a 
negative response associated with a 0.1 percentage points decline. However, as 
we have mentioned in the previous paragraph, for the post-crisis period, with 
the same level of debt shock, the growth rate of long-term interest rates 
responds positively in the second quarter. According to these two completely 
different responses of long-term interest rates to the debt shock, we can see that 
since the outbreak of the late-2000s financial crisis, given the surge of national 
debt level across the Eurozone, especially among those countries which have a 
long history of high debt, the dynamics of long-term interest rates changes have 
performed as the indicator of the risk premium of government bonds again.  
 
 5.6.5.2 Euro12 vs. Euro10  
So far in this subsection, we have obtained some evidence to show that the 
Euro Fiscal Dividend has started to disappear since the recent financial crisis. The 
analysis in this section has focused on Euro12 as a whole by pooling the national-
level data together to create a panel data set; thus, by taking out some key 
economies which still have relatively low-level debts and long-term interest rates, 
we are able to see whether the market has started to discriminate between core 
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and periphery members of EMU. Following the same procedure as the previous 
subsection, we will run the PVAR model based on the Euro10 area, which 
excludes Germany and France from the sample. According to the IC results in 
Table 5-12, three IC approaches all suggest that a lag length of 1 for the sub-
sample of the Euro10 area during the post-EMU period.  
 
Table 5-12 Lag selection – information criterion approach Euro10 area 
(2007:Q1–2012:Q1) 
Lag AIC BIC HQIC 
1 -3.49608
*
 -2.82959
*
 -3.22610
*
 
2 -3.19849 -2.34704 -2.85326 
3 -2.68260 -1.63018 -2.25495 
4 -1.34166 -0.07315 -0.82656 
5 -0.80167 -2.30698 1.41323 
6 -2.44845 -0.68347 -1.73122 
7 -2.76818 -0.71680 -1.93464 
8 -2.63667 -0.26730 -1.67446 
9 0.58571 3.31074 1.69100 
10 0.02100 3.14720 1.28623 
      Source: produced by the author 
 
From Figure 5-6, we can see that the general shapes of the impulse responses 
for both the Euro12 and Euro10 areas are almost identical. The debt shock only 
has a statistically significant impact on the growth rate of long-term interest 
rates in the short term. From the fourth quarter since the initial shock of the 
growth rate of debt/GDP ratio, the impact of the shock will completely die out. 
Since, for both the Euro10 and Euro12 areas, the impact will die out within the 
first four quarters after the initial shock, and only the response of long-term 
interest rate in the first quarter is statistically significant for both samples, we 
should therefore conclude that in terms of timing the dynamics of long-term 
interest rates as responses to debt shock are identical between key/low-debt 
EMU members and periphery/high-debt countries.  
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Figure 5-6 Impact of sovereign debt shock on growth rate of long-term interest rates in 
the Euro10 and Euro12 areas (2007:Q1–2012:Q1)  
Euro10 area 
 
Euro12 area 
    
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
 
Table 5-13 Statistically significant response of long-term interest 
rate: Euro10 vs. Euro12 (2007:Q1–2012:Q1 and 
2000:Q1–2006:Q4) 
 Post-crisis  Pre-crisis 
  Euro10 Euro12 Euro10 Euro12 
Period  1 1 1 1 
Response  0.0065 0.0048 -0.001 -0.001 
                   Source: produced by the author 
 
Although we have seen the evidence which shows that the timings of responses 
between two areas are the same, this is not sufficient to reject the possibility of 
discrimination of risk premiums on government debts between EMU members. 
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In Figure 5-6, we are able to see that the levels of impact are different between 
the Euro10 and Euro12 areas. Furthermore, the values of statistically significant 
responses of long-term interest rate growth in pre- and post-crisis periods for 
both areas are displayed in Table 5-13, which enables us to identify clearly the 
changes of the behaviour of long-term interest rates between Euro12 and 
Euro10 throughout periods of pre- and post-crisis. 
 
During the pre-crisis period, with a one-unit shock in the growth rate of 
debt/GDP ratio, the responses of both the Euro12 and Euro10 areas are the 
same to three decimal places. The growth rate of long-term interest rates will 
decrease by 0.1 percentage points after the initial debt shock in both regions. 
This indicates that the Euro Fiscal Dividend has existed during the pre-crisis 
period since the year 2000. The market failed to provide a signal to alert market 
participants about the accumulation of public debts in the Eurozone. Moreover, 
the market also did not discriminate between key/low-debt members – France 
and Germany – and other relatively small or high-debt countries in that period. 
In comparison to the results of the pre-crisis period, the Euro Fiscal Dividend 
seems dispersed, or at least weakened, during the post-crisis period. With one 
per cent points increase in the growth rate of debt/GDP ratio, the level of long-
term interest rate growth will change positively by 0.48 percentage points in the 
Euro12 area. In the case of the Euro10 area, the response of the growth rate of 
long-term interest rates will be greater than the result for the Euro12 area. With 
the same level of debt shock, the long-term interest rates will increase by 0.65 
percentage points, which is 35.4 per cent stronger than the response in the 
Euro12 area. 
 
 From the results present here, it is clear that, after breaking out of the 2007-8 
financial crisis, the financial market seems to have performed again as a  
signalling device to public debt. The level of long-term interest rates will react to 
changes in debt/GDP ratio positively. Moreover, the results in Figure 5-6 and 
Table 5-13 also imply that from 2007 the financial market started to discriminate 
between Euro12 members. The level of long-term interest rate growth is more 
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sensitive to the growth rate of debt/GDP ratio in the Euro10 area than the 
Euro12 area.  
 
 5.6.5.3 Discrimination between high-debt and low-debt regions  
In the above subsection, we have looked at the existence of the Euro Fiscal 
Dividend at the level of the Eurozone as a whole. The results show that the 
financial market has responded to the development of national debt positively 
since the occurrence of the late-2000s global financial crisis. Furthermore, we 
have also presented the evidence of possible discrimination of borrowers among 
euro members by comparing the analyses of the Euro12 and Euro10 areas. 
Further to the results which are presented above, we have also conducted PVAR 
analysis on some of EMU members that have a relatively long history of debt 
issues and have been especially affected by the current crisis since 2007, to 
provide further evidence of discrimination of borrowers during the post-crisis 
period in the Euro12 area.          
 
We have split our sample of the Euro12 area for the post-crisis period into two 
sample sets. The first is made up by groups of countries which have had long 
histories of high levels of public debt and also those who suffered high-debt 
issues during the recent global financial crisis. They are Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal (GIISP). The second group34 is the rest of the Euro12 members, 
which generally have a low level of debt relative to the GIISP countries. By 
comparing the results of these two groups, we are able to see whether there will 
be any discrimination by the financial markets between low- and high-debt 
regions in the Euro12 area. The PVAR model of the GIISP area and non-GIISP area 
will be conducted at lag lengths of 1 and 4 respectively.  
                                                          
34
 Luxembourg has been excluded from this group. PVAR was also conducted for the second 
group which does include Luxembourg; however, the results of the impulse response function 
are statistically insignificant in every period. Since there are only seven countries in the second 
group, and Luxembourg is a micro economy in the Eurozone but has an extremely low level of 
debt/GDP ratio, this could impose a potential problem of an outlier to the estimation. Therefore, 
we decided to exclude Luxembourg from this analysis.   
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Figure 5-7 Impact of sovereign debt shock on growth rate of long-term interest rates in 
GIISP (2007:Q1–2012:Q1) 
 
Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
Table 5-14 Statistically significant response 
of long-term interest rate 
GIISP(2007:Q1–2012:Q1) 
Period 1 
Response 0.0145 
                                  Source: produced by the author 
 
In Figure 5-7, we present the graph of impulse responses of long-term interest 
rates growth among the area of GIISP. In terms of the timing of response, as in 
the case of the Euro12 and Euro10 areas, the growth rate of long-term interest 
rates will increase from the first quarter after the initial debt shock, and the 
statistically significant response only lasts during the first few quarters in our 
estimation period. Despite the time horizon of responses being the same across 
the GIIPS, Euro12 and Euro10 areas, the magnitude of responses is different 
among these sub-samples. From Table 5-14, we can see that the statistically 
significant response of long-term interest rate growth is 0.0145. The relation 
between growth rates of debt/GDP and long-term interest rates are much closer 
in GIIPS than in the case of the Euro10 or Euro12 areas.  
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Figure 5-8 Impact of sovereign debt shock on growth rate of long-term interest rates in 
non-GIISP Euro12 area (2007:Q1–2012:Q1) 
 
 Note: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 repetitions 
 
Table 5-15 Statistically significant response of long- 
term interest rate non-GIISP Euro12 
area (2007:Q1–2012:Q1) 
Period 1 
Response -0.0021 
                      Source: produced by the author 
 
As with the previous results for GIIPS and union-level samples, the debt/GDP 
growth only has a short-term impact on the growth rate of long-term interest 
rates. As can be seen from Figure 5-8, following the initial debt shock in the non-
GIISP region within the Euro12 area, the statistically significant response also 
occurs in the first quarter. However, compared with the results for GIISP, instead 
of having a positive reaction to the debt shock, the response of long-term 
interest rate growth remains at a similar level as the result for Euro12 at the pre-
crisis period (see Figure 5-5). The long-term interest rate growth will decline 
during the first quarter after the initial debt shock takes place (Table 5-15).  
 
These results suggest a complicated story of the Euro Fiscal Dividend during the 
post-crisis period. According to the analysis at the union level, the reaction of 
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long-term interest rated to the debt shock switched back to a positive 
relationship during the post-crisis period, which may imply that the Euro Fiscal 
Dividend was at least significantly weakened during/after the late-2000s global 
financial crisis. Since, the analysis at this stage is only looking at Euro12 as a 
whole, this may not be sufficient to conclude that the Euro Fiscal Dividend has 
disappeared/weakened for each different part of the Euro12 area.  
 
In order to investigate whether the Euro Fiscal Dividend has changed and the 
financial market has started to discriminate between borrowers from the 
Eurozone, we conducted two sets of further analysis. First, by comparing the 
Euro12 and Euro10 areas, we show some evidence of market discrimination 
between key/low-debt economies and periphery/high-debt members. Moreover, 
the result for the Euro10 area also suggests the Euro Fiscal Dividend seems 
weakened since 2007. However, the second analysis provides us with a relatively 
shocking story, which is perhaps the most interesting part of this subsection. By 
splitting our sample into the GIISP area and the non-GIISP Euro12 area, we 
compared the reactions of long-term interest rates to debt shock between high-
debt and low-debt regions in the Euro12 area.  
 
The results provide further evidence for market discrimination between high- 
and low-debt regions in EMU. The membership of the single currency no longer 
provides the fiscal shield to those high-debt countries from which they benefited 
before the recent financial crisis. More importantly, the result suggests that the 
Euro Fiscal Dividend seems weakened at the union level; however, this may not 
be true at the regional level. The impulse response analysis for the non-GIISP 
Euro12 area shows the Euro Fiscal Dividend still exists inside the low-debt region 
of the Eurozone. Moreover, the extent of this fiscal protection is twice as strong 
as the level for the Euro Fiscal Dividend during the pre-crisis period for Euro12 as 
a whole (see Table 5-11 and Table 5-15).  
 
  A similar type of analysis was also implemented in the previous study that also 
used the PVAR method to investigate the phenomenon of the Euro Fiscal 
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Dividend (Marattin and Salotti 2010). The authors use annual projections for the 
period 1970–2008 to compare the different levels of Euro Fiscal Dividend 
between low- and high-debt region in the Eurozone. However, the impulse 
response analysis did not deliver any statistically significant results in the 
previous literature for this particular focus. Therefore, the authors conclude that 
the pre-existing debt level does account for the fluctuations of long-term interest 
rates in the Eurozone after the creation of the single currency.    
 
By using more high-frequency and real-time (rather than projection) data, we 
have not only proven that the Euro Fiscal Dividend exists after the creation of the 
single currency area, with support from statistically significant results:  we have 
also shown that the reaction of long-term interest rates to fiscal stance has 
diverged due to the impact of the recent crisis. For low-debt countries, the 
membership of Euro still provides, perhaps, an even better fiscal shield than the 
pre-crisis period. However, for high-debt GIISP countries, the financial market 
has clearly discriminated against them relative other members of the Eurozone. 
We may not be able to say that euro membership has completely failed to 
provide any fiscal protection to the GIISP region. Their situation may be worse if 
these countries were not members of EMU. However, at least, we can conclude 
that the fiscal benefit of membership of EMU/the Euro Fiscal Dividend has 
changed and become a weaker element for high-debt regions in the Euro12 area.   
 
 
5.7 Summary of results and conclusions  
  
Over the last decade, the creation of the European Monetary Union and its 
single currency – the euro – has attracted much attention among academics as it 
is, probably, the biggest economic project in modern economic history. Among 
the controversial debates about the fulfilment of optimal currency area criteria, 
many pro-EMU theories have been established to support the movement of the 
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euro. Specific to the issue we are concerned with in this chapter, which is looking 
at the relation between Eurozone fiscal stance and long-term interest rates of 
EMU members, many theories have been raised to argue that the creation of 
EMU would enforce fiscal discipline and lower the risks of sovereign debts of 
EMU members. Such arguments may indicate that the financial market, where 
public debt can be assessed by its risk premiums, may be overly optimistic about 
the level of risk.  
 
Due to the institutional feature of EMU whereby fiscal policy is decentralised at 
the national level, the SGP was created to monitor and enforce the fiscal 
discipline of its members. In addition to this, the financial market should also 
provide extra enforcement to fiscal discipline by penalising those countries that 
have irresponsible behaviour regarding fiscal policy and thus hold high levels of 
public debts. Despite the Eurozone having a dual fiscal/debt safety device 
available to prevent the union from sovereign debt crisis, among developed 
countries the Eurozone has been badly affected by the debt crisis, which can be 
seen as the by-product of the late-2000s global financial crisis. No doubt the 
poor administration of the SGP can be treated as one of the main causes of the 
recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone.  
 
Nonetheless, the financial market, which can be treated as a second safety 
device for the Eurozone, should work alongside the SGP to monitor and enforce 
fiscal behaviours in EMU. However, it seems that the market has also failed to 
correctly assess the risk premiums of Eurozone debts. Thus, high-debt countries 
could easily obtain and serve their debts without receiving sufficient penalties 
from the market. This phenomenon can be treated as a Euro Fiscal Dividend 
which provides a fiscal shield to its members to prevent financial markets 
operating normally as a signalling and penalising mechanism regarding sovereign 
debt and fiscal stance of EMU members. If this Euro Fiscal Dividend does exist in 
EMU, then we can conclude that the financial market also failed to monitor and 
enforce the fiscal stance of euro members, which contributed to the outbreak of 
the Eurozone debt crisis. Therefore, in this chapter we investigated the existence 
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of the Euro Fiscal Dividend, and whether it has changed since the late-2000s 
financial crisis.  
     
In contrast to previous studies (Favero et al. 1997, Reinhart and Sack 2000, Ang 
and Piazzesi 2003, Engen and Hubbard 2004, Bernoth et al. 2004, Chinn and 
Frankel 2005, Faini 2006, Ardagna et al. 2007, Marattin and Salotti, 2010 etc.), 
instead of using projections of national debt, which usually generate statistically 
significant results, we employed real-time data on debt in our analysis. This 
specification of data enables us to identify the relationship between actual debt 
level and long-term interest rates. Although the financial market is usually 
assumed to operate in a forward-looking manner, since long-term interest rates 
are regularly reviewed at a relatively high frequency and also consider the actual 
debt level of every borrower, we therefore cannot rule out the role of actual 
debt in the determinacy of long-term interest rates. 
 
  We have applied the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) method to recover the 
dynamics of long-term interest rates in relation to the shock of debt 
developments. The method of PVAR enables us to consider the Eurozone as a 
whole, but without losing national-level information. Moreover, given that the 
PVAR is based on the panel data, this can overcome the shortcoming of time 
series VAR which requires a large number of observations that are not usually 
available on peripheral members of EMU.  
 
The PVAR method had already been employed by Marattin and Salotti (2010), 
who also look at the relationship between debt and long-term interest rates in 
EMU. The authors use annual projections for debt variables for the period 1970–
2008 to investigate the existence of the ‘Euro Dividend’. Due to the small 
numbers of observations for the post-EMU period, the authors were unable to 
run the analysis for the post-EMU period only. Therefore, there is no direct 
evidence of the Euro Fiscal Dividend in the previous literature. Moreover, 
Marattin and Salotti (2010) also experience the same problem as other VAR-
method literature; most of the results in Marattin and Salotti (2010) are 
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statistically insignificant. Compared with this previous literature, we employed 
quarterly data which covers the period 1994:Q1–2012:Q1, and have obtained 
direct and statistically significant evidence of the existence of the Euro Fiscal 
Dividend in EMU. Moreover, since the data set we used here is sufficiently large, 
we have also investigated whether the Euro Fiscal Dividend has changed since 
the outbreak of the late-2000s global financial crisis.    
 
First, we have estimated the dynamic response of long-term interest rates to 
debt shock for both the full sample period (1994:Q1–2012:Q1) and the post-EMU 
period (2000:Q1–2012:Q1). The results indicate that the response of long-term 
interest rates did change after the creation of the Eurozone. During the full post-
EMU period, the response of long-term interest rates to debt shock has 
significantly reduced compared with the result from the full sample period. We 
also performed the same estimation on the Euro10 area for the full post-EMU 
period; the results have shown that there is no pronounced discrimination 
between key and peripheral high-debt countries.  
 
However, after the outbreak of the late-2000s global financial crisis, which was 
followed by the Eurozone debt crisis, we did see the some dramatic changes to 
the fiscal stance and level of long-term interest rates in some high-debt EMU 
members. This implies that there could have been a possible change to the Euro 
Fiscal Dividend since the outbreak of the late-2000s global financial crisis. 
Therefore, we also tried to estimate the impulse response of long-term interest 
rates for pre- and post-crisis periods. The results have shown a remarkable 
change since the outbreak of the crisis. The Euro Fiscal Dividend seems to 
disappear from year 2007onwards  based on the evidence at the union level.  
 
Nevertheless, the actual story is far more complicated than the evidence from 
the union-level estimation. We spilt our post-crisis sample into groups of high-
debt and low-debt countries. We found that the Euro Fiscal Dividend did 
disappear in the region of high-debt countries, but still existed and actually 
became stronger among the low-debt countries. This implies that, given the 
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deepening of the deterioration of the fiscal stance in the Eurozone and the weak 
recovery of and long struggle for fiscal coordination among EMU members, the 
fiscal shield which was initially offered to Euro12 countries has become decayed. 
In the short term, since the market has started discriminating between members 
of EMU, this would mean that for the high-debt countries it has become more 
difficult to seek finance  and serve their debt.   
 
  It is evident from the results obtained in this chapter that the Euro Fiscal 
Dividend did occur in the Eurozone after the creation of the single currency area. 
The financial market failed to operate as a signalling device to monitoring and 
enforce the national fiscal stances, with poor administration of EMU fiscal rules 
among members of EMU; thus, before the outbreak of the global financial crisis, 
EMU members could relatively easily access and operate their fiscal policy on a 
continuously high level of public debt without penalty by either the market or 
EMU itself. Therefore, the failure of both the SGP and the financial market can be 
blamed for the current Eurozone debt crisis which could have been prevented or 
at least lessened if there had been strict implementation of the SGP and 
sufficient/accurate market monitoring/penalisation.   
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Chapter 6  
General summary and conclusion 
 
 
It has been nearly fourteen years since the Eurozone was finally launched in 1999. 
However, the doubt and worries about this currency union had never been eased 
among academics, and debates and arguments have been continually raised as 
to the Eurozone. With the outbreak of the recent 2007–8 global credit crunch, 
which was followed by the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, tempers have risen 
again among academics in Eurozone debates. Benefiting from both the increase 
in the quantity of EMU members’ national-level data and the econometric 
methods applied in this thesis, in comparison to previous studies, we are able to 
review what has happened to EMU as a whole with consideration of state-level 
information. This has enabled us to see whether the Eurozone can be and has 
been a sustainable system.    
 
 6.1 Summary of key results  
 
In this thesis, we have targeted three questions. First, we evaluated the level of 
business cycle synchronisation among existing members of EMU, therefore 
enabling us to see whether the membership of the single currency area 
enhanced the convergence of growth dynamics between EMU members, which 
indicates if the ECB single monetary policy could more likely be appropriate 
union-wide. The second question reviewed the effectiveness of ECB monetary 
policy. By estimating the dynamic responses of key macroeconomic variables to a 
shock of ECB monetary policy, we evaluated if the ECB’s monetary policy can be 
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an effective tool to achieve its inflation-averse goal, and also its impacts on 
economic activities. Finally, we looked at the relation between long-term interest 
rates in EMU and the fiscal stance of its member states, to see how financial 
markets reacted to the development of national debts of Eurozone countries 
before and after the 2007–8 financial crisis. This would allow us to see whether 
membership of EMU brought additional credibility to Eurozone members, which 
in fact caused optimistic views on risk premiums of national debts within the 
financial markets. That, in turn, can explain the reason why EMU members may 
have found it easy to obtain funds even when some of them already had a high 
level of national debt before the 2007–8 financial crisis. Moreover, we also tried 
to find out if this Euro Fiscal Dividend phenomenon has changed since the onset 
of the crises. 
 
The arguments that were made against the creation and operational ability of 
the single currency union mainly criticise EMU as a non-optimal currency in the 
first place. Moreover, if business cycle synchronisation is low among EMU 
members, even with a homogenous MTM across different countries in the 
Eurozone, a union-wide monetary policy is still unlikely to be appropriate to suit 
the needs of member countries who are on a different cycle (Artis et al. 2004, 
Grauwe 2009, Savva et al. 2010, Soares et al. 2009). However, the modern view 
of optimal currency area theory (OCA), which is heavily influenced by Frankel and 
Rose (1998), provided a theoretical solution to EMU on the question of low 
degrees of business cycle convergence among the potential members of the euro 
area before EMU was formally created.  
 
Frankel and Rose’s (1998) endogeneity hypothesis of OCA argues that cycles 
will tend to be more synchronised, due to increase in trade, if the intra-industry 
trade dominates the inter-industry trade. This modern view of OCA theory 
suggests that due to economic integration members will tend to share the same, 
or at least very similar, business cycles. Therefore, different countries will be 
more likely to be subject to common patterns of economic shocks. Moreover, 
due to the synchronisation of business cycles across the currency union, 
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fluctuations of price also tend to be similar among them. This indicates that 
cross-country relative prices are constant; therefore, the exchange rate policy is 
not needed. Indeed, trade intensity is found to lead to more synchronisation 
within the euro area. Hence, if evidence for increased the level of business cycle 
convergence can be found among EMU member states, then the results may 
indicate EMU is a sustainable system, or at least tends to be one, given that the 
requirements of the monetary policy are more likely to be the same at the 
national level inside the Eurozone.    
 
 In Chapter 3, we adopted the dynamic factor model (DFM) to evaluate the 
level of business cycle synchronisation within the original Euro12 area. In 
contrast to previous empirical studies for EMU that employed the second-
generation DFM approach (Breitung and Eickmerir 2005, Lehwald 2012, Lee 
2011), we have employed the first generation approach and have shown that for 
the case of the Eurozone, this finite variable approach is capable of producing 
statistically significant results for research on the regional scale. 
 
 First, we estimated the unobserved common factors which can capture the co-
movements of Euro12 members’ growth dynamics. Then a conventional 
correlation test was used to investigate to what extent the movement of national 
growth trends are on a similar path to Euro12 common trends. The results show 
that the correlation between national real GDP growth and Euro12 common 
factors is generally improved after the creation of the Eurozone, except for 
Portugal. Then a graphic and variance decompositions analysis was carried out 
after we obtained the correlation coefficients for Euro12. These results 
suggested a mixed answer to our question. For Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, the synchronisation of cycle (i.e. in 
respect of the volatility of national trends in relation to movements of common 
factor that capture the co-movements of Euro12 general economic activities) are 
improved significantly. However, for the rest of the countries in the Euro12 area, 
there were no pronounced improvements. In particular, in the case of Portugal, 
the synchronisation of cycles declined rather than improved.  
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Overall, the results in Chapter 3 suggest that the synchronisation of business 
cycles is improved for most countries in the Euro12 area except Portugal and 
Greece. Our findings are in line with other empirical studies (Kaufman 2003, 
Montoya and Haan 2007, Giannone et al. 2010, Lehwald 2012), but have drawn 
different conclusions from those of a recent empirical study (Lee 2011) which 
suggests that the synchronisation of cycles only increased during the run-up 
period to EMU, with no evidence to show that the improvement continued after 
the creation of EMU. However, our results also indicate that only correlation of 
trends is generally improved for most countries. The degree of volatility between 
national growth dynamics and trends of common growth factors is only 
improved within those countries from the core group of Euro12. Rather than 
having union-wide improvements in the convergence of economic activities, as 
argued by the endogeneity of OCA theory, instead, an imbalance between core 
and peripheral countries occurred after the creation of Eurozone. This confirms 
the argument that has been put forward by Sinn et al. (2011), who suggest that 
the introduction of EMU may encourage imbalance between member states 
rather than delivering universal enforcement of economic convergence. The 
establishment of EMU has caused a divergence between core and periphery 
groups of Euro12. Therefore, after 12 years’ operation of EMU, in terms of 
business synchronisation, there is still a substantial challenge for the ECB to 
deliver an union wide appropriate monetary policy.  
  
So far, what has been found in our thesis seems to suggest that EMU would be 
better left with only those core members rather than including periphery 
members. However, withdrawing membership can be a costly and painful 
process to troubled members and EMU from both economic and political 
perspectives. The key issue is whether the degree of business cycle 
synchronisation can be improved, especially for periphery members.  
 
To address this concern, we conducted further analysis to investigate which key 
components are more important for explaining business cycle convergence 
within EMU. We found export, as the key element of overall economic activities, 
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to be more important than the other two components of output (consumption 
and investment). It can be used to explain the co-movements of economic 
activities for every member of Euro12. However, it is weak in Greece and Ireland. 
This reflects our results of basic estimation in Chapter 3 which suggest the 
endogeneity hypothesis is only true for some parts of the Eurozone. Overall, the 
integration of trade is key to improving the convergence of cycles inside the 
Eurozone, and should be treated as the main policy objective by EMU members, 
thus improving the probability of implementing an appropriate monetary policy 
union-wide.  
 
In Chapter 4, we used the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) method to 
estimate the effectiveness of the ECB’s single union-wide monetary policy. In 
contrast to previous studies (e.g. Butzen et al. 2001, Peersman 2001, Valderrama 
2001, Chatelain et al. 2002, Vermuelen 2002, Rabanal 2003, van Aarel 2003, 
Peersman 2004, Rafiq and Mallick 2008, Favero and Giavazzi 2008, Martinz-
Carrascal and Frenando 2008, Weber et al. 2009, Peersman 2011), we consider 
EMU as a whole through use of national-level data. Moreover, by adopting PVAR 
we are able to be independent from any specific channel of the MTM, thus 
evaluating the overall impacts of monetary policy on EMU’s economic activities. 
Finally, this method allows recovery of dynamics among endogenous variables 
without falling into the problem of low degrees of freedom.  
 
   Our results show the ECB’s interest rate policy is effective in terms of 
maintaining a low level of inflation, but with relatively small impacts on 
economic growth, at least in those countries that have high levels of business 
cycle synchronisation and also had good adherence to the MCC before the 
establishment of EMU. The results suggest that the ECB’s monetary policy can be 
appropriate, or effective, only if membership of the single currency area is 
carefully granted rather than mainly being driven by the political wills of 
participating countries. Moreover, in the context of economic enlargement and 
integration inside EMU over recent decades, the heterogeneity of the MTM still 
exists among members, which makes conducting a union wide appropriate policy 
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even more difficult for the ECB when some of its members’ cycles are less 
synchronised with Eurozone union-level activities.  
  
Although the interest rate policy is effective in controlling price, the weak 
response of real GDP growth to the interest rate shock has indicated a crucial 
weakness of ECB interest rate policy. That is, the ECB’s conventional monetary 
policy may not be sufficient to stimulate or encourage economic growth given 
that real GDP growth does not actively respond to interest rate shock across the 
euro area. This issue may be due to the existence of MTM heterogeneity among 
EMU members, or it also could reflect the different level of business cycle 
convergence among different groups of euro participants. In contrast to the 
interest rate policy, EMU’s GDP growth is more sensitive to changes in the level 
of monetary base, which has less influence on domestic inflation across the 
Eurozone than the inflationary impact of the ECB’s interest rate policy. The ECB 
probably missed the opportunity to conduct an expansionary monetary policy 
that contains both conventional and unconventional monetary policies, in order 
to prevent the Eurozone’s economy sliding into the slump that is badly affecting 
some of its members at present. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 5, by recovering the dynamic response of financial markets 
(changes in long-term interest rates on government bonds) to the developments 
of national-level fiscal stance (changes in the debt to GDP ratio), we tried to see 
if the Euro Fiscal Dividend can be blamed for the poor fiscal behaviours of some 
EMU members before the 2007–8 financial crises. In contrast to previous studies 
which also focused on this area (e.g. Favero et al. 1997, Reinhart and Sack 2000, 
Ang and Piazzesi 2003, Engen and Hubbard 2004, Bernoth et al. 2004, Chinn and 
Frankel 2007, Faini 2006, Ardagna et al. 2007, Marattin and Salotti 2010), instead 
of using projections of national debt, which usually generate statistically 
significant results, we employed the actual data on debt in our estimation. This 
specification of data enables us to identify the relationship between actual debt 
level and long-term interest rates.  
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Moreover, in contrast to the study of Marattin and Salotti (2010), which 
proposes the term Euro Fiscal Dividend and also adopts the PVAR method as its 
econometric technique, we employed a much larger data set through using 
quarterly data and have obtained direct and statistically significant evidence of 
the existence of the Euro Fiscal Dividend in EMU. Furthermore, since the data set 
we used here is sufficiently large, in contrast to the previous study, we have also 
investigated whether the Euro Fiscal Dividend has changed since the outbreak of 
the 2007–8 global financial crisis, which had not been covered by the previous 
study, possibly due to the small sample size of its analysis.  
 
The results here indicate that the response of long-term interest rates did 
change after the creation of the Eurozone. During the full post-EMU period, the 
response of long-term interest rates to debt shock has significantly reduced 
compared with the result of the full sample period. We also performed the same 
estimation on the Euro10 area for the full post-EMU period, and the results have 
shown that there is no pronounced discrimination between key and peripheral 
high-debt countries. However, since the outbreak of the 2007–8 global credit 
crunch which was followed by the Eurozone debt crisis, we did see deterioration 
of fiscal stance and level of long-term interest rates in some high-debt EMU 
members. This implied that there could have been a possible change to the Euro 
Fiscal Dividend since the outbreaks of the 2007–8 global financial crisis. 
 
To address this, we also tried to estimate the impulse response of long-term 
interest rates for pre- and post-crisis periods separately. The results have shown 
a remarkable change since the outbreak of the crisis. The Euro Fiscal Dividend 
seems to disappear from year 2007onward based on the evidence at the union 
level. Nevertheless, the actual story is far more complicated than the evidence 
from the union-level estimation. We spilt our post-crisis sample into groups of 
high-debt and low-debt countries. We found that the Euro Fiscal Dividend did 
disappear in the region of high-debt countries, but still existed and actually 
became stronger among the low-debt countries. This implies that given the 
deepening of the deterioration of the fiscal stance in the Eurozone and the weak 
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recovery of and long struggle for fiscal coordination among EMU members, the 
fiscal shield which was initially offered to Euro12 countries has become decayed. 
In the short term, since the market has started to discriminate between 
members of EMU, this would mean that for the high-debt countries it has 
become more difficult to serve their debt. In other words, the financial market, 
which can perform as an alternative tool for monitoring and enforcing fiscal 
behaviours, has now become available again in the Eurozone.  
 
6.2 General Conclusion  
  The successful implantation of economic policies within the currency union is 
crucial for a sustainable EMU. Questions arise such as: can current monetary 
policy be effective in controlling inflation and influencing overall economic 
activities, and can fiscal activities be closely monitored? These are the important 
questions to consider as they would directly influence the economic 
performance and stability of the Eurozone and its member countries. Moreover, 
the convergence of Eurozone members’ business cycles is another key factor for 
evaluating the sustainability of EMU, given that it forms an essential foundation 
for conducting a union wide appropriate monetary policy.  
 
The 2007–8 credit crunch, which was followed by the global recession and 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, imposed one of the greatest economic hardships 
faced by EMU members. However, some countries were affected much worse 
than other members. Unbalanced economic performance and hardships within 
the euro area have caused fears of the collapse of this single currency area. This 
can be seen as a sign of EMU becoming unsustainable during this time of 
economic crisis. The understanding we require is that of whether the current 
economic issues are solely caused by external shocks or whether inherent 
weakness/problems of the Eurozone have made their contribution.  
 
By comparing the overall economic performance of the Eurozone members, we 
see that the core members (Northern European countries) generally achieved 
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better performance than peripheral members (mainly Southern European 
countries). Monetary policy can effectively influence the fluctuations of price 
level for the Eurozone. However, overall economic activities (real GDP growth) 
are more sensitive to the adjustments of the ECB’s base rates among peripheral 
members than core members. That, in turn, means the peripheral members’ 
economic growth is more likely to be dampened by the inflation-averse-type ECB 
monetary policy, whilst core members are more likely to have their inflation 
stabilised without substantive weakening of economic activities. This might be 
due to the existence of MTM heterogeneity among member countries, or it also 
can be explained by the lack of business cycle synchronisation among EMU 
members.  
 
The endogeneity hypothesis of OCA theory advocates the creation of EMU 
through arguing that the co-movements of aggregate economic activities will be 
enhanced and will eventually converge due to the surge of intra-union trade 
among members. According to this view, a currency can be created with 
members whose business cycle co-movements are not all highly converged. The 
creation of EMU occurred under the influence of this pro-EMU theory and was 
established with members who have different levels of business cycle 
synchronisation. Intra-trade does play a key – and the biggest – part of the 
trading patterns of EMU and its members. However, the predicted outcome of 
the endogeneity hypothesis can only be found among some members of the 
Eurozone, most of which belong to the core group of EMU. This reflects the 
different reactions of core and peripheral members to the ECB single monetary 
policy.  
 
The ECB is the only monetary authority of the Eurozone. It should not offer any 
privileges towards any member when monetary policy is being designed or 
implemented. However, considering the core group of EMU holds a substantial 
weight of the combined Eurozone economy and their aggregate economic 
activities are highly converged with overall economic performance of EMU, the 
averaged economic indicators of the Eurozone, which are used by the ECB for 
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policy design, are more likely to be influenced by core members than peripheral 
members. Therefore, ECB monetary policy is more likely to be appropriate to the 
core group than the peripheral group. This can lead to imbalanced reactions to 
monetary policy shocks within the single currency area. The ‘one size fits all’ 
issue can exist inside EMU if some members’ (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Ireland etc.) 
business cycles remain divergent from the other members’ economic activities.       
 
Moreover, unbalanced business cycle synchronisation among core and 
peripheral EMU members can not only be used to explain the different reactions 
to the ECB’s monetary policy. Considering it along with divergent impacts of 
monetary policy on Eurozone members’ aggregate economic activities, the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis seems to have already taken root when the single 
currency was formed. Countries who see the ECB’s monetary policy as 
inappropriate to their domestic needs may inevitably rely on fiscal measures to 
address domestic economic issues, whilst the automatic fiscal stabiliser may 
further the deterioration of fiscal stance of those EMU member countries. In 
addition to this, the poor adherence to and implementation of SGP combined 
with the impacts of the Euro Fiscal Dividend have meant EMU countries have 
found it was easy to access cheap money to finance their budget deficits and 
existing government debts. However, with the outbreak of the 2007–8 credit 
crunch and global recession, fiscal stances among EMU members were badly 
affected, especially among those peripheral members whose debt/GDP ratios 
were already above EMU debt ceiling. Subsequently, this led EMU into its own 
economic crisis – the sovereign debt crisis.    
 
Overall, EMU, which was established with imbalanced levels of business cycle 
synchronisation, weak policy instruments for enforcing the SGP and disciplining 
the fiscal behaviours of its member states, and the existence of MTM 
heterogeneity, indicates the euro area still cannot be treated as a sustainable 
economic system. The EMU’s economy does not fully behave as the new 
consensus macroeconomics (NCM) model assumed. Although the creation of 
EMU established a creditable independent central bank, which can effectively 
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deliver an inflation-averse monetary policy as has been emphasised by the NCM 
model, however, the existence of less synchronised business cycles among 
members and the existence of heterogeneity of the MTM indicate that ECB 
monetary policy can be effective at the union level, but is still likely to be 
inappropriate to some of its members.  
 
Therefore, although the NCM model, as the theoretical foundation of EMU’s 
implementation of economic policy, assumes that fiscal policy has no real impact 
on economic activities but only leads to high inflation, since the ECB’s monetary 
policy may not always address the national-level needs of its participating 
members, inevitably, national-level fiscal policy would be used to compensate 
the loss of monetary sovereignty and lack of union-level fiscal policy. However, 
the rapid use of fiscal policy can lead to accumulation of national debt, which 
eventually contributed to the current Eurozone debt crisis. The financial market, 
which is assumed by NCM to be efficient and rationally behaved, has failed to 
enforce fiscal discipline. Economic agents were overly optimistic about the 
stability of the economy and national debts, and thus failed to penalise high-debt 
countries. This market behaviour, which was a response to the accumulation of 
Eurozone debt, has shown strong evidence to prove the failure of the efficiency 
market hypothesis that is a key element of the NCM model.    
  
The EMU is currently facing its most difficult time since its creation in 1999, and 
doubts about its unity and sustainability have been raised among academics and 
policymakers. However, generally, the Eurozone can improve its sustainability if 
business cycle convergence can be improved through enhancement of intra-
trade, thus allowing monetary policy to become more appropriate to the union’s 
members. Moreover, in addition to the return of a market enforcing mechanism 
for fiscal behaviour, EMU also requires better coordination and corporation in 
terms of enforcing and monitoring the fiscal activities of its member countries. 
Fiscal federalism can be a solution to enhancing fiscal discipline by making fiscal 
transfers between member countries to reduce the possibility of overuse of 
national-level fiscal measures. Moreover, it can be used to compensate the loss 
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of national-level monetary sovereignty when the ECB’s monetary policy is less 
appropriate to some members of EMU. Then EMU can really operate as a single 
entity, just like any other sovereign country. However, this would require a huge 
step forward in European political integration and coordination compared to 
what is achieved at present.  
 
Moreover, the lesson we see for the existing Eurozone is that the decisions on 
the granting of euro membership in the future needs to be done more carefully. 
The eastern enlargement of the EU has brought potential new members from 
Central and Eastern Europe to EMU, for which membership is an obligation that 
is binding with their EU membership agreement. Since the initial creation of EMU 
has not fully addressed potential issues such as selecting countries with similar 
business cycles and good adherence to the MCC, these poor practices of EMU 
have created a single currency area where union-wide monetary policy is still 
hardly appropriate to every member of the currency union. This problem can 
happen again, and will get worse if the approval of new membership is again 
driven by political will rather than based upon adequate economic justification.  
 
Finally, based upon this thesis, we can take the study further from following 
aspects. First, it failed to capture the spill-over effects for most of the selected 
countries in Chapter 3. This problem can be due to the nature of the spill-over 
effects, which can probably be more appropriately explained by using high-
frequency variables or other indicators rather than industrial production index, 
which focuses on a relatively narrow range of economic activities. Moreover, the 
key argument which being put forward by the endogeneity hypothesis of OCA 
theory is the enhancement of trading relationship can enforce the 
synchronisation of business cycle among EMU countries. The result suggests that 
the theory does reflect what being happened inside EMU, at least, for the core 
and some periphery members. Trade has an important role for business cycle 
convergence,  but EU itself has also encouraged more trading to be conducted 
among its members disregarding whether those countries are members of 
eurozone or not (e.g. UK, Sweden, Central and Eastern European Countries). 
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Therefore, in future research, it will be interesting to see if the other EU 
members who are outside EMU have also experienced similar trend as EMU 
members. Hence, further investigate whether the tight trading relations can 
drive cyclical convergence and also find out if those new EU members are ready 
for single ECB monetary policy from business cycle perspective.   
   
Secondly, given that Chapter 4 used a model which is independent from any 
specific channel of the MTM, our results cannot be used to provide detailed 
analysis on the MTM to see each particular step that explains how monetary 
policy transformed from interest rate variations to fluctuations of real economic 
activities. Moreover, the model we used can contain more variables to provide 
wider understanding of the effects of the ECB’s monetary policy on the real side 
of the economy. For example, in further research, we could consider labour 
market conditions such as unemployment rate and the natural rate of 
unemployment, thus seeing how the labour market reacts to a monetary shock 
inside EMU. In terms of application of PVAR method, the research in this chapter 
was being implemented through impulse response analysis that can be sensitive 
to the choice of lag length in the model. Even though, the information criteria e.g. 
AIC, BIC, HQIC were used for making decision of lag length. However, in order to 
improve the accuracy and appropriateness of chosen lag length, in future 
research, in addition to information criteria, the neighbouring length value 
should also be used , hence to select the appropriate lags for PVAR analysis.     
 
Finally, for analysis of the Euro Fiscal Dividend, we confirmed its existence by 
showing how the market failed to adjust the interest rate upwards when national 
debts were rising. The same approach could be employed to test if the bond 
yield spreads have similar pattern of reaction as bond rates in our future 
research. Hence, it would enable us to have further understanding of the level of 
discrimination when EMU members were ‘protected’ by the Euro Fiscal Dividend. 
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Appendices 
 
Menu cost theory  
 
According to the menu costs theory, the market is assumed to be imperfectly 
competitive; therefore, rather than being price takers, as had been described by 
the new classical model, firms are price makers. This means that firms are able to 
operate with a price that diverges from the optimal level without it having 
significant impacts on their profits. The barrier to firms’ willingness to adjusting 
price back to its optimal level is known as menu costs. It can be the cost of 
renegotiation of price and contract with customers and suppliers, cost of printing 
new catalogues and price lists etc. These costs may only be a small fraction to an 
individual firm; however, it can have much larger impacts on overall economic 
activities if a large number of firms are experiencing menu cost (Akerlof and 
Yellen 1985, Mankiw 1985, Parkin 1986).    
 
Let us assume a firm is in an imperfectly competitive market; therefore, it 
should look like Figure A1. Initially, the firm is supplying at its initial equilibrium 
level Q0 with optimal price level P0 where marginal cost MC equals marginal 
revenue MR0. The firm’s demand is assumed to be dependent on general 
economic conditions (e.g. aggregate demand) and relative price. If there is a 
demand-side shock that causes a shrinkage in the level of aggregate demand; 
given that a firm’s demand depends on the overall economic conditions, the 
demand curve will shift to D1 from D0. Under these circumstances, since we are 
under imperfect competition, the firm can choose to change or not change its 
price. If a firm decides to maintain its price at its initial level P0, the volume of 
current profit after the demand shock will be the area of P0EFG, which is much 
smaller than its initial profit-maximising level P0AGB. However, when the 
demand curve is D0 and the marginal revenue curve is MR1, maintaining its price 
at P0 does not provide the optimal outcome given that the profit maximisation 
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condition is MR1=MC. Therefore, if firms foresee this and behave rationally, in 
order to maximise their profit according to the new economic conditions they 
should lower their price to P1.  
Figure A1  New Keynesian nominal rigidities 
 
Source: figure drawn by the author 
 
However, since firms are price makers in this imperfectly competitive market, 
a firm’s intention of reducing the price to the optimal level P0 will depend on the 
size of new profit-maximising level P1CDG relative to the level of profit when 
price is at P0 (P0EFG). If P1CDG is smaller than P0EFG, then a firm will choose to 
maintain its price at P0, though this implies a non-optimal level of price and profit. 
Therefore, the total revenue a firm is making now is lower than the maximum 
level it can achieve when price is at P1, but the profit is higher. Such decisions by 
firms would mean a reduction in the level of total surplus (EHC+HCDF). This is 
clearly a non Pareto-optimal condition as society is worse off, but firms are 
gaining higher level of profits. From the macroeconomic point of view, as firms 
are trying to avoid the loss of profit due to ‘menu cost’, they will hire less labour 
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and supply at a lower level. Although this is just a small fraction to firms, 
collectively, this will cause much greater impact on real economic activities at the 
aggregate level (e.g. employment and output). 
 
 
The Efficiency wage model  
  The Efficiency Wage Model is an approach that uses real wage rigidity to answer 
the question of observed unemployment and economic fluctuations35. The 
model suggests that it is not in firms’ interest to reduce the level of real wages, 
even if there is an economic downturn and the presence of high unemployment 
should impose a downward pressure on wages. However, lowering the real wage 
implies the loss of efficiency/productivity as the labour’s motivation for working 
depends on the level of real wages36 (Yellen 1984, Akerlof and Yellen 1986, Haley 
1990).  
 
    This model can be seen in Yellen (1984) and is based on the basic structure 
provided by Solow (1979). So, the model can be expressed as Equation (A1): 
 0)('],)([  weLweAFQ f  (A1) 
 
where Qf is the output of a firm, A measures the level of productivity shift, e is 
the effort of a worker that is dependent on the level of real wage w, and L is the 
size of labour force. Since the efforts of workers are positively related to the real 
wages they receive from firms, the output of a firm depends on the efforts 
                                                          
35
 There are also another two alternative approaches to addressing the issue of wage rigidities, 
which are the insider–outsider model and the implicit model. Due to the length of the chapter, 
they are not included here. For details of these two theories see Bailey (1974), Azaridais and 
Stiglitz (1983), Ball (1990) and Sanfey (1995).   
 
36
 There are four key microfoundations of the efficiency wage model: 1) the shirking model, 2) 
the fairness model, 3) the labour turnover model, and 4) the adverse selection model. For details, 
please see Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Salop (1979) and Weiss (1980), 
respectively.   
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workers put into their job, which is then multiplied by the productivity shift 
factor A. Moreover, the profit a firm can achieve will depend on the output and 
the level of labour costs; hence, the profit of a firm that tries to maximise it can 
be illustrated by Equation (A2): 
 wLLweAFPT  ])([  (A2) 
 
Since profit PT depends on the difference between the value of output and 
labour costs, by maximising the efforts of worker e(w) through offering higher 
wages, the firm is able to gain higher profits by maximising the productivity of 
their workers.  
 
This can be more easily demonstrated by using Figure A2. Curve E represents 
how the effort of a worker may change if real wage changes. Before point M0, 
the effort of a worker is more elastic to changes in real wage. Once point M0 is 
reached, where effort function E tangent to line A (measures the unitary 
relationship between effort and real wage), the effort ratio e/w will reach its 
peak value. Meanwhile, the wage cost per efficiency unit curve (w/e) is at its 
minimum level x on Figure A2(b). Hence, by offering wages at we firms are able 
to extract the highest possible efforts from their labour force, and therefore the 
maximum level of productivity, hence gaining the maximum level of profit. 
Moreover, another condition for profit maximisation is that a firm has to hire 
labour until its marginal product equals the level of the efficiency wage. For 
instance, in Figure A2(c), the efficiency wage we is higher than the equilibrium 
wage w, which indicates the occurrence of involuntary unemployment. This 
excess supply of labour should bring up the downward pressure on the wage in 
the labour market; however, given firms can maximise their profit by offering a 
higher wage to motivate their workers, there is no intention for firms to change 
the situation. Therefore, if the efficiency wage is higher than the level of market-
clearing wage, then the unemployment is not entirely voluntary; though we still 
see this as an equilibrium condition since no one is willing to change their 
behaviour (Stiglitz 1987).   
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 Figure A2  Efficiency wage model 
 
Source: figure drawn by the author 
 
  Since the efficiency wage rate is neutral to the level of employment and the 
available technology to a firm, changes in economic performance (e.g. a decline 
in aggregate demand due to an exogenous shock) can only affect the level of 
employment, not the efficiency wage. The efficiency is rigidity to such changes. 
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Assuming there is a demand shock, which subsequently causes the downward 
shift of the labour demand curve from DL
1 to DL2, the efficiency wage is at we 
and remains unchanged due to its rigidity nature. Involuntary unemployment will 
increase from Ls-L1 to Ls-L2. The flexibility of wage is dismissed in this case, thus 
the instant and continuous market-clearing. Necessary government intervention 
has to be implemented in order to reduce involuntary unemployment. However, 
as the new Keynesian model does not claim absolute fixed price/wage, there are 
some slow adjustments to wage and price which can lead to a slow self-
correcting of an economy. Suppose long-lasting high unemployment has made 
impacts on workers as they become more afraid to be laid off by employers. The 
effort of a worker can increase for any given level of real wage, which leads to 
the upward shift of the effort curve from E0 to E1. Consequently, the efficiency 
wage will decrease and involuntary unemployment will fall.  
 
 
